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DRAFT FINAL REPORT

Evaluation of promotion of development and confidence building in CHT

Experts:

	Arend Van Riessen, Team leader
	Marie-Thérèse Mayoux
	Abdus Sabur
	John Tacon (UNDP)
	Simon Strachan (UNDP)

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Annexes

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFSP	Agriculture and Food Security Project (EC-CHTDF)
ASPS-II	Agriculture Sector Project Support-II
BECHT	Basic Education for the CHT
CB	Confidence building component
CE	Community empowerment
CEP	Community empowerment project
CF	Community Facilitator
CHSW	Community Health and Sanitation Worker
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CHTDB	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board
CHTDF	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility
CHTI	CHT Institution (MoCHTA, RC, HDC, CHTDB)
CHTWON	CHT Women's Organisation Network
CL	Cluster Leader
CS	Civil Surgeon
DAE	Department of Agricultural Extension
DPEO	District Primary Education Office
EC	European Commission
ECD	European Commission Delegation
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
ED	Economic Development
EDM	Environment and Disaster Management
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EU	European Union
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
HDC	Hill District Council
HH	Household
ICB	Institutional Capacity Building component
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
ICDP	Integrated Community Development Programme
IGA	Income Generating Activity
INBAR	Institute for Bamboo and Rattan
LGED	Local Government Engineering Department

MAPs	Medicinal and Aromatic Plants
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MLE	Multi-Lingual Education
MoCHTA	Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs
MoHFW	Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
MoLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MoPE	Ministry of Primary Education
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
PDC	Para Development Committee
PEDP	Primary Education Development Programme
Phase II	First phase of EC funding : January 2005 - June 2006
Phase III	Second phase of EC funding : July 2006 – September 2009
Phase IV	Third phase of EC Funding: November 2009- November 2013
PNDG	Para Nari Development Group (women's group)
PNGO	Partner Non-Governmental Organisation
QIF	Quick Impact Fund
QIA	Quick Impact Activity
RC	Regional Council
RR/IDP/ExC	Returned refugees /Internally displaced persons/ Ex-Combatants
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time bound
SMC	School Management Committee
ToR	Terms of reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UnFC	Union level Facilitation Committee
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UP	Union Parishad
Uz	Upazila
UzAC	Upazila Advisory Committee
UzST	Upazila Support Team
UzST	Upazila support team
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

The Project

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, or CHTDF, as it will be named throughout the report, is a multi-sector post-conflict confidence building and economic development programme implemented through UNDP with the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs through a wide range of collaborating institutions. Implementation started in 2004 and at present it implements four basic components, namely institutional capacity building, community empowerment, service delivery (health, education, economic development) and confidence building. The EC, which is the project's major donor, commissioned this evaluation of Phase III 2006-2009.

The Evaluation

The field work for this evaluation took place from 3 October to 6 November 2009 through a team of two consultants fielded by EC and two consultants provided by UNDP with continuous support from CHTDF. The mission visited and met with numerous community groups, field activities, schools, clinics, coordination bodies and implementing partners at all levels, donors, and relevant organisations and projects. Although the project takes place in a post-conflict environment, most activities are designed and implemented as regular development activities and could be evaluated as such. The mission realised during work that CHTDF is actually a complex set of sizeable projects that would each deserve their own evaluation.

The mission was continuously assisted by the project with logistics, personnel and whatever data were available, but depth and detail of the evaluation was affected by sometimes incomplete and SMART component logframes, the confusion resulting from multiple logframes and reporting formats, and the virtual absences of target-referenced progress data, of logframe indicator-relevant baseline data, and of result and impact monitoring. This situation prevailed throughout all components, albeit in different ways. Some components, like health and community empowerment collect data, but these are not processed and not related to the logframe indicators. Education was the only component to provide the mission as yet with data related to each logframe indicator. As a result the mission had to spend disproportionate amounts of time on data gathering and verification, while for some project aspects it was only able to scratch at the surface.

While this absence of proper data management and monitoring systems and practices affects reporting to and evaluation by the donor, it is more important that it cannot but affect decision making and project management, too. The mission has to conclude that the project is often unable to know and evidence what it is achieving and at what cost and at what risk. This concerns achievement, overachievement, underachievement and side effects.

Risks and Assumptions

Most of the assumptions underlying the Phase III logframe, which reflected a status quo, proved to be valid. This includes the most important assumption, namely "No drastic deterioration in the political/security situation", although there has been a temporary deterioration during the caretaker government. The mission realises that this status quo is an unfavourable situation with inter-community tensions, inability for community to invest in future due to land or displacement problems, extortion, and restrictions by security forces and strikes, all of which constitute a sometimes difficult working environment.

2. THE COMPONENTS

Community Empowerment (CE)

The project's main achievement is still its involvement with and capacity building of 2179 Para Development Committees (PDCs), and 607 PNDGs (women subcommittees), through its Quick Impact Fund (QIF) programme, which supports PDCs to plan and implement development activities, and increase their access to banks, extension and input supply structures. The mission found that the pressure from implementing QIF-projects through a highly regulated set of procedures has had an empowering effect, but also that it had gone at the cost of attention for e.g. monitoring, the technical aspects, and tailoring empowerment approaches to the different needs and potentials of the various PDCs,. Economic impacts of the QIF were found to be very limited so far. Although the oldest PDCs are already five year old and many are reported to be able to run their own administration, the project has not developed exit strategies or categorised PDCs as per strengths, weakness, needs and opportunities. Issues include the risk of misuse and extortion of PDC funds if PDCs would be allowed to manage their own bank accounts, the lack of growth in institutional strength after the first two QIF years, the exit strategy for illiterate and weak PDCs, the extent of dependency of PDCs on CHTDF, the cooperation with other development actors in the same PDCs, increasing economic impact from QIF, and the lack of knowledge and expertise on the technical, social and environmental feasibility of QIF interventions for different social and physical environments.

Economic Development(ED)

The project supported from 2008 onwards various income generating activities (mushroom, beekeeping, weaving, ginger, Medicinal and Aromatic Plants, and Bio-briquettes) with selected members of 120 PDCs and 18 weavers groups. Results are so far very limited or absent. Much more could have been achieved if the economic development component had focused firstly on supporting the more than 5000 QIF projects (reaching 2179 PDCs and 200,000+ people) instead of supporting unproven marginal products with limited markets. Secondly, the project hired an organisation that lacks the required value chain development expertise, and failed to ensure comprehensive feasibility studies for each selected product. The mission does not see it as a problem that the project could not start youth employment and tourism activities. In the present development and security situation, tourism is still controversial and unfeasible, while lessons from other countries show that youth employment would require disproportionate amounts of budget and very different expertise to achieve results that compare in impact with what the other subcomponents might achieve.

Education

Since 2008, the project supports 150 schools, 72 of which with multi-lingual pre-primary education, with enrolment of about 8500 students. The project is still in the initial stages, and seems to meet needs and demands, but very little is available in terms of either baseline or achievements on its indicators to evidence the need and the benefits. The project has taken some steps to address sustainability issues, but as long as the government and PEDP-II do not have a CHT-specific or general tribal education plan, and as long as the government can only register and support a limited percentage of new community schools, more effort is required to make community schools sustainable.

Health

The project has directly, through seven medical teams, run satellite clinics in 35 locations of six Upazilas, in some cases for three years, linked to a network of 419 CHSWs based at village level. The clinics and CHSWs have dealt so far with more than 600,000 cases. The project is expanding to nine more upazilas through collaboration with HDCs and NGOs. Although villagers obviously benefit from these services, the project does not have or collect evidence of its health impact as per logframe indicators. The project only records cases, in which the only notably trend so far is a drop in malaria cases. It is not known how much of this trend is attributable to the free distribution of treated mosquito nets by BRAC/Global Fund in the same areas. The component has originally been designed

as a directly UNDP-implemented emergency or peace dividend project for the first upazilas, but an expansion presently under way will be more appropriately implemented by NGOs and CHSWs under the HDCs. Involvement of the Health Department, the CHTDF Community Empowerment component and the UNICEF-supported ICDP, all of which implement health or health education activities and would provide suitable platforms for community outreach, is still weak. The project has to make more effort to assess how the health sector can develop under different scenarios and how to improve sustainability for each of these scenarios.

Institutional Capacity Building (ICB)

Through its CE and more recently ICB and service delivery components, the project has strengthened institutions and institutional networks at para (2700), Union (75), Upazila (20), district (3), regional and national level through continuous and increasing involvement in implementation and through capacity building measures. The component and the evaluation are hampered by the general character of its activities, but recently the strengthening of institutions has got renewed focus and impetus through involvement in component activities like health and education. ICB component activities would benefit from result monitoring and further integration with the other components.

Confidence Building (CB)

The project has a stabilising effect through its widespread presence, its continuous engagement with nearly all stakeholders and its support to crisis management by the national government and the international community. The specific confidence building activities are opportunity driven and lack proper and monitoring and delineation with other components. Evaluation is hampered by the lack of clear targets and SMART indicators. The project has no contingency plans and budgets in place for if new Peace Accord-related opportunities arise.

3. THE PROJECT AS A WHOLE

Relevance of the Design

The UNDP umbrella of the project provides consistency and protection for the whole project and its partners. This is much appreciated by all stakeholders. CHTDF and UNDP presence is under the present circumstances still all-important for peace, stability and development.

CHTDF has been formulated as a development facility, but is in fact a large complex set of projects to which CHTDF adds components as opportunities and funding occur. All key components are directly implemented by CHTDF, partly through local NGO-contractors. As a result UNDP-CHTDF has at the one hand to provide expertise in sectors relatively foreign to it, while it misses the opportunity to engage organisations with more expertise for specific sectors and limit itself to coordination, monitoring and to sectors where it has expertise. At the other hand, if CHTDF the Facility mobilises funds for new components or project enlargements, it automatically reduces the time and resources that CHTDF the Project can spend on already committed activities. The donors, who before agreed with CHTDF about a programme and its staffing and management set up, have no control over whether e.g. management and administration will divert more time to the new project at the cost of the earlier agreed commitments. Problems the mission has noted with regard to slow administration, slow decision making in economic development and the lack of monitoring rigour, cannot have been helped by the fact that concerned components depend on support and decisions from a strained central management and administration.

The mission did not find alternative implementation options to the present UNDP-framework that could guarantee the same level of coordinated confidence building. The alternatives are:

1. The present implementation arrangement, partly delegating work to GoB, consultants and NGOs through contracts and letters of agreement. The project will continue to have the same strengths (coordination, confidence building, and continuation), and problems with technical and empowerment expertise, monitoring, project-facility role conflicts, procurement, cost efficiency and sustainability.

2. One EC project with mostly the same forma and components, implemented by MoCHTA supported by Technical Assistance (combination of UNDP, consultants, INGOs). This alternative could provide more sector expertise and maybe at less cost. Changing to this alternative however would not be possible without some disruption and risk of losing built-up trust and confidence, and complications for accommodating non-EC funding. It would also be difficult to arrange GoB agreement with a phase from CHTDF for which UNDP has just agreed an extension with GoB.

3. Splitting off of certain components to directly EC-funded projects, implemented by consultants and international organisations/INGOs. Components that might qualify are economic development, health and education. The project's core and guarding the framework would stay with UNDP. This alternative could provide more sector expertise, maybe at less cost and strengthen UNDP's role as facility/facilitator and governance and peace building expert. Separate projects that have the same focus and direction as the core CHTDF and are closely coordinating with it will probably strengthen the position of CHTDF as well as the peace process. Having eggs in different CHT baskets moreover will spread risks. It would further avoid the procurement and cooperation problems that UNDP has had with ICIMOD, multilateral organisations and partner NGOs. Changing over to this alternative would not be possible without a tedious and maybe confusing change over process, and a risk to project unity. Ideally the Prodoc with GoB would become a tri-partite Prodoc.

Under the circumstances the present set-up has to be continued at least for the next few years, as discontinuation of a project machinery that is set to continue in the same way for many more years, will have only adverse consequences. The mission however thinks the project will gain in strength and cost efficiency, if gradually the service delivery clusters will be delegated to other organisations with more sector expertise, that are allowed to manage their own implementation and administration within a UNDP guiding framework that keeps all components directed towards confidence building and economic development. This would leave institution building and confidence building with UNDP, while Community Empowerment might be done through a UNDP-led conglomerate of INGOs and NGOs. This change over process can be completed within Phase IV.

Efficiency

CHTDF is the biggest and most visible development-related institution and operation in the Hill Tracts with € 3-4 million budget per year, 43 vehicles and various speed boats, and more than 1000 staff employed directly or indirectly. Most institutions in the CHT are in one way related and dependent on CHTDF. The project should take steps to become less vulnerable to possible image and relational problems by streamlining its operations, increased partnerships, and continuous vigorous self- review.

The mission noted that a number of partners and project staff from more than one district complain about the slowness of operations, which they assert compares unfavourably with other organisations. The mission was due to lack of time and data unable to obtain and check relevant evidence and information, but advises the project to do a review to see whether improvements are possible.

Due to lack of detailed data and time the mission could not compare implementation and operation cost with those of comparable projects and organisations. It is advisable that UNDP critically reviews efficiency aspects (and maybe carbon footprint), maybe during the next audit.

Effectiveness

Due to lack of result monitoring in most sectors detailed effectiveness assessments were not possible, while for some components that started one year ago (education, parts of economic development) it was still too early. Where raw data was available, notably in community empowerment and economic development, processing by the mission shows that some positive results, some very limited and some mixed results are achieved, and that the project is not yet achieving what it intended to. The mission also observed probable positive results that were not monitored by the project. Anecdotal evidence of positive results (not listed in the logframe) in conflict prevention and institutional development were

mentioned by various external parties. The positive attitude and trust from local people towards CHTDF for their community empowerment and health activities also can be taken as circumstantial evidence of positive results.

Impact

The project has had a positive impact on the confidence built over the years in the CHT among people and institutions. This confidence is not yet enough for many communities to deal confidently with outsiders perceived as adversaries, or for institutions and communities to settle conflicts and other problems, but there is a gradual increase in awareness, knowledge, skills and capabilities required for settling all the outstanding issues. It is however a fragile confidence that can be easily affected by political shifts, by eruption of local conflicts generated by parties that consider themselves potential losers, by failure of empowerment and economic development activities or by the withdrawal of intensive but yet unsustainable programmes like the health satellite clinics.

The overall evaluation highlights that the project is important for stability and confidence building. The project has to pay more attention to the technical and programmatic details of each individual component as all these tools should be seen as important as their goal of overall peace building. If PDCs fall in to discord over fund misuse once their executive committees can decide about what happens with the bank balance, if cows die in an epidemic or do not fetch a good price due to market oversaturation, if health services collapse once aid stops, if enrolment rates do not increase, this all will seriously affect confidence and peace.

Sustainability

The fragility of impacts discussed above is for a big part due to sustainability problems. If CHTDF would have to withdraw right now, much of what is built up will vanish, although one can imagine that many communities will not lose part of their new found confidence in dealing with projects and outsiders, and that involved institutions like Unions and Upazila agencies might continue in some way and at least for some time to benefit from and work with the network of communities and actors with which they worked for the last few years. Whether HDCs, MoCHTA and RC will sustain the new achievements will be more doubtful, because they depend more on commitment from the government and are also more vulnerable to changes in staff. The health services and many of the schools would very probably vanish. Continuation in the same way for another four years will only slightly increase the chance of sustainability.

The project would have been in a better position to estimate what might be achieved, how it could withdraw from its ongoing commitments and how long its commitment would have to last, if it had formulated exit strategies for different components and target groups under different scenarios. This would have helped the project to develop more sustainable mechanisms.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides the general component recommendations plus a repetition of all the recommendations given under each component chapter, for easy reference. It closes with project-level recommendations.

Community Empowerment

1. First ensure a) to carry out CHT-wide confidence and capacity analysis and categorisation of all PDCs, Union, Upazila and vulnerable PDC subgroups, b) to establish a result monitoring system, c) to conduct comprehensive feasibility studies for each QIF-intervention and PDC category, d) to provide adequate technical assistance, and e) to formulate detailed support and exit strategies for each category of PDC, Union and Upazila.

2. Review and reinvigorate community empowerment strategies, especially the policies and activities related to bank account management, benefit distribution, PNDGs, women's access to project resources and decision making, and local government involvement

3. Provide adequate resources and budget to fund required senior technical, community empowerment and monitoring expertise.

4. Form a community empowerment alliance with other NGOs and projects like BRAC, CHTRDP (ADB) and CHTDB and thoroughly assess the current assistance and needs of paras not yet covered by CHTDF

5. Free up implementation capacity for the required overhaul and revision by temporary suspending expansion to new paras and by handing over capable PDCs and part of the not yet covered paras to alliance partners

6. Transition from management of contractors to development of mature partnerships with local NGOs.

7. Thoroughly review the feasibility and risks of supra-PDC organisations, consider limiting such structures to cooperation on economic development, health and education, and consider limiting to those PDCs that show the willingness and capability to do so.

Recommendations Economic Development

8. Focus completely on PDC and weaver group product value chain development (extension, inputs, services, processing, marketing). Activities should include establishment and training of service providers (barefoot technicians, input sellers, indigenous traders), marketing studies, collection points, collection point management committees (made up of producers, not U.P. officials, NGO staff or traders), linkage development (exchange visits to and meetings with traders, bazaars, whole sellers, input suppliers)

9. Conduct as yet comprehensive feasibility studies through expert organisations for all promoted economic interventions and different communities and environments, including gender, environmental and benefit distribution impact assessments

10. Review each IGA started under ED during summer 2010. Consider a more bottom-up approach for weaving, limited support continuation for mushrooms (incl. spawn production by Ashika), and just monitoring for MAPs and bio-briquettes. Integrate ginger in AFSP.

11. Postpone promoting community-based tourism, business development and youth employment that is not tied to PDC product economic development till a next Phase, i.e. till after CE product value chain development has become sustainably successful and the security situation has improved.

Education Recommendations

12. The project should first establish its baseline for each school, strengthen its data collection, establish its present results and review its strategies and plans before further expansion; it should establish for each present and future school catchment the population, the school age children's population, presently available schools, present ethnicity- and gender disaggregated enrolment rates. These data should guide the targeting and intervention design and be the basis for support, registration and exit strategies and a simple though comprehensive monitoring system on trends in enrolment, drop-out and other GoB-defined competencies which allow comparing achievements with other schools and students.

13. PEDP-II/Tribal Education Plan. The project should continue to closely coordinate with MoPE and PEDP-II and provide these with information, data and pilot results required for developing a nationally accepted education plan relevant to CHT and tribal people in Bangladesh.

14. Review in coordination with the CE component the need for adult literacy pilot programming, to be based on a survey, and if found to be a priority, to be implemented by an expert partner.

15. The project should initiate sooner than later a debate with the HDCs, Ministry of Primary Education and sector partners about support to education beyond Grade 5 in CHT.

Health Recommendations

16. Before expansion, the project should develop a path to long-term sustainable CHT-relevant health service delivery that includes the phased transfer of salary payments and running costs to either the HDC or the MoHFW budget, and the phasing out of direct implementation by UNDP.

17. For that purpose it should bring policies on salaries, running costs and drug supplies in line with national health policies and the tribal health and nutrition plan principles, and strengthen its links with the health coordination community, especially the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

18. The project should establish its baseline and establish a sound progress and result monitoring system.

Confidence Building Recommendations

19. The project should more clearly outline the strategy, results, indicators and activities for each subcomponent, indicate how confidence building will be mainstreamed and implemented through other components, and establish its baseline and monitoring system.

20. The project should develop implementation strategies with tentative workplans and budgets for each Peace Accord subsector (land, IDPs, elections, police, forestry), and to keep these for transparency reasons separate from the minority culture, dialogue and exchange plans and budgets.

21. The mission proposes to explore the possibility of making detailed satellite imagery-based Union and Upazila maps that establish infrastructure locations and union and mouza borders to help stem some of the problems resulting from the present fluid and insecure land situation.

Institutional Capacity Building Recommendations

22. Clarify overall ICB strategy and establish per institution a baseline, targets, result indicators, and support and exit strategies.

23. Integrate the strengthening by other components of other institutions (CBOs, NGOs, Line Departments and private-sector partners) and institutional networks in the strategy, targets and monitoring. Clearly indicate what will be done through other components.

24. Further increase links with UNOs, DCs and CHTDB in coordination mechanisms to strengthen cooperation, resolve institutional mandates and facilitate exit strategies.

25. Strengthen the component's capacity to monitor the results and to track what institutions achieve with and without project assistance. Use budget flows managed as indicator.

26. Assist Circle System to modernise its tribal land management and arbitration systems

Recommendations, Project as a Whole

27. Link all components stricter to community empowerment and to needs assessments and feasibility studies done at para level.

28. Give ICB and CB more direction and focus, by working from within the various sector components

29. To avoid effect and sustainability risks and to increase efficiency and effectiveness, don't expand to new areas or new projects/donors in the existing sectors before establishing logframe-based baselines, result monitoring systems, achievements so far, technical feasibility, social, environmental and equity impact, end-of-project visions and exit strategies, and ensuring expertise, sustainability and financial efficiency for each activity.

30. Form an alliance with other development actors to synchronise activities and coverage.

31. Increase the EC role to supervise UNDP more strictly until it has implemented a mutually agreed set of steps and improvements and to provide capacity development for UNDP, notably in monitoring and evaluation

32. Adjust the Phase IV budget to real needs and capabilities and to the proposed temporary slow-down of activities during the review and redirection stage and allocate the rest of the committed €24 million for beyond 2014.

33. Decide whether CHTDF is a project or a facility (funding/policy)

    a) If facility: limit UNDP role to policy, coordination and resource mobilisation, while delegating components to expert INGOs, private firms and GoB agencies who become fully responsible for their management

    b) If project: disengage from resource mobilisation, limit the project size to be managed by the management, delegate authority to component managers, and create separate structures for newly funded projects

34. Use Phase IV to transition to a facility in which UNDP continues to provide coordination and direction, while some components are implemented by partners under UNDP and others through partners directly hired by EC or other donors.

35. Systematically work through the mission's recommendations and document for project staff, partners and donors whether, why and how each recommendations will be implemented

1   INTRODUCTION

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, or CHTDF, as it will be named throughout the report, is a multi-sector confidence building and economic development programme implemented through UNDP with the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs through a wide range of collaborating institutions. CHTDF started in 2004. In December 2005 UNDP and GOB signed the Project Document. In 2009 the Project Document was extended.

The project aims, as its logframe states, "*Improved Socio-economic development of Chittagong Hill Tracts in line with the principles of self-reliance, decentralisation and sustained peace*"

Its purpose was "*Effective and conducive development mechanism in CHT reinvigorated and strengthened*"

The project is at present organised through four components: Policy and Confidence Building (confidence building, institutions, advocacy, gender, capacity development, etc.), Implementation (community empowerment, economic development and disaster management), Service Delivery (health and education) and Operations. Community Empowerment and scholarships started implementation in 2004, institutional capacity building and health started in 2006, confidence building and gender in 2007, education and economic development in 2008, and disaster management in 2009.

The European Commission (EC) has assisted, as major donor of the action, CHTDF's Phase II (2005-2006) and Phase III (2007 to 2009) with € 24 million. The EC fielded this evaluation and formulation mission to assess the programme's achievements and capabilities, and to assess whether and how it should support the program for another 4 years. The present evaluation took place from 3 October to 6 November 2009. See Terms of Reference in **Error! Reference source not found.**.

2   THE MISSION

2.1.1   *Mission Activities*

The mission consisted of three EC consultants, Marie-Therese Mayoux, Abdus Sabur and Arend van Riessen, Team Leader. The UN added its own two consultants, Simon Strachan and John Tacon, to the mission. The team decided at the start to make it one integrated EC-UN mission. Abdus Sabur, an international relations and peace building, contributed to the mission through a review of CHT history, the conflict and confidence building. Subjects were divided within the team as follows: Mayoux for community empowerment and back up for health and education, Tacon for institutions, Strachan for health and education, and van Riessen for economic development, confidence building and back up for all components. The mission was ably supported during the field phase by Ushing Mong and Provat Tripura, CHTDF Upazila Coordinators, for logistical, information and translation support. CHTDF provided near complete logistical support for the mission.

The mission visited and met:

- CHTDF Sector staff in 3 districts, Rangamati HQ, Dhaka HQ

- CHT Institutions: 3 HDCs, RC, CHTDB, 1 DC, 3 Circles (2 Chiefs), MoCHTA

- CE Inst.: 4 (5?) UzAC/UNOs, 4(5?) UP/UnFCs, 2 LD

- CE: 3 district CE CHTDF teams + all NGOs

- CE: 19 (21?) PDCs, 8 PNDGs, joint CFs of 6 Uz

- Econ: 4 Weaver groups, 7 IGA PDC, 3 NGO shops,1 NGO

- Health: 4 Satellite clinic, 2 CS, BRAC, MSF clinic, X CHSWs, UNICEF

- Education: 2 MLE, 2 other school, 2 DPEO, BRAC,3 NGO, UNICEF, PEDP-II

- Other: Individual resource persons, ADB, SC, Worldfish, WVI, CCDB, UNDP, CIDA, DANIDA, ASPS-II-DANIDA

See further Annex 3 Itinerary and Persons Met.

The Paras, schools, clinics and groups were initially all proposed by the project. After an initially high proportion of PDCs with project awards and A-rankings, the composition was somewhat adjusted. Also few PDCs visited during the 2006 evaluation were included. The selection provided a good cross-section of the various activity types, levels of access and ethnicities. The mission visited no or very few PDCs that had started within the last two years. Few types of PDC activities, and only the rare ones like biogas and rain water harvesting, were missed. And among ethnic groups only four out of thirteen (if Bengali and Santal are added to eleven CHT indigenous peoples) were missed, namely Khyang, Chak, Santal and Pankhua. See names of villages in Annex 3.

Village visits consisted of discussing the process, achievements and future with the PDCs, who normally turned up with fifteen to thirty members. Of these on average 20 to 40% were women. Wherever PNDGs had been formed (7 cases) these were interviewed separately. Most villages were rather homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. The longest visits lasted three hours, which was often still not enough to assess benefit distribution issues and technical issues within the community. Activities and achievements were inspected through more detailed site visits at about a half of all visited PDCs. Where possible the concerned Union Facilitation Committee and Upazila officials were met. Clinics, schools, weaver groups and IGA PDCs were visited as per the project's proposal. Meetings with institutions and resource persons were mostly arranged through CHTDF.

Although the project takes place in a post-conflict environment, standard PCM evaluation procedures could be followed adequately. Most of the activities are designed and implemented as regular development activities and could be evaluated as such.

Throughout the mission, the team has been in close consultation with both CHTDF and EC. Meetings with CHTDF and EC on preliminary findings were held on 25th (Rangamati), 28th (CHTDF/UNDP Dhaka) and 2nd November (EC). Final debriefing was done with both EC and UNDP/CHTDF on 5th November. See the mission schedule.

2.1.2   Evaluation Environment

Finally, a few aspects of the environment in which the mission took place should be mentioned:

Overall Environment

- Full, continuous and professional support for the mission by the CHTDF and EC

- CHTDF team inspiration at all levels that worked stimulating

- Few security complications that reduced mission mobility

Availability of documents, proposals and staff

- The Phase III project logframe (See Annex 2) was incomplete for some sectors and other components had not been elaborated (SMART-ened) after the 2006 evaluation mission-facilitated start.

- The project did not possess reports recording activity progress against Phase III targets, let alone results against Phase-III logframe indicators/targets. Even annual and quarterly progress reports did not show the targets against which certain progress was booked.

- The project reports at present not against the result indicators in the logframe/document agreed with EC but against either the very unspecific UN-GoB Prodoc targets(general annual report) or a logframe of unknown origin that was much less specific and SMART than the logframes shared with the mission by the EC and the project during the evaluation.

- The project conducted a large baseline study, but this is completely disconnected from logframe indicators and has very limited use for monitoring and evaluation. It is understood that sector staff has hardly been consulted in the design.

- Some relevant information and documents only came through towards the end of the mission. The project was totally unprepared for the evaluation and the mission had to spend inordinate amounts of time on digging up and checking data, sitting with project staff behind their computers. Also because CHTDF is actually a complex set of projects that each deserves a separate evaluation, the evaluation mission has not been able to go in to sufficient detail to really help the project on its way. This has also gone at the cost of formulating jointly a logframe for a next phase. The logframe prepared by the project during the mission, and which the mission had hoped to use as basis for a new logframe exercise, was not yet specific enough for inclusion. The logframe outline attached in Annex 4 is only the mission's own idea, and as a logframe can only be made together with the project, it should be seen only as an effort to help with creating clarity and formulating more useful indicators. As each component is in fact a full-fledged project that deserves its own logframe, the annex provides 10 to 20 indicators per component, which relate to both purpose and results.

- The different EC and UNDP planning and reporting systems and standards have still not been synchronised.

- Most subcomponents have no elaborated component document for Phase IV yet. The logframe on which the project worked in October is only in a very preliminary stage.

2.1.3   The Structure of the Report

The report evaluates the various components one by one, starting with what it sees as the basis of all development, the community empowerment component, working upwards till ultimately those components that have so far the least direct dealings with communities.

1. Community Empowerment (CE)
2. Economic Development (ED)
3. Education (E)
4. Health (H)
5. Institutions (I)
6. Confidence Building

   a. Exchange, Dialogue and Culture(CB)

   b. Peace Accord Implementation (Land, El(ections), P(olice), IDP)

In dealing with the components or clusters, the evaluation mission had difficulty with the components of institutional capacity building, confidence building, gender, and knowledge management, which actually concern general cross-cutting activities that should be done at all levels and throughout the project, but are at present often dealt with as one corner of the project, sometimes disconnected from the core components. The evaluation will therefore have to deal with them as separate clusters.

Disaster management and scholarships are not supported by EC funds and will not be evaluated as clusters, but as their implementation affects the other components they will be dealt with when discussing the project as a whole.

3   ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

Most of the assumptions underlying the logframe, which reflected a status quo, proved to be valid, and the mission concluded that the project could be evaluated against its logframe indicators. The most important assumption concerned the security and political situation:

- No drastic deterioration in the political/security situation:

During the caretaker government the situation temporarily deteriorated, but not drastically. Although the situation for some villages, notably in Khagrachari, is still not normal at all, the project itself has in general been able to continue as if under normal implementation conditions. The mission visited villages that are less able to focus on development as their lands are infringed upon by settlers, and discussed with project

and NGO staff about special measures to protect PDC and project finances from extortionists, and delays from strikes and blockades. Only during the caretaker government has the management been diverted few times to crisis management.

In hindsight two assumptions could have been added:

- No major disruption due to natural disasters. The rat flood has not been a major disruption for the project as a whole, but has resulted in disruption of village level work and diversion of resources and management attention to relief. This however has also created goodwill and opportunities for confidence building

- Stability in UNDP project management. Since 2006, especially during 2006-2007, all senior UNDP staff at central level has been removed or replaced, which has led to loss of momentum and inconsistencies

The mission is well aware of the fact that the project implements regular development efforts in a constrained post-conflict environment, in which limited access to land, conflicting claims on forest, displacement, lack of security, extortion and regular strikes all limit the project and project staff in their operations and level of success. The mission is of the opinion these constraints have been taken along adequately in the logframe and are dealt with admirably by staff and project.

4   SECTORS AND COMPONENTS

The project set up still adheres to the UNDP-GoB project document, which was recently extended. Although the original structure is not used anymore, the project is in effect still divided in the original components for Community Empowerment, Institutional Capacity Building(ICB), Region Wide Initiatives (RWI) and Confidence Building (CB). The mission does not see problems with this. See Annex 5 for an idea of the project's component and implementation structures.

Table 1   Status of Planning and Implementation by Component

#	Component	Status 2006	Progress 2006	Progress 2009
#1	ICB	Proposal Mar'06	start early'06	
#2	Region-wide Initiatives			
	Economic Opportunities	Proposal Oct'05	Start mid'06?	Started 2008
	Environment & disaster management	ToR	Start 2007?	Started 2008
	Health	Pilot ongoing	Start 2006?	Started 2007
	Education	ToR	Start 2006?	Started 2008
#3	Community Empowerment			
	Community Empowerment	25% progress	Ongoing	Ongoing
	Community outreach and support	ToR	Mid 2006?	?
#4	Confidence Building (CB)			
	Dialogue and partnerships	started modestly	2004	Ongoing
	Exchange visits	started modestly	2005	Ongoing
	Awards & incentives	ToR	2004	Ongoing
	Natural resource management	ToR Apr'05	unpredictable	Unpredictable
	Police	ToR	Mid 2006?	Unpredictable
	Elections	unpredictable	unpredictable	Unpredictable
	Land	unpredictable	unpredictable	Start 2010?
	RR/IDP/ExC	ToR	unpredictable	Start 2009?
	Minority rights and culture	Proposal Oct'05	Start 2006?	Started 2006

5   COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

5.1   Sources of Information

The 2006 midterm evaluation and reformulation exercise allowed for several large debates among CHTDF project staff in the districts and in Dhaka, which produced a common understanding of the project strategy, expected results, key indicators and risks. The outcomes of these discussions were later on synthesized in a Logframe that became the basis of the agreement between UNDP and the European Commission. Because of the bottom up method that was chosen to produce it, the CHTDF Logframe is particularly useful to evaluate actual results against expectations.

Logframe are means and not ends; thus they evolve during implementation phase so as to produce timely changes in targets, means, and tactics. The CHTDF Logframe has been "compacted", but most of its indicators at purpose and results levels where kept as per the 2006 discussions.

Sources of Information are

- Field visits and interviews with 19 PDCs, 8 PNDGs

- Meetings with 5 UzAC/UNOs, 4 UP/UnFCs

- Meetings with individual and joint CEP NGOs

- Discussions with CHTDF CEP staff in Dhaka, Rangamati, and each of the Hill districts

- CHTDF bi annual surveys 2007 and 2008, a remarkable amount of data collected and compiled but not processed at all before this evaluation. Survey 2009 was due.

- Some data for 2009 compiled upon evaluation team requests

- Community facilitators' questionnaires: for the evaluation team, community facilitators answered questions about their respective paras in relation to indicators from the 2006 Logframe. 34 CFs from Bandarban, 17 CFs from Rangamati Sadar, 12 CFs from Barkal, covering in total 552 PDCS and 134 PNDGs

5.2   Community Empowerment Design Relevance

This component is the pillar of CHTDF program. It is meant as a critical tool used to create, among the poor communities of the Hill tracts, confidence in their future after years of conflict, neglect and poverty, confidence in the local and national institutions, from extension workers to banks, and last but not least, confidence in their own capacity to decide and manage development.

Since inception of the program to date, the relevance of this component has always been extremely high. During the Phase I period, the volatility of the political climate and the setbacks in the implementation of the Peace accord made confidence building even more necessary than six years ago, when the original project was designed; the presence of activities and organisations throughout the districts, in remote areas, in GoB line agencies and in the Peace accord institutions played a critical role in maintaining stability.

Improvement of social and economic conditions, long overdue in the Hill Tracts, is, once translated into tangible changes, key to create confidence. Hence this objective is highly relevant.

The design is pyramidal, not participatory

The programme is structured so as to cover, with identical procedures and resources, a territory as vast as possible and a number of communities as high as possible. Considering the results in crude numbers, this structure proved efficient. To make this work for so many PDCs a more centralistic approach was required in which instructions flow from central levels to communities through guidelines, supervisors, coordinators, facilitators, in NGOs and CHTDF staff.

QIF centred

The expected outcome of the QIF is twofold: it is an investment to create economic growth at para level, to generate incomes and accumulate capital, as well as something upon which communities can get organised, build their cohesiveness, strategic capacities, technical skills and linkages with the external world. In practice, the component focus has been on facilitating and controlling cash flows to and from communities,

in line with centrally designed procedures; in general these flows seem under control, because expenditures by PDCs need to be approved by the project. PDCs financial management is not externally audited.

When reviewing the relevant logframe indicators with the project, it indicated that it now sees economic benefits and the creation of self reliant communities more as long term aims to be fulfilled only beyond the present Phase.

Involving many stakeholders

As a positive feature of the design, the committees at Union and Upazila levels give a real strength to the programme. New forms of local governance where people from all paths of life, teachers, farmers, extension staff, UNOs can debate on local development issues, local democracy up and downs, and take action to mobilise - and to some extent control - communities as well as project staff.

Lack of applied expertise and attention for technical, social and environmental feasibility

For a project that empowers 2700 paras, mostly through linkage and economic interventions, the seeming lack of senior specialists in rights-based approach, IGA and agriculture and the lack of thorough analysis of QIF opportunities is surprising. The project has no experts for rights-based approaches and the most common QIF-sectors (livestock, horticulture), while it has always assessed the government technical abilities and extension messages inadequate for the CHT. The few Line Department feasibility studies seen were limited in character and quality, while Line Departments are also not able to visit all sites. . The project initiates numerous cattle and horticulture projects without proper assessment and has not heeded the 2006 evaluation recommendation that CHTDF should first do proper technical, economic and environmental assessments for each intervention category for different scenarios, PDC types and household types.

It is an efficiency concern, as this lack of expertise input and attention for technical aspects has put empowerment processes and economic feasibility at risk. If lack of soil fertility management, lack of market study or lack of exit strategies, lead to crop failures, market failures or PDC failures for hundreds or thousands of PDCs, the project might in theory even undermine confidence and peace.

5.3   Community Empowerment Efficiency

Logframe target: 1650 communities.   Actual result: 2722 communities and 3872 committees

Figure 1   CEP Coverage Trends

Amounts here stated in Euros are conversions of amounts provided in US$ by CHTDF team, using an average 1.4 exchange rate.

In Sept. 2009, 2786 committees, including 603 PNDG are managing the QIF they received, partly or in total. Almost 1200 more PDCs and PNDGs are formed and are expecting QIFs the coming year.

This very high increase of committees formed (3872, i.e. 235% of the target) and the consequences for staff and quality are not emphasized by the project.

5.3.1   Expenditures

It is impossible for CHTDF team to accurately state which actual expenditures correspond to the CEP.

The CEP management has found out various forms of economies of scale: Until 2006, due to miscoding, most expenditures were booked under "Operations". This dilutes the overall clarity of expenditure data. Using Atlas, it would be extremely cumbersome to reallocate each of the "operations" expenditures to its accurate adequate component. The 2006 evaluation was informed that CEP expenditures for 2004 and 2005 were each about $1,000,000. From 2006 onwards, the expenditures record is supposed to be more specific; but they clearly decrease while activities level increase, which leaves evaluators with more questions than answers.

- a "light" type of empowerment for PNDGs

Although PNDGs are managing 2.3 million Euros, these groups do not access the same level of inputs from the project as PDCs. Community Facilitators did not receive any additional time allocation to support them and to monitor their progress. PNDGs were not included in the annual surveys etc. A critical tool for empowerment, a separate bank account has been skipped. Thus their specific use of CHTDF funds cannot be assessed, controlled or corrected if necessary. It is assumed that PDC executive members, more experienced, will do for PNDGs the coaching that CHTDF did for them.

- Communities projects replicated instead of diversified

In the entire Hill Tracts, the majority of communities opt for less than 20 different types of QIF project. Among all projects, cattle rearing and feeding account for a third (from 26% in Rangamati to 38% in Khagrachari). In PNDGs, formed in the past two year, diversification is even lower: women chose livestock for 62% of their projects. Also PDCs that saw their first QIA fail, opted for cattle rearing as their second QIA. It is logical that variety of QIAs decreases as PDCs learn which ones work and which don't. At the same time, this increases the urgency and importance of a thorough feasibility and risk analysis for the various QIAs.

5.3.2   Available Resources and Technical Expertise

The project has applied inadequate expertise and feasibility study to the QIF projects. This has been one factor behind the often low QIF results. PDCs were left to a trial and error system of learning, which is in itself very empowering, but runs the risk of disempowering. E.g. the Bandarban team provided us raw data that the mission analysed. It showed that 25% of interviewed PDC members in Bandarban consider their QIF project a failure, while 54% considered their QIA a success. Both figures will increase once the 21% that did (could) not answer will do so as yet (See Annex 7). It would be beneficial for the project if such data could be provided and analysed for all three districts. The mission cannot evaluate these figures, in absence of baseline data, data for the other districts and relevant result targets against which this can be evaluated. As for the Bandarban data, the mission can only assume that the failure level perceived by PDC members in Bandarban could have been much lower if the project had conducted proper CHT-level feasibility studies and provided proper technical guidance so that QIAs that posed a risk for all or some communities would have been avoided and other QIAs would have been guided better.

5.4   Community Empowerment Effectiveness

Logframe indicator at purpose level: "income generated in 1650 targeted communities"

For indigenous people who lived for centuries away from the mainstream monetary economy, and who experience till now very high levels of poverty, income generation is of utmost importance.

In practice, with CHTDF facilitation, all PDCs, as well as PNDGs, prioritised the potential for income generation as the key criterion of selection of projects. All of them decided to rear cattle, lease machines, and start commercial fruit gardens, over meeting their immediate needs for safe water and education, which tend to be less sustainable unless additional income is earned to cover maintenance costs.

Surprisingly, the project has no baseline and no target in relation to incomes or poverty in its target areas and partner communities. Moreover, the project did not measure to which extent at which pace and by which mechanisms income is really generated.

When discussing income issues with CHTDF management, the mission was informed that community- or household level incomes are not considered important anymore by CHTDF management as a relevant indicator of the CEP effectiveness; it is assumed that incomes do increase thanks to the QIF projects, irrespective of other critical factors such as agricultural risks, price fluctuations, impacts by third parties like NGOs' micro credit schemes. The logframe should have been timely and accordingly adjusted to show that quick impact actually concerns empowerment.

Annual surveys do collect some economic data, strictly related to PDC projects, but none to PNDGs projects; and these data were not processed before this evaluation.

All project stakeholders live by the assumption that the overall outcome is positive, that at least after a couple of years cash returned exceeds communities' initial investment. It does, but so far only for a minority of successful PDCs.

After 2 to 5 years involvement with CHTDF, on average PDCs do not seem to make money yet, let alone in significant amounts or with quick economic impact. Of the three districts Khagrachari PDCs seem to fare a little better than those of the other two districts.

Table 2   PDC Assets versus Investments, 2008 situation (in Euros)

(PDCs that received at least one QIF instalment)

No. of communities for which data are available	Cash returned from projects	Value of PDC assets	2008 : Total assets & cash returned	total QIF disbursed	communities' investments	Total sum of initial investments
Bandarban, 636 para	103,057	1,546,892	1,649,949	1,601,485	278,268	1,879,753
Rangamati, 704 para	400,813	1,580,042	1,980,855	1,842,194	419,625	2,261,819
Khagrachari, 662 para	353,946	1,897,083	2,251,029	1,671,707	301,103	1,972,810
Total, 2002 para	**857,816**	**5,024,017**	**5,881,833**	**5,115,386**	**998,996**	**6,114,382**

 "Cash returned from projects" comprises product sales put back in bank and cash under PDC control, plus cash returned to households. Amounts of cash which have been reinvested are not mentioned separately; they are now part of the assets. When PDCs are disaggregated by year of formation, data show that it takes in general a minimum of 2 to 3 years to generate an income from CHTDF investments.

According to the 2008 annual survey, the most recent data collection exercise, half of the PDCs that received funds between 2004 and 2008 had not enjoyed any return at the end of 2008. (cf. chart 3, Khagrachari example).

Figure 2   PDCs and households that generated income

In the long run the picture will improve as the unsold PDC assets should normally fetch higher than the original buying prices, even after deducting the dead cows and broken power tillers. But neither the PDCs nor the project make such cost-benefit analyses, e.g. ones that include the cost of their own labour, local material and cash investments, inputs, marketing costs and line agency support.

The estimated value of PDCs' assets is composed for 90 % of cattle that will be sold after one or two years, or later. (cf. chart 3). Cattle value only was estimated at €3.4 million at the end of 2008; since then several hundred PDCs and PNDGs have purchased theirs.

Other assets are less visible. Fruit trees, ginger and turmeric, absorb less cash, and their value is minimal during the first years, but they could be in the medium to long term at least as important as cattle for PDCs capacity to generate income. They represent 10% of projects in Bandarban, 15% in Rangamati, 16 % of PNDGs projects.

PDCs are of course satisfied and hopeful about their new assets, but more is needed to talk about economic impact or an economic underpinning of their empowerment. To talk about a significant economic impact for projects that do not consume too much labour or procured inputs, the total net gain for 2000 PDCs on initial investments should be €5m to 10m to provide those 50,000 households (average 25 households) with a few hundred Taka per month for the average three year they managed a QIF project.

The mission's statements are based on its own analysis of these unprocessed PDC data, and on frequent consultation with CE management about these data and their interpretation. The project should see the mission's quick and dirty data analysis as a start of the required comprehensive analysis by the project itself. We cannot exclude the possibility that such analysis by the project itself might result in other numbers and

interpretations, but we estimate that that will not change the general conclusions based on them with relation to the quickness and the size of the impact.

Logframe indicator at results level:

Indicator: "In 50% households (in 75% of most vulnerable ones) income is increased"

Household incomes have not been monitored at all by the project. There is no baseline data on poverty, and no data in the annual surveys, that could be used to assess the effects of CHTDF on incomes, poverty or living conditions. The nearest proxy available in the project monitoring system is the amount of cash return shared between the PDC and HHs who participated. In total, from project inception to the end of 2008, 10 % of HHs received an income from the project, amounting to €16 each. Many more households (number unknown) have received some project assets, such as cattle yet to be sold; but these belong to the community, each HH is only responsible of its maintenance.

Inclusiveness

The focus on the poorest HHs was not strong during project implementation, although all staff members who participated in the 2006 Logframe exercise mentioned it. Rules and criteria for selecting beneficiaries were left to each PDC to decide upon. Vulnerable HH may have been identified during the PRA exercises, but there is no baseline, no target, and inclusiveness is not monitored at all.

On average 90 % of HH joined the PDC in their respective paras. In most paras all HH are included; in a few of them the ratio can be as low as 60 %; there is no way to know who did not join and the variety of reasons why, in particular if social or economic status play a role.

Annual surveys show that the proportion of HHs included in the PDC who received some income is quite low: the average per district goes from 4% in Bandarban to 14% in Rangamati.

Due to the heterogeneity of paras as per their number of HHs (varying from 14 to 200 plus), and the fact that the QIF amount is the same for all PDCs, mechanisms for distribution of project benefits are bound to vary greatly: some paras could allocate one cow per household, while large PDCs would have to go through cumbersome selection processes and rotation system.

Indicator: "75 % of communities successfully and independently (without CHTDF and NGOs) implement and manage development activities"

In the Logframe, this indicator at purpose level is more detailed at results level: 75% of PDCs and 75% of women-headed PDCs manage alone technical and financial aspects, generate significant profits, hold regular meetings without external facilitator, and start new projects with QIF.

a) Community Facilitators' questionnaires

A set of questions was proposed to CFs in Rangamati and Bandarban to evaluate progress against these indicators that specifically targeted the capacities to perform independently from NGOs

Figure 3   Can PDCs manage by themselves?

Question to each CF: Among the PDCs you work with, what is the percentage of PDCs that:

The 75% target is not met but the situation is satisfactory: more than 75% of PDCs hold regular meetings without their assistance. For their financial management, monitoring, technical problems, 50 to 70% of them don't need assistance.

b) CHTDF 2008 annual survey (for all PDCs; women headed PDCs are not identified)

This survey does not target exactly the same capacities; questions are more related to the tasks and outputs PDCs are expected to deliver. Among these, two have been added recently (revolving fund, para development plans). It is unclear whether these are delivered with or without facilitators; but the last line suggests that, if almost 100% maintain properly their documents, while they face difficulties in performing others tasks, documents are maintained with a lot of CF support.

Figure 4   PDC capabilities and linkages

In the "best" district, Khagrachari, the proportion of "successful PDCs", i.e. who have can manage 7 or more out of 9 capacity indicators surveyed, represent only 28% of all PDCs. District wise results are quite different: Bandarban PDCs seem less capable than the others to perform most of the required tasks. It may be worth noting that district wise disparities mirror the adult literacy rates provided by GoB (cf. Education chapter). But within the limits of the present monitoring system it is impossible to identify and analyse these factors at program level and consequently to identify adjusted strategies that would enable to meet the 75% target.

According to the CFs, almost all PDCs adequately maintain their documents. It is regretful that the project did not have its own assessment to rely on because the mission had problems interpreting the CFs' statements in the light of other findings:

- More than 90% PDCs can reportedly manage their own books, also in Khagrachari, while only 60-65% of treasurers there can read and write (see Figure 6)

- The mission visited at least few PDCs for which the books were still maintained by the CF or with much help from the CF

- The figure for more literate Rangamati is much lower than for less literate Bandarban(Figure 3 and Figure 4)

- PDCs have not been allowed to test whether they manage their books and accounts alone without supervision and approval from CHTDF

On average, the number of years of existence for a PDC is not the primary factor defining their capability (see figure). For most PDCs the first year was sufficient to acquire the management techniques required by the project.

Figure 5   PDCs Uneven Progress (Khagrachari example)

These results do not show a learning curve of PDCs. Hopefully it shows more a learning curve of the project. Errors made in the first years could be corrected for more recent PDCs.

It is possible to imagine positive and negative factors impacting on management capabilities: intervention of other NGOs (micro credit) before or after CHTDF, reformations of the executive committees, and local context.

Steps taken by CHTDF

To support the weakest communities the project has provided refresher training on financial and management skills, and extra facilitators support. Exchange visits are also used to this purpose.

Successful and independent PDCs have been rewarded with special awards, and extra funding with the creation of PNDGs. In Khagrachari, 21 PDCs, i.e. 3% have delivered all the required outputs and acquired all necessary capacities.

No step has been taken so far to withdraw project support, although communities seem ready for this development; when visited by the evaluation team, all successful communities agreed to the idea that the project should progressively shift its support and resource form their community to new ones. The idea was also generally accepted by UnFCs when this was discussed.

All PDCs and PNDGs, irrespective of their management capabilities, have to request permission before retrieving their funds from the bank. This rule is meticulously followed; it was reduced for a while to allow retrieval of amounts less than Tk. 5000 (50 Euros), but reinforced soon after the project faced few cases of misuse and extortion and decided not to take more risks at a time that some NGOs' contract is running out. Also PDCs do not have free access to their cash returns if they deposit those in bank accounts. This seriously impinges on impact as well as sustainability and should be urgently reviewed. The project management intends to do so in the next phase. The project will continue to have a dilemma in some areas where local extortionists remain active and a hand-over of bank accounts to PDCs poses a genuine risk.

"Gender equity enhanced through small community run projects"

In 2006, the main strategy regarding gender was to foster women access to, and control over the resources allocated by the project as well as benefits expected from the project (cf. Action fiche, gender assessment form)

a) Access to skills and knowledge: the gap is deepened by the project

.

women access to CHTDF and GoB training since 2004, Bandarban

percentage of women among trainees

Training	%
Tubewell maintenance	30%
Fish Culture	40%
Agriculture	40%
Livestock	40%
Entrepreneurship Development	49%
Women Leadership	72%
Linkage Building	44%
Organizational leadership	39%
Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation	42%
Fin. Management for PDC Exec	38%
PDC management	41%
Fin. Management monitoring by community	40%
Dispute Resolution	40%
Training on Gender	44%

number of persons trained

As per CHTDF's data, 40 of trainees are female. Although this means that still 50% more men than women have acquired skills which are critical to the PDCs (financial management for PDC exec. members, PDC management, monitoring and evaluation, organizational leadership), in the local context, 40% women participants is a solid achievement to continue building upon. Moreover, 600 men also attended the Women leadership training in Bandarban; this certainly helped to instil a common understanding of women's role in the communities. The project informed that PNDGs executives have been trained in management, leadership, financial management, but PNDGs training sessions do not appear in the annual surveys. In livestock management training, although women are the major care takers and although most PNDGs specialised in this type of project, they are only 40 % of the trainees. The project has encouraged GoB technical training to taking place in the communities, in order to reduce women's traditional constraint to remain at home to provide care and food to everybody. It is unclear whether this has increased women's effective attendance and reduced their constraints.

b) Women's access to benefits of training is completely unknown

The Logframe proposed result indicators which were disaggregated to capture progress not only at PDC level but also for each community member. For example "75 % of community members (women /men/ vulnerable HHs) know and understand their rights, have changed some of their practices, know where to get technical support, raise their voice in meetings, are involved in new community projects".

The above mentioned indicators relate to benefits created by training sessions. Like many results indicators, they were not monitored at all during the project implementation. The huge amount of resource allocated to building human capacity at local level did not seem sufficient to justify an assessment of what people actually did with their new knowledge and skills. As a side effect, gender distribution of these benefits is completely unknown.

c) "70% communities have projects which can equally benefit men and women"

This indicator refers more specifically to the concretization of the principle of gender equity in the projects themselves. It has not been monitored, although discussed at length during the 2006 participatory sessions. If it had been, it would have appeared clearly that most projects such as livestock increase mostly women's workload, while cash returns to the household, where its distribution is in general unequal (cf. CHTDF baseline study). This was not compensated by PNDG projects, which followed and even worsened the PDC pattern.

d) "In 75% of communities women have increased influence on collective decisions"

There is no baseline, and no monitoring of attendance, participation or influence throughout the project. While visiting PDCs and communities that were also visited during the 2006 evaluation, the evaluation team found signs that women participation is really encouraged, and that some changes have occurred.

Women presence in PDC executive committees is compulsory, and the quota has been raised from 30 to 50%. Within the 3 most influential positions, they access one as a minimum, by rule. In practice it is mostly the treasurer position, because women are supposedly more honest, or because these tasks can be performed inside the village, do not involve representation and exposure to outsiders, except for the bank. Although the team encountered at least a few illiterate female treasurers, it is impossible to evaluate for how many PDCs is the case, and how this affects independent accounts maintenance.

Figure 6   Literacy status of PDC treasurers, Khagrachari Oct. 2009

Access of women to the most influential position is not measured by the project; an ad hoc survey processed upon request of the evaluation team showed in Khagrachari an average ratio of women chairpersons below 10%. This ratio is hardly higher than that of traditional headmen, indicating that the project's added value is minimal. In Bandarban and Rangamati, according to CFs, the ratio varies from 2% to 10%. The project should learn lessons from Subalong Union (Rangamati) where 50% of chairpersons were women.

PNDGs and women empowerment

The rationale and objectives of the creation of "women only" groups beside community PDCs is unclear, and vary among the component staff and stakeholders. A single policy or approach document was not provided. It was probably a way to compensate the slow pace of progress towards equal access to resources and decision making within the PDC system, without disturbing regular PDC operation. In most cases, PNDGs were presented as a bonus for successful PDCs, in rare other cases, they were a "plan B" for failing PDCs. When asked about the purpose and use of PNDGs, men generally talked about gender equality in general terms, while women invariably pointed at the fact that PNDGs gave them much more opportunity to acquire skills and experience than working within PDCs.

To date, the positive opinion of all stakeholders on this scheme is as high as was the resistance against it before its introduction. Without objectives, without additional CF's time to support them, without separate monitoring and without separate bank accounts, PNDG results cannot be well evaluated. The weak framework and the inadequate levels of assistance and monitoring put the PNDGs' potential success at risk and should be improved on a priority basis.

5.5   Community Empowerment Impact

Positive impact on social development and confidence

Assessments done with groups of Community Facilitators (CFs), show that they think that most target communities are experiencing positive social development; that cohesiveness is higher than before in most paras.

According to Community Facilitators, the gaps between the poorest and the richest HHs are in general stable or reduced by the project; CFs on average think that the gap has increased only in 10% of their respective PDCs. Some PDCs explained that before the project some households had cattle and now many households at least one. Stronger communities are definitely an asset for local development. Although the team heard some cases of affluent or influential families appropriating more than their share of project benefits, during field visits very few cases have been reported to the evaluation team. Linkages established with banks, line ministries, and many other stakeholders through the project facilitation committees are also a potential factor of social development. However the level of trust and confidence built through these linkages remains unknown for lack of baseline and monitoring.

In general it should be evaluated positively what the CFs say, which is basically that in nearly all aspects the majority of their PDCs are better and more confident PDCs than they were at the start, It is however more important to know how much better, how much more confident, and how this compares with what other actors normally achieve in this field. The mission assumes the results to be reasonably positive but regrets that it is not able to provide proof as indicators and measurements for this are not available.

Slow impact on economic development

Results analysis shows that a large majority of communities have chosen to use QIFs for economic development. Economic impacts have not been quick and on average very low. The mission estimated that on average economic benefits amounted to around €5/hh/yr, i.e. €900,000 cash return for 2000 PDCs of 30hh over average 3 years. This is roughly equal to what according to CHTDF data (see

Table 2) the communities have been invested in QIAs from their own resources, not including labour and inputs during implementation and maintenance. As a consequence, living conditions are quite similar now to what they were 4 or 5 years ago. Access to e.g. schools and safe water have been given lower priority as QIAs by the PDCs, although these are dire need for most Hill Tracts communities. The general idea is to generate cash first in order to be able later to build and maintain water supply equipment. But returns on investments are not only slow, but also very low, and it is unsure whether this investment in infrastructure that would change living conditions will ever be affordable through this project.

However, according to the annual survey, the opinion of PDC members who opted for cattle rearing and other slow impact projects is favourable: 75 % of them regard their QIA as successful. PDCs that experienced first QIA failures have shifted to second QIAs with more potential. It is therefore likely that, in absence of environmental, social or marketing problems, the average annual income from QIAs () will increase over the years. In how many communities living conditions will be significantly impacted cannot be foreseen. The project also lacks a baseline to compare against.

Probably positive impact on access to development assistance

The project should urgently assess the seemingly increasing development initiatives by communities with support from third parties and the relation between this development and the skills and relations developed through the CE component. In Rangamati, in December 2008, 1125 projects (UNICEF, NGOs, etc.) were managed by 856 communities in addition to their CHTDF projects, out of which 44 % for micro-credit. See Annex 6. Although the data compilation does not allow for in depth analysis, the mission found communities, especially those that formed their PDCs in the first years, that now manage three or four projects, including one or two with other development actors. In absence of baseline data, it is unclear how big this phenomenon is and in what way this is attributable to CEP, and in what way to changes in NGOs' strategies or the improved development environment in the Hill Tracts. In all cases this has created a context which is important for the future impact of CEP, and in which CHTDF can cooperate with others for increased impact.

The project should also analyse how communities use other NGOs' resources in synergy with CEP resources: Does micro credit provide short term cash while QIF provides long term returns? Which amounts are communities actually managing? Is there duplication? Will water and sanitation interventions (137 projects in Rangamati) meet all the needs? Do other projects' monitoring committees at para, Union and Upazila levels strengthen or duplicate CEP committees?

5.6 Community Empowerment Sustainability

At community level

Each QIF project has elements built into its design to increase sustainability. The mission found examples in the field of projects that were well maintained, including water supply systems that were maintained with QIF funds reserved for that purpose. It also found dysfunctional tubewells and a PDC that sold its new equipment because it could operate and maintain it effectively. As many QIAs are already few years old, the success ratings given by Bandarban PDC members to QIAs, and discussed in a previous chapter, can also be seen as an indication of sustainability so far.

But the sum of all projects has also systemic effects that would need to be more evaluated. Will the sale of a large number of cattle create a deflation of prices if all communities decide to sell at the same time to face a regional crisis? Has the risk of a cattle disease or epidemic been assessed? Will PDCs be able to maintain soil fertility levels, and inherently crop production and price levels?

Experience of social cohesion and establishing linkages through managing common funding is very important; it will have to be thoroughly monitored when communities start being really independent from project staff, i.e. when they can access their bank accounts without external clearance. How high is the risk to cohesion, community empowerment and to the project as whole, of relinquishing control of PDC bank accounts to PDCs with the necessarily resulting increase of misuse? Social cohesion also depends on other factors which were considered in 2006 but are so far not under control for lack of monitoring and use of strategic thinking, such as equity of benefits distribution, attitude of traditional leaders towards emerging leaders, attitude of men towards PNDGs when they can have their own bank account, levels of adult and PDC functionary illiteracy.

When discussing the lack of exit strategies, the project mentioned it intends to work on sustainability and exits through grouping of PDCs at a higher level. The mission has not seen a well-elaborated strategy for this and had no opportunity to discuss this at length. Few remarks should be made however that the project can take along when further elaborating strategies:

- Bigger groupings should, as the history of cooperatives teaches us, never be imposed but grow organically from PDC needs and desires to link up with others.

- Bigger groupings normally only become effective and sustainable if organized for a specific purpose with daily tasks and rewards like marketing or school management

- Bigger groupings can be easily hijacked for political purpose and might be seen by third parties as a risk if not working on something practical and technical

- Management of PDC-owned money by bigger groupings is very risky as administrative and management skills as well as control are still very weak in most cases.

The project should be prepared to accept that bigger groupings will not be the right exit strategy in many of its areas.

Conditions of sustainability of CEP mechanisms

Community selection, mobilisation and back up mechanisms by local committees (UnFC, UzAC, District committees) are strongly established, and do provide an important factor of stability to CEP. They will sustain only if progressively integrated in to local administration systems; otherwise, when funds stop flowing in, they will slowly disappear. A total hand-over process needs to be initiated. At the same time, HDCs must be in capacity of initiating and managing community focused development projects which can integrate bottom up planning.

PDCs and PNDGs should also be mainstreamed, i.e. linked to other by national or local institutions, where not yet applicable. Capable PDCs might benefit from registration, but this should not be made a condition for all. In Bangladesh tens of thousands of CBOs are flourishing without being registered. Registering remote and mostly illiterate PDCs is less meaningful. Registration, which has already started for some PDCs, should be given priority in the coming year, at least for PDCs which are already 4 or 5 year old and benefit from several NGOs' support. This should be closely monitored and registered and non-registered PDCs should be compared to learn lessons and to fine-tune the empowerment process

Technical, social, economic and environmental feasibility should be assessed in detail for each intervention category, so that PDCs and project will be able to assess the risks and potential of interventions and adjust activities to enhance sustainability.

Technical support to agriculture, livestock and other projects, provided by line ministries technical extension workers, is quantitatively insufficient; only half of PDCs received visits so far after their initial training. According to CFs, PNDGs face even greater difficulties accessing this support. The recent introduction of mobile phone coverage has improved the situation, but this relies on personal contacts; in some paras visited, women don't call, even for their own PNDG cattle.

It is envisaged that in the next contracts with partner NGOs, para technicians will be part of the project. This is an appropriate answer in the short term, but will not survive the end of CHTDF funding. For communities, paying for vaccinations and training, officially, and not as now as a form of bribe, is unavoidable. Barkal Upazila is training 30 community based vaccinators. Supply and logistic may remain problematic, but UNICEF cold storage system should be studied.

To create a pool of private sector service providers, local trained people that can commercially provide services would be the best option in theory and has in other countries and parts of Bangladesh been proven to work. In practice the profitability of such services for the service providers will be affected in parts of the CHT where distances are long, education levels low and people poor. In such areas such services might need to be subsidised for some time, while the system in the most viable areas develops itself and overcomes its teething problems.

5.7 Community Empowerment Conclusions and Recommendation

5.7.1   Community Empowerment Conclusions

The Community empowerment component, although highly visible and praised by all stakeholders in the Hill Tracts, is characterized by the lack of clarity on its actual expenditures, results and impacts. This is mostly due to the multiplication of QIF centred activities without sufficient consideration for resource implications in terms of community level staff, expertise application, results oriented monitoring and strategic management. The accumulation of data on facts disconnected to objectives does not compensate these shortfalls. An important part of the component activities and resources, PNDGs who constitute 30% of committees, wasn't even allocated a clear and univocal purpose.

Where the evaluation team could dig up and analyse data, it often appeared that actual achievements, in particular on economic development, are below expectations and consensual assumptions, while some positive achievements, like community cohesion, are not reported at all.

Some essential elements of empowerment have been missed out, such as participation of communities in all project phases, not only to select QIF projects, but also the access of women to project training and local decision making, or autonomy of committees regarding their bank accounts.

The absence of exit strategies also impinges on empowerment, and seems risky. At PDC / PNDG levels, communities seem more prepared to envisage conditions of phase out than CHTDF and PNGO staff. While considering to phase out, the project has to decide in which cases grouping of various PDCs in new entities is a suitable step, whether and how it will support activities by these supra-PDC bodies, and how support services can be made more sustainable. The mission does not think that GoB technical services, already constrained in their outreach to PDCs, will sustain, without financial and technical project support.

5.7.2   Community Empowerment Recommendations

1. Empower

- Empower communities

- Ensure participatory and systematic monitoring for results (so far training did not make this happen)

- Facilitate the creation of strategic and feasible plans through expertise-backed technical support

- Prioritize income generation as a basis for empowerment; diversify options for QIF utilization

- Ensure women access to all project resources and benefits, including incomes and influence on decision making, with simple community monitoring system of gender equality

- Categorise PDCs and PNDGs by capability, opportunity and duration of past engagement, and draft potential exit strategies for each category

- Plan with each community how to phase out direct support and control, while continuing back up

- Plan mainstreaming of the most capable PDCs and PNDGs as registered institutions on a pilot basis, and systematically monitor to learn lessons for the other PDCs

- Recruit an international and national community empowerment expert as a permanent technical adviser

- Empower local institutions

- Draw a road map per Union and Ward to hand over CHTDF tasks of community funding, support and audit to local institutions;

- Enhance local institution capacities and political will for bottom up, pro poor and community centred planning and development

- For sub-Union/supra-PDC level planning and monitoring - not for management or finances - consider ward-level councils in which PDC representatives sit with UP ward members and headmen. Projects above four lakh Taka might be done through project implementation committees, under those ward-level councils.

- Empower partner NGOs

- Start phasing over from treating NGOs as contractors to treating NGOs as development partners. Organise dialogues on objective; integrate lessons from their and others' experiences.

- Change contracts for next round of NGOs to allow more ownership for the development processes, to allow a percentage of the budget to be spent on initiatives that the NGOs and their PDCs see as necessary.

- Rigorously review current contracting and fund disbursement procedures which create disruptions in NGO financial and human resource management

2.   Concentrate on creating an enabling environment

- Feed communities' and local partners' decision making with professional feasibility assessments (technical, economic, social, environmental impact) for each type of intervention (cattle breeding, cattle fattening, bananas, lychees, mangos, MAPs, gravity water supply, etcetera). Contract it out to a reputable international-national value chain development consultant consortium/firm.

- Create /enhance market linkages, local service providers(village technicians, contractors, traders), and linkages with NGOs and other service and resource providers

- Study the options for creating a pool of private sector service providers; earmark project funds to support the creation and development of local businesses during a few years

- Seek progress on land issues at local levels, for example by linking up with Bandarban HDC initiatives (to secure lands for a mix fruits gardening project)

3   Make project monitoring compliant with international standards

Design the monitoring system in coherence with the objective of empowerment and the necessity of exit strategies

- Focus data collection on a limited number of SMART indicators

- Assess and support PNDGs and PDCs with the same tools and objectives

- Organize data analysis so as to create intelligence and enable debates on alternative strategies

- Seek intelligence from various partners like NGOs or advisory committees

- Ensure that the analyses are shared with all partners, in priority the ones who collect data

Keep expenditures transparent and under control

- Each unit manager should be responsible for recording , monitoring and reporting on her /his expenditures

- Structure the expenditures record in coherence with expected results and indicators

- Organize four times a year managers meeting focused on expenditures monitoring and control

6   ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

6.1   Sources of Information

The evaluation mission has visited numerous regular PDCs involved in market–oriented agriculture, and in addition five IGA PDCs involved in beekeeping(2), mushroom(2) and ginger cultivation(1), and production of bio-briquettes(2), three weaver groups(three Sadar upazilas and Thanchi Upazila) and three NGO shops. It had extensive exchanges with district- and project-level staff and one NGO (Ashika), and it studied numerous documents provided by CHTDF.

6.2   Brief Description Economic Development

6.2.1   Activities and deliverables

The component summary as derived from the logframe reads as follows:

Result: 2. (a) Economic opportunities enhanced for small local enterprises, youth and farmers

Table 3   Overview of Achievements

Result indicators and activities 2006-2009	Achievements
Youth employment: 500 youth trained, 50% employed and organised in Entrepreneurs Corps	Not started yet. Youth employment focus abandoned in 2009. Merged with 2.
Marketing and infrastructure: 20 commercial items marketed, trained self help groups and NGOs, collection points, RC technical unit, Market Info Systems	Product feasibility studies; 120 PDCs with 1172 PDC members (Female -420, Male-752) trained on different IGAs like mushroom, honey bee keeping, bio-briquette, ginger and medicinal plant; 22 PDC members on marketing exchange visit; NGOs run shops selling IGA produce.
Private sector development: Business Promo centre; trained women and youth groups; strengthened ChamberofCom, Bus. Ass., production units for handmade paper, indigenous textile manufacturing and exports, agro-processing, bee keeping; SMEs registered, finance readily available for SMEs, new CHT-Bangladesh partnerships	18 weavers groups (88 members, 87 female) trained in entrepreneurship, silk, cotton and natural dyes; 15 local institutes and NGOs ToT-trained in entrepreneurship development; Product Award competition reached indirectly 308 producers
Community based tourism: packages, strategies and best practices, tourism centres, trained associations/staff, 100 new jobs, increased household incomes	Not started yet

Activities started only end of 2008 under ICIMOD which engaged three local NGOs (Eco Development, Pajureco, and Ashika). About 20% of the 120 PDCs' members were trained in any subject, often those with more education and ability to take economic risk. CHTDF staff only monitored. Visible results in the visited PDCs and weaver groups were still very limited.

The feasibility studies by ICIMOD and consultants were not comprehensive enough as basis for introducing new products and technologies. Value chain analyses (input supply, services, cultivation, harvesting, processing, marketing, cost-benefit analyses for producers and traders) were absent or sub-standard. Household-level economic calculations were only done for one product (mushrooms) and then still incomplete (transport to market not included) and not done for different household economies and scenarios. As a result the project did not have a projection for who might benefit in what way.

Bio-briquettes. Only few households produced bio-briquettes and remained dependent on the NGO for producing (machinery was too heavy for women) and marketing (NGO was only buyer). Very few people expect to continue producing bio-briquettes.

Beekeeping. Per PDC on average three households per PDC were trained and supported in beekeeping. Only few better-off households were still actively engaged. Honey production was very limited or absent so far. Quality of honey as sold by the NGO was slightly sugary and watery. It is not known whether quantity and

quality will improve during winter. No analysis is made of the fact that the CHT do not have any beekeeping tradition.

Mushroom. Only very few households were engaged in mushroom cultivation in two visited PDCs. In Bandarban, only one (the wife of the PDC chairman) out of ten trainees was still involved, reportedly because the others were unsure about feasibility (insecure spawn supply, unavailability of straw, cost of investments). In Rangamati, the project had revived mushroom cultivation in Sukorchari, where in the past DAE had promoted mushrooms but faltered due to inadequate spawn supply and funding.

Ginger. Farmers were trained in ginger cultivation and storage to increase production and prices. The subject was well chosen as many PDCs under CE had failed to benefit from ginger cultivation due to disease and marketing problems. Annex 7 shows that in Bandarban 72% of the involved famers thought their ginger QIF project a failure. The ginger training arranged by the NGO was however the same as under CE provided by the line departments. At least in one village the training (for two PDC members) had been too late to apply in the 2009 season, which will not have helped either. Villagers were pessimistic about possible results.

Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (MAPs). Results (and reportedly markets) are unsure. Produce is not harvested or marketed yet.

Weaving. The project focused on group cooperation, entrepreneurship skills, and especially the introduction of silk, cotton and natural dyes. After the trainings, none of the weaver groups had continued with silk (supply, difficult to weave), cotton (to slow to weave, fading colours) or natural dyes (material supply, no local markets, cumbersome). Beneficiaries mentioned as main benefits a few elementary business skills (a fraction of all the trained subjects) and working as a group.

The project initiated a CHT product award competition and a national CHT fair, which have created awareness of production and marketing opportunities in the CHT and the nation. It is not monitored in a systematic way what the effects have been. The activities need to become a more integrated part with the other economic development activities.

Others. CHTDF could not book any progress on youth employment, community based tourism, and strengthening of higher level private sector development mechanisms. This has been a blessing in disguise as these are notoriously difficult sectors with often very limited success, even if dealt with by experts.

6.2.2 Funds, Human Resources and Operations

The component had sufficient budget, also to recruit expertise. Unfortunately CHTDF chose to engage ICIMOD for this component - not through a competitive process - while ICIMOD and its local partners did not have the required expertise in implementing value chain development projects. The engagement of the partner NGOs as commercial partners in input supply and product marketing created further confusion. CHTDF decided not to extend the 1-year partnership with ICIMOD and its partners and merged the component with the community empowerment component.

CHTDF itself also has had problems to provide the required expertise, being at the time of evaluation already some months without any senior national or international sector experts (except a short-term cultural industries consultant). For a complex and difficult sector, in which it is already difficult for experts to add to what farmers and private sector are already achieving, this is a serious handicap. As a result the project cannot steer the component, take timely and expert decisions and expertly judge partners' proposals and implementation work.

During 2009 the project increased its focus on what the farmers were already producing and marketing. It started to map markets and to organise exchange visits to ongoing successful CCDB interventions. This is much in line with recommendations of the 2006 evaluation. The project has not clearly outlined yet which way it will go with economic development.

6.3 Economic Development Relevance

The economic development component made several false starts. It went through two complicated design processes, of which the 2005 exercise was confused and substandard (see evaluation report 2006) and of which the 2006 redesign exercise was still not based on priority needs (marketing of existing production) and available implementation capabilities (no expertise in UNDP, CHTDF or CHT partners in the subsectors). The 2006 redesign did not solve the 2005 design problems, with a confused overambitious and

still confusing programme as result. It also still left the most obvious economic development opportunity (adding value to and marketing of PDC outputs) alone, and did not study existing economic initiatives like CCDB's. Instead it focused on new products.

6.4   Economic Development Efficiency

The mission is convinced that the project's inability to implement activities as planned and to achieve visible results, is due to weak design and planning and the lack of rigour and expertise during feasibility studies. As monitoring of results (e.g. adoption, production, marketing and benefit distribution patterns within villages; opinions, investments and earnings of IGA-ers) is absent, it is still unable to tell what might work and what not. Although ICIMOD's partners are known to have discouraged active monitoring by CHTDF, CHTDF should anyhow have developed indicators and a monitoring system itself.

The key questions for efficiency evaluation are whether the same could have been achieved with less resources and activities and whether more could have been achieved with the same. Both questions have to be answered with "Yes, very much so". Efficiency should be evaluated as very low.

6.5   Economic Development Effectiveness

The programme did not lead to increased youth employment and incomes from tourism as activities did not start yet. Most of 2006-09 has been spent on new IGAs. The IGAs were mostly new for the CHT and not properly analysed. Results are disappointing so far. The beneficiaries are so far mostly better-off risk takers, and only mushrooms and weaving seem to have potential for a limited number of households and groups.

The results of IGA activities are difficult to measure as the project lacks a baseline. For beekeeping and bio-briquette the baseline is still easy to establish as these are very new IGAs. CHTDF only has to compare the results with what villagers did before with their time and resources. The situation is more problematic in case of mushrooms, MAPs and weaving.

Weaving. The project shows the quantity of cloths the weaving women have produced as a result, while all the involved women were already weaving and selling. The weavers interviewed during the evaluation indicated that they doubled their production and that by thinking more as business women and working as groups they hoped to earn more. Whether their social and economic environment will allow them to do so, is not known.

The main thrust of weaving (silk, cotton, natural dyes) resulted from a top-down approach, and has not produced results yet and is viewed by weavers with scepticism. They however feel themselves better business women now thanks to CHTDF. With more efficiency and bottom-up processes in planning, the project could have achieved much more.

Mushrooms. In Sukorchari the poorest 25% households found mushrooms too risky to take up cultivation, but the other 75% intended to restart it coming winter, while few more resource-rich households had continued it during the monsoon also. Profits were good, but people are apprehensive what will happen if many more villages start to produce mushrooms.

If the market is big enough, enough families might grow mushrooms to make investment in the newly started spawn production by Ashika in Rangamati bazaar feasible. Even though spawn quality will be probably lower than that of DAE in Savar, Dhaka, it has the advantage of access and price. However, if spawn or straw supplies falter or markets remain low, only the few better-off families that are able procure spawn from Dhaka might continue.

Overall the results of the economic development component have been minimal or absent, in spite of the talents and dedication of field staff. The economic opportunities for the people have been only a little bit increased, and only few, mostly better-off, families have made profits. The majority of trainees and their co-villagers are sitting on the fence, waiting and seeing.

Illustrative was the relatively successful PDC of Kolabunia (Rangamati), which ranked IGA(bees, briquettes) way below the CE-related initiatives (fruit garden, cows, turmeric, ginger, pigs) in terms of economic gain for the present and for after five years. They thought bees could as yet work for a few families, but they had no hope for bio-briquettes.

Effect on partner institutions has been logically minimal as cooperation with the involved institutions, except those for the PDCs, has been discontinued. PDCs have not yet become stronger or more market-savvy

institutions due to this component. Intra- and inter-PDC cooperation on input supply and marketing was checked in all PDCs but was virtually absent.

Economic development comprises an important part of the overall strategy and relates to many of the CHTDF purpose indicators and results. Although part of these targets will also be achieved through the community empowerment component, the economic development was supposed to contribute, too.

Table 4   Achievements of ED against (joint ED/CE) purpose indicators

Relevant Purpose Indicator	ED Contribution
Local producers market higher volumes and get higher prices	Not visible
Optimal prices and marketing channels for village products	Not visible
Confidence, technical skills and income generated in 1650 targeted communities	120 PDCs, Nearly invisible
In 50% households (in 75% of most vulnerable ones) income is increased	Little in c. 200hh, but not most vulnerable

6.6   Economic Development Impact

This component's contribution to "improved socio-economic development of Chittagong Hill Tracts in line with the principles of self-reliance, decentralisation and sustained peace" has been so far invisible. This is not surprising as the component had a very weak design, has only run one year, lacked relevant expertise and has been thoroughly restructured recently. But also in the longer term the impact of the presently supported IGAs and promotion exercises will remain very small as IGA-markets and the number of involved households will remain limited.

By comparison, the impacts from the agricultural development activities initiated under the CE component should also in future remain bigger. If this component focuses instead on sustainable production and marketing of CE-initiated produce and can ensure economic focus and expertise, impact could become visible.

6.7   Economic Development Sustainability

Among all the components, economic development has inherently the biggest chance of sustainability as in theory it will not depend on continued support from government or project. Exit strategies are relatively easy to design. Condition is however that supply chains for inputs and services and marketing chains should be in place. For the rest it depends on economic benefits for and capabilities of producers and traders. This is not guaranteed yet for any of the initiated IGA, including weaving. The involvement of non-commercial NGOs in input supply and marketing reduces sustainability.

6.8   Economic Development in Phase IV

Plans and logframes for the coming years do not show a major focus shift, and build on the old plans. The project has initiated another new IGA, bamboo craft with support of INBAR, and can be expected to initiate others as they come up. The project intends to run ED through the CE component so as to improve the economic impact of QIFs. CHTDF's less positive experience with implementation through an external organisation will have discouraged to look for another such option. However, as the CE-management lacks a senior economic development or value chain development expert and will continue to have an already very high workload by implementing (and, if the mission's recommendations are accepted, also improving) a very ambitious CE/QIF programme, there is a genuine risk that ED will as yet not receive the required attention and expertise. The new food security projects' district experts will solve only part of this problem.

In theory the new food security projects (Danida, EC) should provide a sounder basis for economic development, but this will only be so if thorough subsector assessments are done for each product and if sufficient expertise is provided. As this is not yet the case, the risk that these components can undermine both the ED and CE components' achievements cannot be excluded.

6.9   Economic Development Conclusions and Recommendations

6.9.1   Economic Development Conclusions

The ED relevance of the design, the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability should be evaluated as low to very low, but they could improve if the project applies more focus, expertise and resources.

The component is at risk of continued substandard performance as long as UNDP-CHTDF runs the component itself and as long as the project continues to attempt to implement all the originally intended subcomponents.

6.9.2   Economic Development Recommendations

1. *Overall*

- Eliminate youth employment and tourism subcomponents and try first to make CEP-based economic development a success

- Limit all ED to CE product value chain development: extension, inputs, services, processing, and marketing. Activities should include establishment and training of service providers (barefoot technicians, input sellers, indigenous traders), marketing studies, collection points, collection point management committees (made up of producers, not UP officials, NGO staff or traders), linkage development (exchange visits to traders, bazaars, whole sellers, input suppliers)

- Involve international value chain development expert organisation for implementation. This can be INGO, INGO-NGO combination, or combination of INGO and consultant firm.

- Hire a consulting firm with South-east Asia, South Asia and value chain development expertise to make subsector analyses for each product presently promoted through CE and ED with full technical, economic, social, environmental analyses.

2. *Future for present IGAs*

- Evaluate the presently initiated IGAs after one year (Summer 2010), discontinue those with limited or no success and promote the replicable successes, if any, through the CE component.

- Consider a more bottom-up approach for weaving, taking the women's interests and capabilities as basis for slow but steady business development

- Consider limited support to mushrooms. This could include spawn production by Ashika under condition that Ashika converts to a commercial enterprise or forms a completely independent enterprise.

- Just monitor MAPs and bio-briquettes for one year, and decide

3. *Food Security*

- Ensure that Danida and EC Food security projects are based on thorough sub-sector analyses and work with senior experts at project and district level.

- Ensure that the influx of new QIFs from Danida and EC Food security projects (and ADB) does not undermine empowerment and economic development achievements

7   EDUCATION

7.1   Education Sources of Information

The mission used programme documentation, annual and quarterly reports, meetings with staff, project contractors, counterpart officials, donors and field visits to inform this evaluation. Interviews with senior officials and NGOs working in the sector but outside the CHTDF also provided contextual information. The education team was the only component to provide the evaluation mission, after the first meetings on the evaluation mission's scope and approach, with a helpful and comprehensive review of progress against logframe indicators on basis of whatever data were available.

7.2   Education Brief Description

The education project is based upon the work of a technical mission, which visited CHT in 2006, was in a pilot phase in 2009, and has two key objectives:

- extend access to basic education for 10,000 students; and

- Improve quality, through developing and piloting Multi Language Education, to ease children's integration in the school system.

These objectives were underpinned by support to management structures, ranging from Mothers' Groups and School Management Committees at the village levels, to working with the Hill District Councils to strengthen their management capacity.

7.3   Education Relevance

The project is highly relevant to the wider aims of CHTDF, addressing socio-economic development in general. Greater access to basic education, and subsumed within that the adaptation of child-centred teaching to raise the quality of education, contribute to the achievement of peace-building through the extension of services to communities in more remote parts of the CHT.

The project's strategy of developing community organizations such as the Mothers' Groups, and strengthening the School Management Committees, is closely aligned with the wider institution building undertaken by CHTDF.

The Multi Language Education project, also supported by regional language development committees, is a substantive contribution to confidence building in a community that had previously been affected by sustained inter-ethnic conflict.

Figure 7   Adult literacy: % of women aged 15-24 that are literate[1].

The project design could have been enhanced by seeking to address adult literacy. This is provided for in the project design, but not starting until 2010. The below table underlines the disparity in adult female literacy

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[1] Source: Progotir Pathey: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2006, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

between the three CHT districts and the national average in Bangladesh. One district lags nearly 20% behind the national average.

As noted elsewhere in this evaluation report, the (relatively) low level of adult literacy in the target communities does impinge on the strength of community institutions supported in the project.

7.4 Education Efficiency

It has been difficult to assess the efficiency of the project, in the absence of data on unit costs for children enrolled in the project's schools, or for teacher training costs. Enquiries to a range of organizations working in primary education drew no information on the costs of teacher training.

Whilst it is not an exact like-for-like comparison, the costs of teacher training in the CHTDF project are set against the costs of community development workers in the UNICEF-funded Integrated Community Development Project(ICDP)[2].

Table 5   Training costs[3] (US $)

	Cost of full training course	Cost per day of training
UNDP-CHTDF project teachers (36 days training in 3 parts)	446	12.40
UNICEF-ICDP para workers (25 days training in 2 parts)	198	7.92

The teacher training provided by the project was carried out through direct implementation, and the CHTDF may be able to pare the cost. In terms of the cost-efficiency, against an admittedly limited comparator within the UN family, the CHTDF shows itself to be more expensive but still in a comparable range. The project should however compare itself with NGOs like BRAC to meaningfully assess its cost effectiveness and find ways to reduce its costs.

7.5 Education Effectiveness

The project has achieved nearly all of its targets in this, its initial, phase.

With a target of enrolling 10,000 children in new schools in 2009, 8,400 children entered basic education for the first time in new schools. Girls constitute 48%, producing a gender parity index of 0.91[4], which lags behind the national average of 1.06. BECHT logframe lacks gender disaggregated targets or indicators. In addition, the project is close to attaining its target of building 60 new schools, of a government-approved appropriate design. (The mission saw schools built by another project which had used corrugated metal sheeting, becoming too hot for teaching in the dry season.)

It was difficult to assess the net enrolment rates in the project schools, in the absence of a head-count of the number of children in the school's catchment area. Data was lacking on whether these students were already going to school (like the students of Mai Prue Para, visited by the mission), on how many children of the school's catchment area go to other schools, on the number of starting pre-primary students that would have gone to other schools. As the project is in its first year, it is too early to assess either drop-out or repetition rates.

In undertaking the development of Multi Language Education, the project has used scripts developed by third parties for what had previously been exclusively oral cultures. The project has taken 7 of the 12 tribal languages (Tripura has two distinct dialects), and created basic materials to introduce children to literacy and numeracy in their introduction to formal education, to overcome a concern that children of ethnic minorities were educationally disadvantaged when having to start school in what was effectively a foreign language. It

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[2] To clarify the comparison, the workers in the ICDP para centres have a broader range of social issues – health, water & sanitation, nutrition and early child hood development, and have a contact time with children that averages 2.5 hours per day.

[3] These costs exclude the development of training packages, which are taken as non-recurrent costs which would be spread cross the duration of the project.

[4] The gender parity index is based on the ratio of girls to boys in school. 1.00 would be absolute parity, whilst < 1.00 would indicate more boys in school than girls.

is too soon to see the impact of this initiative, but that should become clearer in the next phase of the project, as children engage more deeply with formal education and work in a curriculum more exclusively Bangla-based. The breadth of the MLE work, drawing in children from 8 language groups, has achieved equity in terms of enabling access to education for children from a range of ethnicities, (as set out in the table below). Simultaneously, the project is discussing the resourcing of MLE with the HDCs and Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, with a view to their taking responsibility for this.

Table 6 Ethnic composition of students in CHTDF-supported schools

(of a total no. of 8,400 students)

Priority Rank	Ethnic Group	Years of schooling (baseline indicator of need)	MLE material developed	% of CHTDF Students	% of CHT population 1991	Proportion student %: CHT pop %
a	b	c	d	e	f	G
1	Khumi	0.60	no	0.4%	0.1%	4
2	Mro	0.60	yes	2.5%	2.3%	1
3	Khyang	1.30	yes	2.6%	0.2%	13
4	Tanchangya	1.80	yes	12.9%	2.0%	6
5	Tripura (2 languages)	2.10	yes	15.1%	6.3%	2
6	Marma	2.50	yes	20.4%	14.6%	1
7	Bawm	3.30	yes	3.4%	0.7%	5
8	Chakma	3.30	yes	22.5%	24.6%	1
9	Chak	3.90	no	0.0%	0.2%	0
10	Pankhua	4.70	no	0.7%	0.3%	2
11	Lushai	5.60	no	0.0%	0.1%	0
12	Soantal	?	no	0.1%	?	?
A	IP Subtotal	2.70		81.0%	51.4%	1.6
B	Bengali	2.90	NA	19.4%	48.6%	0.4
	Total			100.0%	100.0%	

Source: CHTDF Socio-economic Baseline study and CHTDF Education cluster

The table shows that choices are generally in line with the needs per ethnic group if the (CHTDF SE baseline 2008) figures for average years of schooling per person are taken as need indicator. The mission however noted that the education component works in Khumi areas, especially in Remakree and Bolipara Unions of Thanchi upazila, but did not target Khumi villages (e.g. those where the CE component works) or develop Khumi MLE material, while these need MLE assistance much more than e.g. the much more literate Chakma and Bawm (column d). It would also have been in line with assessed needs if Khumi and Mro, who have very low levels of education, would constitute much higher proportions of CHTDF student beneficiaries than of the CHT population (column g=e/f). Similarly the proportion of Chakma should have been much lower considering that their enrolment rates already hover around 90% and literacy rates are above the national average.

The project has supported education management structures within the CHT, aligning the project's implementation management with those of the public sector, and creating linkages to the community structures developed by other elements of CHTDF.

7.6 Education Impact

Without detailed baseline and monitoring data on performance and enrolment, it is not possible to assess impact.

7.7 Education Sustainability

Assuming the project leads to increased enrolment (percentage, years of enrolment), useful MLE materials, better school buildings, and functioning school management committees, PTAs and mothers groups, can these benefits be sustained?

CHT education and Multi-lingual Education. The education sector and CHTDF are only in a phase where education systems, including multi-lingual education, are piloted. The ultimate goal should be to find how education indicators can be brought at par with the rest of Bangladesh. Close coordination and, if possible, ultimately integration with PEDP-II will be important. For full integration with PEDP-II it is essential that the government first elaborates the Tribal Education Plan, which at present is only a set of principles. It is probably an advantage that the Tribal Education Plan has not been finalised yet, so that CHTDF and others can pilot and learn lessons that will provide tested building blocks for a nationally accepted plan and related budget. Such a Tribal Education Plan would have to be based on solid arguments for multi-lingual education and establish provisions (teachers, salaries, facilities, etc.) that will ensure education levels at par with the rest of the country for the CHT as a whole and particularly for vulnerable ethnic minorities.

Materials. A great deal of material has been developed. This will not only assist the concerned schools, but any MLE programme of government or NGOs.

Teacher salaries/Registration. Salaries generally account for between 80% and 90% of national education budgets, and hence a project which addresses these recurring costs will have gone a long way towards securing sustainability. In the case of the CHTDF, the opportunity to secure teacher salaries lies in transferring these to government budgets. To do so, schools need to be registered with the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education; in prescribing standards for school registration, they have adopted lower criteria for schools in the CHT, requiring that the school needs less land, fewer teachers and fewer students than would be the case elsewhere in Bangladesh.

In the first year, the project has seen 7 (out of 60) new schools begin the registration process. This is an important step, but as the process takes 3 to 4 years to complete, and it is not guaranteed that each school starting the process will ultimately succeed in achieving registration (and thus gaining salary support from the public sector). CHTDF staff informed that experience figures show that on average 50% of schools starting registration process will ultimately achieve registration.

SMCs. The created institutions at the community level (SMCs, PTAs and Mother Groups) are good tools to achieve short-term project goals, but the project should be realistic about the long-term viability and sustainability of and in the mid-term focus on those institutions (SMCs) which are essential for survival and registration. Visits demonstrated strong parental demand for education in the communities with schools, but the local governance structures are not yet in place to effectively transmit these demands to the HDCs. The project management structure mirrors government structures, and transferring these to the public sector should be a straightforward task, once the political will is in place.

MoPE/DPEO/HDC. Central to the consideration of sustainability, however, and beyond the control of the project's managers, is the transfer of resources to follow the transfer of education from the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education to the HDCs. Financial sustainability may be achieved, but without such transfer, it will remain tentative, and the authority of the HDCs over the primary education system – and their ability to respond to community aspirations in education – will be seriously constrained.

7.8   Education Conclusions and Recommendations

7.8.1   Conclusions

The education project meets a pressing need in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and in bridging a gap in many remote communities is meeting a basic pre-condition for development. The MLE component of the project will help children to achieve their potential in a Bangla-speaking education system in the short-term and in the wider community in the longer term. In reducing the scope for marginalization, that should help solidify the peace process.

However, the financial foundation of the project remains a challenge, and if the project schools were to close, or access to basic education be severely curtailed, then the education project's positive contribution to the Peace Accord would dissipate.

7.8.2   Education Recommendations

The project is in its early days, and as such should continue.

It is planned to extend to a further 150 schools by September 2013, and steps should be taken to strengthen sustainability before these further schools are added by the project.

1.   Sustainability

- PEDP-II/Tribal Education Plan

Project sustainability is closely linked to the finalisation and implementation of the Tribal Education Plan and integration with PEDP-II and MoPE. The project should continue close coordination and provide MoPE and PEDP-II with information, data and pilot results required for developing a nationally accepted education plan relevant to CHT and tribal people in Bangladesh.

- Political context

Project sustainability is closely linked to the implementation of the Peace Accord and its provisions for education as a "transferred subject". As such, the project should work with partners to clarify Government plans to underpin the transfer of responsibility to the HDCs with the transfer of budgetary authority.

- School registration, and incentives

The next phase of the project should strengthen the support to schools initiating the registration process. One simple way of encouraging this would be by developing incentives for schools completing the first and subsequent steps of registration.

- Teacher training

The project's work in teacher development, particularly in Multi Language Education and child-centred learning, should be integrated in the curriculum of the region's two teacher training institutes.

2.   Post Grade 5 schools

The project should initiate a debate with the HDCs, Ministry of Primary Education and sector partners about the provision of education in CHT beyond Grade 5. It will need a serious financial investment to expand access at this level, in excess of the levels of project funding available to partners such as CHTDF, requiring significant lead time. This policy dialogue should draw in all actors in formal education in CHT, (and should not be taken to imply that CHTDF provide this level of education). It would seem unlikely that this is an issue that will be resolved quickly, and as such the discussion should begin soon.

3.   Enrolment rates / Gender Parity

The project should strengthen its data collection; it should establish for each present and future school catchment the population, the school age children's population, presently available schools, present ethnicity- and gender disaggregated enrolment rates. These data should guide the targeting and intervention design and be the basis for simple though comprehensive monitoring system on trends in enrolment, drop-out or absenteeism.

4.   Multi Language Education

This is an important contribution toward fulfilling the rights of marginalized groups, and should continue.

The project should establish a mechanism to monitor the educational impact of the MLE schools, and how children in those classes have adapted to formal education in the Bangla language compared with their peers entering Bangla language schools without the induction to formal education through the MLE classes. This will require a control group to be established now, and this might usefully be one mechanism for more actively engaging the teacher training institutes in the project. This will also strengthen the project's underpinnings, which is now based mostly on assumptions and anecdotal evidence. It will allow the project to streamline and economise its intervention design.

Within the education sector, there were some indications of a top-down approach[5] in attitudes towards minority groups, and hence this should also be subject to close monitoring which would consider not only the educational impact, but also the communities' perceptions of how this work is developing.

5. *Adult Literacy*

The pilot phase of the project did not include adult literacy; however, with the prevailing literacy levels – the three districts reporting lower literacy levels than the national average – and given the relevance of literacy to other components of the CHTDF referred to elsewhere in the evaluation, the project should continue in its plans to begin adult literacy work in 2010.

The project should engage with the Government's Adult Literacy campaign due to start in January 2010, seeking to create a synergy in the 150 rural communities where Para Development Committees and a School Management Committee exist, drawing upon this social infrastructure to strengthen the campaign. The project should also work with others in the education sector to ensure that functional numeracy is included in the campaign.

A strong institutional partner, with demonstrated competence in adult literacy work, should be engaged to take this forward, in a limited number of those paras with both PDCs and SMTs. The project design should include a capture of baseline data to enable subsequent monitoring of the economic outcomes, given the relationship between literacy and income generation.

Given the start-date of January 2010 for the national campaign, the project should move quickly to engage a consultant to develop the necessary partnerships to launch this work. This aspect of the project needs to be closely coordinated with the community empowerment work and income generating activities, literacy being a critical factor in these areas, as noted elsewhere in this evaluation report.

8   HEALTH

8.1   Sources of Information

The mission used programme documentation, annual and quarterly reports, meetings with staff, project contractors, counterpart officials, donors and field visits to inform this evaluation. Interviews with organizations working in the sector but outside the CHTDF also provided contextual information.

8.2   Brief Description

The health project began in 2006, working in 6 of the CHT's 25 upazilas, expanding to 11 upazilas in 2009 and four more by early 2010. Health services are delivered through a network of Community Health Service Workers (CHSWs, 390, by 2010 more than 1000)), with a second tier of services offered by 7 mobile teams which visit 35 satellite clinics on a weekly basis, to which patients are referred by the CHSWs. Each satellite clinic has a management committee, consisting of local community representatives. In turn, the mobile teams refer further cases to Upazila health facilities and district hospitals in the three main towns of the CHT. The CHSWs are resident in their communities, covering 4 villages each.

The project estimates that by early 2010 it would provide health services for approximately 300,000 people in those 15 upazilas, which would be approximately half of the rural population of the CHT, but this has not been based on detailed census data or a headcount, but rather is based on the average village size, and the number of CHSWs.

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[5] Such attitudes were not noted amongst the CHTDF team, but some public policy did seem to be based on a prescriptive approach which had not apparently been verified with the minority groups themselves.

8.3   Health Relevance

The health project is highly relevant to the wider aims of CHTDF, addressing confidence building and socio-economic development in general.

The project seeks to:-

i.)	Support a basic healthcare system, based on community health workers and satellite clinics;
ii.)	Provide a referral system between the different levels of health care, from CHSW to satellite clinic, thence upazila and the district facilities;
iii.)	Strengthen health management facilities at community, upazila and district levels; and
iv.)	Develop community participation in the management of health facilities.

Greater access to basic healthcare contributes to the achievement of peace-building through the extension of services to communities, especially in the more remote parts of the CHT. Effectively, the health service constitutes a significant peace dividend to a large part of the rural population of CHT.

The structure of the health project is closely aligned with the structures of communities and governance in the CHT, with the pinnacle of management being the Civil Surgeon in each of the HDCs. This is reflected in the referral system, more serious cases being consecutively referred to higher levels in the health structure. Originally the design had neglected to build on the network and strengths of earlier CHTDF components, notably the PDCs and UnFCs, but after encountering problems with communities in Baghaichari Upazila, some steps have been taken to correct this.

The project has begun – in 2009 – to integrate its delivery within the public sector, moving a greater part of its administration into the Hill District Councils, but it remains exclusively funded by CHTDF.

The recruitment for CHSW of women living in the villages that they serve is an effective strategy to overcome the tendency of absenteeism which many noted as a characteristic of the government health facilities. Ease of access to the CHSWs, along with their local language knowledge, are important characteristics of the project design which have enabled it to avoid difficulties encountered by the government-managed health system.

The project has also established a management system providing supervision of the CHSWs, in order to maintain quality of services delivered at community level. Project supervisors monitor the work of CHSWs, recommending refresher training as necessary. So far, this has entailed regular participation of CHSWs refresher training.

Clinic management committees have been formed to support the satellite clinics, managing space, buildings and water supply for the visiting clinic, managing crowds on clinic days, and solving clinic-related problems within and with the community.

8.3.1   The Logframe

The mission should use the logframe, but especially to check whether the project is effective, in other words whether the results contribute to the purpose, is difficult to evaluate because of a confusing logframe. See the simplified logframe table below. The logframe is specific on activities and the outputs of those activities in terms of "surveys completed" and "report accepted", but confusing on where that leads to, i.e. the overall results and their indicators. One would expect that good health (overall goal) is achieved by improved health behaviour and effective health care (purpose), which is again achieved by a good CHT-adjusted system and good coverage (result). This logframe however puts only one part of the "system", i.e. CHSW system, in results and another, i.e. stakeholder concurrence with that system, under purpose, missing out on health behaviour and putting other essential elements of the "system" and health service effectiveness under results. The mission thinks it does not make sense to, as per this logframe, to check whether (in the short term) the CHSW employment system works well and whether (in the long term) services are effective and whether this leads to mobilisation of all stakeholders for tribal plan implementation, and to assume that this is the case if the RC and HDCs have a 5-year plan for this.   These are all important elements of the logframe, but put in the wrong location.

Table 7   Original Health Logframe, simplified

	Intervention Logic	**Objectively Verifiable Indicators**
Overall Goal	Health, Nutrition & Population (HNP) in the CHT improved	Maternal Mortality Rate in the CHT reduced by 40% Infant Mortality Rate in the CHT reduced by 30% Malnutrition status of children 0 – 59 months improved Stunting (HAZ) 35% Underweight (WAZ) 27% Contraceptive prevalence rate increased by 20%
Global Objective	All development stakeholders mobilized and reinforced in the CHT in order to implement HNP activities outlined in the Tribal Plan	Regional Council (RC) and the three Hill District Councils (HDC) adopted a 5 year planning for the development of the health sector
Results – Medium Term Strategy	A systemic approach related to the selection criteria, salaries, activities, and follow-up of the performances of the community health workers (CHSWs) has been adopted in the all CHT	Clear selection criteria Same basic salaries Package of activities provided by the CHSWs in the CHT Supervision system implemented in order to follow up performances of the CHSWs
Results – Long Term	Quality and efficiency of health services available in the CHT improved	Number of patients treated in health facilities increased by 50% by 2013 Patient satisfaction with standards of care increases

The sequence in the logframe might also relate a design problem.

Firstly, it assumes that the HDC will implement health programmes in future, while it will always be the Civil Surgeon, and preferably under the HDC. The CS does however not figure in the logframe. The RC and HDC having a health plan does not guarantee anything.

Secondly, the choice for immediate implementation instead of waiting for a tribal health plan has been a sound one, but the activities by the project should have clearly been formulated as a pilot to support formulating the tribal health plan. The fact that the project now shifts from direct to NGO-implementation also shows that is the reality. That pilot should however been officially accepted by not only HDCs, RC and MoCHTA, but most of all by the Ministry of Health.

The mission proposes to change the logframe for this evaluation's purpose to the following, which we feel is basically what the project wants to do and is actually doing. The following chapters will also show that this logframe can be evaluated.

Table 8   Improved Health Logframe, quick and dirty trial

	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
Overall Goal	Health, Nutrition & Population (HNP) in the CHT improved	Maternal Mortality Rate in the CHT reduced by 40% Infant Mortality Rate in the CHT reduced by 30% Malnutrition status of children 0 – 59 months improved Stunting (HAZ) 35% Underweight (WAZ) 27% Contraceptive prevalence rate increased by 20%
Purpose	Improved health behaviour and health care in 15 upazilas	- % of 15 upazila people have at least once a week access to well-staffed clinics and their referral systems within a day's walk - % of 15 upazila people adopt X% of a set of Y promoted health behaviours
Results – Long Term	A well-tested cost-effective Tribal Plan-based health care system that is accepted by the district, regional and national health stakeholders	- the piloted system is in line with tribal health plan - the piloted system is financially feasible for GoB - health indicators for populations covered by the piloted system are at par with those of the rest of Bangladesh - Regional Council (RC), Hill District Councils (HDC) and MoH adopt a partly GoB-financed 5 year health sector development plan
Results – Medium Term	CHSW-system and satellite clinics tested and effective in 15 upazilas	- Number of patients treated in health facilities increased by 50% by 2013 - Patient satisfaction with standards of care increases
	All development stakeholders mobilized and reinforced in the CHT in order to implement HNP activities outlined in the Tribal Plan	- RC, HDC and MoH commit support to the health pilot within their present limitations
	A systemic approach related to the selection criteria, salaries, activities, and follow-up of the performances of the community health workers (CHSWs) has been adopted in the all CHT	- A CHSW system with clear selection criteria, same basic salaries, package of activities provided by the CHSWs in the CHT, and a supervision system implemented in order to follow up performances of the CHSWs

It is further advised that CHTDF will, in revising the logframe, follow as much as possible the logframe and related terminology, as it is used by donor-supported national health plans.

8.4 Health Efficiency

8.4.1 Health Results

The project has substantially increased the proportion of the population with access to health services, shown by the growing numbers of patients making use of them, as detailed in the table above. The network of locally resident CHSWs has provided a reliable and credible point of contact for rural communities, who would otherwise have virtually no access to health facilities. The project has been effective in providing health services to rural communities in 6 upazilas across the three districts of CHT.

Figure 8   Total number of cases treated, 2006-2009[6]

In a structure founded upon CHSWs, the project has been providing basic health services to approximately 1,250 communities in rural areas. The number of patients using CHSWs and satellite clinics has grown over the three years – between 2007 and 2008, when the project coverage was consistent, patient visits to both levels rose by 51%.

8.4.2   Relation between Health Activities and Results

If we take the improved logframe as basis, the activities under the pilot have led to 1) A good system of satellite clinics and CHSW village health care and prevention, 2) ownership by the RC and HDCs, and 3) good health care coverage.

8.4.3   Relation between Health Means and Results

CHTDF has so far chosen for a UNDP-implemented pilot which is much more costly than one implemented through the government or NGOs, but has the advantage of total control of the pilot. Only for the second batch the project will work through NGOs.

The project is presently carrying 100% of the salary costs of the health staff engaged in the project. As of late 2009, these are being transferred to Government pay scales, and being administered by the HDCs, but remaining funded by CHTDF. The shift to public-sector pay scales will bring some cost savings to the project, although it is likely that there will be some dislocation, as some staff that were willing to live and work in CHT for the higher UNDP-pay scales might move on when their salary drops to a lower level. (This process is underway as the evaluation mission undertook its field visits, and it is still too early to identify how many staff may leave the project.)

The quality of the referral level of health care provision is uneven. At the upazila level, half of the medical positions remain vacant, and of those positions recruited, few are consistently available to patients – noted by senior officials in the Civil Surgeon's office in each district. Thus, a patient referred to a higher level of facility might reach there, and find that treatment is not available. Project staff noted that they often recommend referral directly to the district facilities, as absenteeism is less consistently the case there.

As noted, absenteeism remains a serious problem in the public service. One civil surgeon estimated that doctors might be at work for 3 or 4 days per month, at the most, spending the rest of their time in private practice, usually away from the district. Many positions in Upazila facilities are vacant. In light of this, the contribution of CHSWs to healthcare in CHT is extremely important, and given the difficulties in travelling to the district capitals from remote areas, the CHSWs play a role – either in treatment or in referral – which should not be under-estimated, but which hasn't been effectively measured either.

Training costs[7] (US $)

	Cost of full training course	Cost per day of training
CHTDF project CHSWs		

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[6] The total for 2009 is for the period to the end of August

[7] These costs exclude the development of training packages, which are taken as non-recurrent costs which would be spread cross the duration of the project.

(60 days training delivered as one residential block)	613	10
Integrated Community Development project para workers (25 days training in 2 parts)	198	8

The project's training costs are higher than those of the UNICEF-funded Integrated Community Development Project, but that has a larger workforce – some 3,000 para workers compared to 300 CHSWs trained, and hence it will achieve some efficiencies of scale. It was not possible to compare with trainings in the probably much more economically run BRAC programmes. The training provided to the CHSWs requires them to acquire a deeper understanding of health issues, rather than the broader training provided to the ICDP workers. Taking these factors into account, the marginally higher cost per day of training delivered would seem reasonable.

The health component would have achieved more and at lower costs if it had closely worked through the community empowerment programme, through which Community Facilitators have given health and hygiene sessions for about 2000 para communities, and whose PDCs and UnFCs, if used well from the start onwards, would have provided good vehicles for planning and implementation.

The project has transferred payroll management to the HDCs, and these now manage payment of health project staff with CHTDF funding. Costs could have been reduced by learning from other projects. E.g. ICDP has secured the transfer of salary costs to Government. One large project funded by another UN agency has seen 2,000 of their para-level staff salaries transferred to Government, the remaining 1,000 salaries being passed over in a period of 4 years. There was no indication of any discussion with Government about their assuming responsibility for the funding of salaries.

Two other cost issues that need solutions, are the replenishment of drug stocks (now distributed free of cost) and the funding of outreach services, such as the travel costs of the satellite clinics.

8.5   Health Effectiveness

8.5.1   Direct Evidence on what Results contribute to Purpose

Whether following or not following the quick-and-dirty improved logframe, the project does not monitor health behaviour or health care results, only inputs (training sessions and treatment cases), so the project is not able to provide direct evidence that the CHSW-system, the satellite clinics and active involvement and ownership of the stakeholders have led or will lead to improved health behaviour and health care. It is also still too early to see whether the long-term results, notably cost-effectiveness and GoB-acceptance will be achieved.

The patient records maintained meticulously by the project show that the number of patients has climbed steadily since the inception of the project. However, without a relevant baseline and without result monitoring, the project is unable to provide evidence of health effects and changing health behaviour. The very voluminous patient records could have yielded some insights, but are not being processed for the benefit of management or monitoring. The only clear trend visible from the tables is that malaria cases have decreased since the start, but as BRAC runs a Global Fund-funded mosquito net distribution programme in the same areas, this cannot be fully attributed to the CHTDF.

The fact that many patients are satisfied with the services and come back in bigger numbers is a good "circumstantial evidence" indicator that the services have an effect. At the other hand, it was noted in Matiranga and Sajek that numerous patients return with the same problems, some of which were chronic and actually incurable, but others recurred without clear reason, probably also because the patients were not able to follow the instructions on medicine intake. In Sajek patients left with a whole set of (free) medicines and short instructions, clearly not able to read or to follow those instructions. It seemed impossible for the CHSWs to follow up on all those patients, until the next satellite clinic day.

8.6   Health Impact

The project has no baseline or monitoring system that allows it to make any statements on impact. The logframe goal-related indicators refer to reduced maternal mortality rates, infant mortality rates, stunting prevalence, underweight prevalence and contraceptive use prevalence, and improved child malnutrition

status. For some of those indicators it will be very difficult to prove improvement statistically, while for others no reliable baseline is available. It is unfortunate that the CHTDF baseline survey did not cover these indicators or not for relevant upazilas as suggested during the survey design phase by the health team. The health team is now commissioning one more baseline survey, specifically for health. The project should revisit its indicators and select only a few, and only ones that it is sure it will have a measurable impact on.

8.7   Health Sustainability

The component is transforming from an emergency health programme for a very needy area to a pilot project for CHT-relevant services that can be adopted in the mid- or long term by the government and local partners under a tribal health plan. For this to happen the pilot should prove first that is effective in bringing the CHT's health indicators at par with the plains figures, the government objectives, the MDGs or whatever the government agrees to. Secondly it should prove that this is the most cost-effective way to achieve those goals and that the government cannot achieve these goals without spending similar amounts of money and resources. Thirdly the government should have the political will and the resources to implement such tribal health plan. Then only can the benefits and impacts of this component be called sustainable.

As noted, the project is designed in a way that reflects the public health system, and thus it lends itself to easy integration into the public management framework. But as the project is currently implemented, sustainability will still be a long way off. The project is already proving that it can achieve whatever goals with this system and that a system of satellite clinics and CHSWs is an appropriate system for the CHT, but the project has started with the most expensive way, whether that is on purpose or not, and therefore has still a long way to pare down costs and to increase government ownership. It will be a long time before the project has a pilot that can be replicated by the government with minimal aid. Besides implementation through HDCs and NGOs, CHTDF has to work through MoHFW/CS under HDC, learn lessons from UNICEF-ICDP, has to work on replenishment of drug stocks and the funding of outreach services, such as the travel costs of the satellite clinics.

8.8   Health Conclusions and Recommendations

8.8.1   Health Conclusions

The project has made a major and positive contribution to the health of many people in rural areas.

This is a large and complex project, reaching communities in remote districts, and giving many of them a point of entry to secondary healthcare for the first time. The project is designed in a way that enables managers to monitor the performance of the team at subordinate levels, and is also well-placed for integration in the public system, should the funding issue be resolved.

As such, the project makes an important contribution to the overall goals of CHTDF, in advancing confidence building and socio-economic development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and in developing health services for a dispersed population.

The component should be further transformed from an emergency project to a pilot scheme that can be accepted and replicated by the government in the long run.

8.8.2   Health Recommendations

Looking ahead, the project should focus sharply on ways of attaining financial sustainability.

Sustainability

➢   political context
The sustainability of the health services delivered by the project is closely linked to the implementation of the Peace Accord and its provisions for health as a "transferred subject". As such, the project should work with both HDCs, RC and MoHFW to clarify government plans to underpin the transfer of responsibility to the HDCs with the transfer of budgetary authority. This, though, should not become a condition upon which sustainability must be based, and if the transfer to the HDCs is not to happen in the foreseeable future, the discussion should take place with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

➢   salary costs

The project needs to take this forward urgently, with the goal of securing budgetary provision in the next allocation of public funds in May 2010, whether with the HDCs or MoHFW.

> running costs – drug costs, mobility costs

The recurring costs – currently comprising the mobility costs of the satellite clinics and the regular replenishment of pharmaceuticals used by the CHSWs and satellite clinics – should be subject of further study by the project. It would seem unlikely that the HDCs will have resources to support the outreach work – even if the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare transfers the budget to the HDCs, given the present absence of resources for MoHFW staff to travel around the districts and upazilas. For the running costs of the satellite clinics, the project should initiate this issue with the Clinic Management Committees. It should bring policies in line with national health policies and the tribal health plan principles.

The project also needs to examine how costs such as drug supply may be met in years ahead, possibly through interim solutions such as cost-recovery (or partial cost-recovery). (Whilst the mission was in the field, CHTDF had contracted consultants to look at drug management, and hopefully their report will offer concrete recommendations for how this may be resolved. If not, then this is an issue that the project management should return to.)

To strengthen the prospects of sustainability – never an easy achievement – the project should also strengthen its links with the health coordination community. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Tribal Health, Nutrition and Population Plan has been developed, but has not been implemented. This is a national plan, but it is only the three CHT districts which have tribal groups accounting for more than 3% of the district population; thus, its non-implementation in the remainder of Bangladesh may have marginal consequences, but the plan would have wider implications – both for health and broader confidence-building – in CHT. UNDP have an advocacy role, which might best be taken forward firstly with the wider UN system, then with Government, in seeking the implementation of the tribal health plan. This is perhaps a symbol of the challenge facing GoB in ensuring that line ministries[8] engage actively with the transfer of subjects to the HDCs.

If sustainability is not strengthened – and this will be a protracted process – then the erosion and ultimate closure of health facilities is likely to pose a threat to stability in the CHT, as communities see one of the few public services withdrawn. The project should take immediate steps to initiate sustainability through salary support from Government. Whilst the resource allocation issue is a political matter, the project's work in community empowerment could form a foundation for mobilizing public demand for these services.

Monitoring

As mentioned elsewhere, the health project generates a great deal of data. However, it should move to a more strategic data capture, which should help the project and counterparts make adjustments as necessary to their work, and also generate much stronger information for advocacy purposes, whether with donors or those managing Government finances. One example of this is in the area of nutrition surveillance; the project is currently contracting a health survey which will include nutrition assessments, but unless there is relevant comparator data, the results of the nutritional study will give no indication of trends, making programme response more difficult to plan.

Coordination

The HDCs are developing a role in leading the health sector; this is consistent with the "transferred subject" status of health under the Peace Accord, but has only recently begun: the first such meeting in one district occurred whilst the mission was in the field. The project needs to strengthen this, both by supporting the HDCs in this role, but also by building a stronger culture of coordination amongst sector partners; there were some instances which emerged during the mission demonstrating lost opportunities due to the absence of cooperation.

Community Empowerment

The project has developed structures that link the population to management of the health system, but their role could be strengthened. It is difficult to see how the staffing problems – particularly for fully qualified doctors – will be resolved quickly, but a significant part of the government health funding available to CHT is dissipated in salaries for ghost doctors. Addressing this may not enable the HDCs to fully staff their

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[8] i.e. Ministries other than MoCHTA

upazila level facilities, but in raising demand for better health care, the CMCs could encourage closer monitoring of the performance of facilities. This would be consistent with the wider empowerment work of CHTDF, and would deliver a substantial improvement in the provision of health care in the CHT, as well as demonstrating the value of empowerment, and it's potential more widely.

9   CONFIDENCE BUILDING

9.1   Sources of Information

The mission

9.2   Brief Description Confidence Building

The logframe result, i.e. component-level purpose, was: "*Confidence is built to solve long-standing problems critical to sustainable development and peace in CHT*" At present CHTDF formulates the component's purpose as "to contribute to harmonious co-existence, prosperity and peace in the CHT through building mutual trust and confidence among all diverse residents of the CHT".

Purpose indicators:

-Increased interactions, recognition and confidence between and among people, groups and institutions

-Reported incidences of political/ethnic tension on declining trend

Result: *Confidence is built to solve long-standing problems critical to sustainable development and peace in CHT*

The approach and activities as described in the CHTDF-provided logframe and Description of the Action are very unspecific and for evaluation purposes the outputs as listed in the Description of the Action (ASIE/2006/124929) are used. The table in Annex 8Annex 6 Non-CHTDF NGOs working with CHTDF communities, Rangamati 2008

Greenhill	Water & Sanitation	137	12%
CIPD	Micro Credit, Rice Banks	17	
Paddakhep	Micro Credit & Ed.	49	
BRAC	Micro Credit, Health &Ed	7	
IDF	Micro credit & Solar	76	
BRAC	Micro Credit	121	
Grameen Bank	Micro Credit	65	
ASA	Micro Credit	90	
BRDB	Micro Credit	21	
CODEC	Micro Credit	46	44%
MSF,WFP	Health, Food	8	
BRAC	Health Care	12	
BRAC	Health	11	3%
Taungya	Education, Forest preservation	18	
BRAC	Education	55	
SAS	Education	18	
UNICEF	Education	113	
Ahsania mission	Education	65	
ICDP	Education	24	
BRAC	Education	10	
CHTDB	Education	6	
ADB	Education	6	

Ahsania Mission	Education	5	28%
Gramin Shakti	Solar Panel	30	
Ashika	Livelihoods	12	
CARITAS	Horticulture	20	
Green Hill	Rights education	50	
JMF & 17 other NGOs	various	33	
Total projects	for 846 PDCs	1125	

Annex 7   Project Success and Failure according PDC members (Bandarban)

	Community initiated project component name	QIF Contribution (Tk.)	Community Contribution (Tk.)	Opinion PDC meeting on Project success (D.10)			
				Total PDC Member respondents	% Success	% Failure	*Don't know/ No answer/ absent*
1	5.4 | Sanitary Latrine	564,830	140,510	544	**0%**	**0%**	*100%*
2	1.7 | Sugarcane cultivation	245,900	140,600	264	**0%**	**0%**	*100%*
3	4.8 | Spray machine	44,953		21	0%	**100%**	*0%*
4	7.11 | Puller van	5,100	0	44	0%	**0%**	*100%*
5	2.4 | Duck rearing	897,372	201,930	949	**6%**	**13%**	*81%*
6	10.1 | Handloom	243,050	44,500	340	**9%**	**87%**	*4%*
7	1.9 | Nursery	531,450	79,400	432	**21%**	**45%**	*34%*
8	1.4 | Ginger cultivation	14,431,660	3,191,300	4,833	**22%**	**72%**	*6%*
9	4.2 | Power tiller trolley	30	5	42	24%	**76%**	*0%*
10	1.6 | Vegetable gardening	208,987	64,600	117	**26%**	**74%**	*0%*
11	2.5 | Goat rearing	7,974,039	1,530,656	4,377	**28%**	**17%**	*55%*
12	9.3 | Entrepreneurship	1,834,100	248,696	668	**31%**	**54%**	*15%*
13	2.7 | Pig rearing	3,794,207	1,340,160	2,814	**33%**	**24%**	*43%*
14	2.8 | Poultry	605,670	106,700	591	**36%**	**14%**	*49%*
15	5.1 | Water Filter	380,050	33,060	375	**37%**	**17%**	*46%*
16	4.3 | Rice mill	4,204,866	567,007	2,987	**41%**	**38%**	*20%*
17	12.1 | Forestry	646,435	281,108	236	**46%**	**11%**	*43%*
18	4.1 | Power tiller	3,313,218	411,003	2,886	**47%**	**25%**	*28%*
19	9.2 | Small shop	1,396,106	129,339	296	**50%**	**31%**	*19%*
20	4.6 | Pump machine	1,057,391	65,735	538	**51%**	**19%**	*30%*
21	1.5 | Turmeric cultivation	2,380,408	649,698	688	**54%**	**36%**	*10%*
22	3.3 | Fish cultivation Creek/dam	10,018,398	1,394,495	2,626	**55%**	**22%**	*23%*
23	4.4 | Paddle Thresher Machine	1,139,909	200,729	491	**55%**	**33%**	*12%*
24	1.1 | Mixed fruits gardening	10,531,365	3,046,166	3,609	**57%**	**23%**	*21%*
25	3.2 | Fish cultivation in ponds	4,208,032	820,670	1,197	**57%**	**32%**	*11%*
26	7.3 | Engine Boat	1,890,003	145,939	885	**58%**	**23%**	*19%*
27	8.1 | Rice Bank	14,247,458	2,856,279	4,866	**62%**	**20%**	*17%*
28	5.5 | Gravity Flow system	410,014	32,310	49	**63%**	**37%**	*0%*
29	7.2 | Rowing boat	809,651	12,771	904	**68%**	**27%**	*5%*
30	2.6 | Goyal/ Buffalo rearing	2,098,400	242,490	554	**71%**	**29%**	*0%*
31	2.1 | Cattle rearing	111,451,677	14,423,285	20,796	**75%**	**16%**	*9%*
32	6.4 | Generator	164,346	14,104	317	**76%**	**18%**	*6%*
33	4.5 | Seed sowing machine	124,600	15	34	82%	**18%**	*0%*
34	9.1 | Candle factory	188,340	20	34	82%	**18%**	*0%*
35	1.11 | Watermelon cultivation	118,410	143	24	83%	**17%**	*0%*
36	1.8 | Arum cultivation	371,125	23,031	63	**86%**	**14%**	*0%*
37	6.2 | Solar Panel installation	2,654,972	228,223	225	**86%**	**14%**	*0%*
38	1.3 | Paddy cultivation	508,410	56,063	74	**95%**	**5%**	*0%*
	Bandarban Total	**162,421,477**	**31,722,324**	**60,888**	**54%**	**25%**	***21%***

Annex 8 gives an overview of progress (activities, results) against targets and result indicators. The progress column has been compiled with the help of CHTDF.

The component consists of studies and publications, dialogues and exchange activities, media publications and, if concerned Peace Accord elements will be implemented, technical support to the Land Commission, Refugee Task Force, elections, and community forestry. Part of these has been implemented, part of these has not been implemented, while other elements (disaster relief) have been added and others could not have been implemented. See Annex 8.

As with other components, progress is neither reported against multi-year or annual plans, nor against logframe results. Reports with participation and expenditure per activity per year were not available.

9.3   Confidence Building Design Relevance

The component might also be described as assistance to implementation of the Peace Accord, as all its sub-components (minority rights and culture, land, police, elections, refugees, forest) directly derive from that accord. The essence of the design is to keep engaging stakeholders through non-controversial activities, while waiting for opportunities to assist with peace accord implementation.

Annex 9 provides a check on the assumptions and risks and finds these mostly still relevant, although the situation seems to be improving.

The issues dealt with are crucial to confidence building and peace in the area. Nobody else is working on these issues. Other actors and donors expect a lead role from UNDP in this field. The project is in close consultation with CHT leaders on the issues and walks a fine line between all the different interests and opinions. To organise consultation with all relevant key players is not so much a means but an aim of this component.

Overall, the component consists of a vague core that has many overlaps with other components and a series of core issue opportunities for which the project needs to be prepared. This design was relevant in the first phases of CHTDF, but now requires adjustments. At present most important confidence building is actually occurring through the sector components: villagers, leaders and government officials build up trust through continued mutual cooperation at para, Union, Upazila and District level, through quick impact funds, health and education service delivery and institutional capacity building. Experiences with this cooperation also show there is still a long way to go before CHT people and outsiders can deal with each other on an equal basis and in full mutual trust.

UNDP has proven to have the expertise and diplomatic acumen to deal with the overall issues involved. While CHTDF and UNDP are well placed with regard to peace building, police reform and elections, issues with regard to land and forestry will require set-ups and expertise that are not available within CHTDP/UNDP at present and must be arranged when the time of preparation comes.

The mission cannot comment on the design relevance for these components as no attempt has been made at a tentative design, in spite of recommendations to that extent in 2006.

9.4   Confidence Building Efficiency

As the implementation of the peace accord has been in an impasse for long, this component's achievements vis-à-vis the logframe have been limited to few activities related to minority rights and culture, creation of goodwill, dialogues and lobbying.

The team could not acquire detailed reliable information about activities and expenditures on confidence building during the past years. Therefore the assessments and comparisons required for an efficiency evaluation could not be well done. The mission likes to make few remarks:

- The mission is unable to assess what changes resulted from the project, whether costs and applied resources have been reasonable, or whether the project has been better or cheaper than alternatives

- The unfavourable national environment has hindered progress on peace accord implementation, limiting the project often to problem solving.

- There has been progress, but the progress lacks evidence and monitoring data. It is also not possible to attribute this progress to either the CB component, to other components, to other actors, to national developments or to international community involvement.

- Much confidence building has been achieved through other components, without synchronisation or monitoring.

- Expenditure figures coming from the CHTDF financial section show this component spent $3 million during the last 3.5 years. This seems a high level of expenditure, considering that the most costly components (land, elections, refugees, forestry) could not even start. Compared to other components, only a small proportion, i.e. about $600,000-700,000 (20% of $3m), of this has been claimed against the EC-budget (€1.5m). The mission's understanding finances and efficiency would have benefited from an overview of what is budgeted and claimed against which budget and donor.

Table 9   Confidence Building Phase III Budget and Progress

6.5 Confidence Building (CB)	Budget 06-09 (€)	Progress
6.5.1 National, Regional and Community Level Dialogues	96,000	Yes
6.5.2 Community Forestry- Programme strategy preparation and subcontracting	160,000	No
6.5.3 Minority Rights and Cultural Diversity Programmes	220,000	Partly
6.5.4 Capacity Building for Police in CHT	225,000	No
6.5.5 Incentives Programme (Sports4Peace, Awards)	187,500	Partly
6.5.6 Returned Refugees, IDPs and Ex-combatants- Preparation of Strategy and Rehabilitation Programme	250,000	No
6.5.7 Confidence Building Fund -Land & Elections	220,000	No
6.5.8 Community Exchange Visits (CHT and CHT-Plains)	50,000	Yes
6.5.9 Study Tours (post-conflict, indigenous issues)	165,000	Yes
Total	**1,573,500**	

- The relevance of study tours, exchange visits and sports tournaments has been discussed and agreed upon in the 2006 report. Compared to other activities, the mission considers foreign study tours an expensive means of bringing separate stakeholders together. It seems it has become more of a tradition, a perk for stakeholders, not all of whom seem concerned about the actual aim of the event. The fact that the organisers of this year's tour were not aware that to be visited areas of Kalimantan were actually not good examples of conflict resolution, shows further that the project has to be much more rigorous in selection and preparation.

- The small grants fund for confidence building is in principle a good initiative. It has been used to fund cultural, awareness raising and sports events from small organisations. It needs a thoroughly thought-out structure that includes neutral administrators as well as stakeholders from various backgrounds so that risks of favouritism and misuse can be minimised.

- The project has not, as intended and expected, formulated strategies for different scenarios to deal with land, refugees and ex-combatants, police capacity development, and forestry, so that it would be prepared if and when opportunities would come up. Especially support to the land commission would probably be a large, costly, long-duration undertaking, e.g. because of the probably required incentives for people to start new lives either in CHT or outside. Contingency plans and budgets for different scenarios would prepare the project for the future.

- It would also be possible to undertake already neutral activities that will facilitate future ventures in these sectors, like infrastructure mapping based on satellite photos and forestry resource and use mapping.

9.5 Confidence Building Effectiveness

The mission has been unable to evaluate effectiveness well and in detail, as data and monitoring were lacking.

In general the situation and implementation of the peace accord has not improved since 2006. It has actually suffered serious set-backs during the caretaker government, and is only recovering since the recent regime change and the commitments of the present government to implement the Accord.

What has improved is the increase in mutual confidence and cooperation between people, government and development actors. This positive trend, stated by few interviewees, resulted from increasing engagement of development actors in the Hill Tracts. Notably CHTDF's other components have contributed to this.

The main effect of the project comes from simply being there, as has been repeated by many stakeholders. So much so, that some stakeholders found it less important what the project was actually doing. CHTDF's presence has been a deterrent for conflict activities, as potential perpetrators of disruptions do not want to risk project withdrawal or negative reactions from project beneficiaries towards their cause. The project's widespread presence is important in this respect.

The project does not have a peace keeping or conflict resolution role but has been able to successfully alert the government and international community to negative events.

The impression is that the component itself has not improved its clarity and approach since 2006 and should be reviewed and probably revised to become a cross-cutting and mainstreaming aspect to be taken care of by each component, with a senior watchdog-cum-advisor helping and watching the components to build optimum confidence.

9.6   Confidence Building Impact

Changes listed under previous chapters have contributed to overall development and confidence in the CHT. However, without data and evidence it is difficult to assess what the contribution to these trends has been of confidence building activities. The project has only anecdotal evidence that it helps slow down negative trends and accelerate positive trends.

9.7   Confidence Building Sustainability

The impacts the component itself might have had, notably conflict resolution and prevention, are not sustainable and would vanish as soon as CHTDF would withdraw. They can only become sustainable once the Peace Accord is implemented. Therefore it is important that CHTDF and donors commit themselves long-term to CHT peace and development.

There is evidence that some of the institutional cooperation and confidence impacts will last. Government institutions, notably HDCs, UPs, UNOs and line departments, see the need for increased cooperation and sorting out of mandates and have, assisted by the project, taken steps in that direction. Continued engagement with all actors is important to make these changes meaningful and lasting.

Impact, multiplier effects and sustainability of the peace accord-related subcomponents very much depend on the design, which will only be finalised at the time opportunities arise.

9.8   Confidence Building Conclusions

9.8.1   Ethnic Minority Culture and Rights, Dialogue and Exchange

The mission assesses the programme activities related to minority culture and rights, dialogue, study tours, sports tournaments and exchange visits as a good contribution to confidence building. The unplanned interventions on disaster relief and crisis management assistance are also valued for their direct impact, their creation of good will, and the opportunity for institutions to learn to cooperate. The lack of detailed strategies, planning and especially monitoring, however, lead to a loss of transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The lack of detailed implementation strategies for land, refugees and forestry moreover leads to a loss of readiness for the time that assistance is required.

9.8.2   Assistance to Peace Accord Implementation

The conditions for effective assistance to peace accord implementation have not been fulfilled yet, but the situation appears to be changing and the project is exploring support to existing developments with regard to land and refugees. The project has not prepared strategies or shadow plans for such assistance and did not provide estimates for the involved budgets and project duration, although some such opportunities might come up soon since Peace Accord implementation has climbed up on the government agenda.

9.9   Confidence Building Recommendations

9.9.1   Ethnic Minority Culture and Rights, Dialogue and Exchange

• The project should more clearly outline the activities and strategy in the logframe for the subcomponents.

• Budgets for this and the other Confidence Building components should be clearly separated, creating transparency and allowing planning and contingency planning by donors and project

• The confidence building through this component and through the other components would benefit from synchronisation to seize on opportunities within all sectors.

• The design at present can better be based on confidence building through sector activities (mainstreaming), donor commitment for a very long period, and quickly accessible reserve funds for new opportunities. This can create clarity and renewed focus for the different sectors.

• The project should make more effort in involving the ultimate target group, i.e. the displaced, the refugees, the victims of violence, and the settlers, in order to confront leaders with desires and initiatives at grassroots level.

9.9.2   Assistance to Peace Accord Implementation

• Implementation strategies with tentative workplans and budgets for each Peace Accord subsector (land, elections, police, forestry)

• The mission assumes that under the present status-quo, which is the logframe assumption, the project will not be able to book much progress as per the proposed budget, but proposes to include as yet a budget that can accommodate a more optimistic scenario. This will avoid that the project has to find additional funding in case such a more optimistic scenario develops. Part of this budget can be formulated as contingency reserve fund, which according procedures can reach 5% of eligible cost. Exactly this same recommendation was made in 2006, but not implemented. If unused during this phase, the fund will automatically be reallocated to a next phase.

• The mission proposes further that each subcomponent, on which the project can progress with formulation missions, shows a proper subcomponent logframe, a detailed workplan, bar chart, so as to enable proper planning and evaluation. Exactly this same recommendation was made in 2006, but not implemented.

• The mission proposes to explore the possibility to make detailed infrastructure maps of all Unions and Upazilas with the help of satellite photos. This will fix locations of infrastructure and borders of unions and mouzas, and can help stem some of the problems resulting from the present fluid and insecure land situation.

• The mission proposes to explore the possibility to map and study forest resources and use, as well as to study models of government, community and joint forestry management. This will help the project to formulate forestry strategies.

10   INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

10.1 Institutional Capacity Building Relevance

The Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) cluster is specifically designed to assist six high level governmental institutions[9] "function as development agencies in service to people". It aims to achieve this outcome through flexible, needs-based inputs that strengthen status, governance, processes and operational capabilities[10]. Through related outreach activities, ICB also aims to build similar capacity in lower level institutions[11]. Overall, ICB aims to strengthen the capacity of high and lower level institutions to oversee increased resource flows and collaborate effectively address district wide human development priorities, particularly those of the region's 5,400 remote villages. See Annex 11 for the CHT institutional map.

Institutional Capacity Building

"What is an economy for if it is not ensuring that everybody can survive, be healthy and prosper?"
Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Daily Star, Nov-09.

ICB is designed to strengthen local governance and resource management. It also supports inter-communal trust and harmony. Its results also underpin exit strategies for project support to community based organisations and related health, education and economic development services.

The current ICB design has effectively enabled the cluster to deliver a wide range of value results. But in 2009 lacks strategies to assist key stakeholders - including its assisted institutions - address all unfulfilled Peace Accord agreements, the formation and empowerment of fully elected hill district councils in particular.

10.2 Institutional Capacity Building Efficiency

Though cost-to-activity financial reporting capacity has improved in 2009, the mission faced challenges in identifying volume and costs of ICB activities across all years. But the ICB team was able to gather data to inform some degree of objective analysis. From this analysis, the mission verified a wide range of results have been achieved against logframe targets and significant progress has been made against nine of 11 indicators.

An analysis of costs by cluster activities, however, is obscured by the inconsistency of codes since 2003. The project could not provide consistent expenditure figures by component. Figures obtained from different sources vary from $1,000,000 to $2,000,000. Overall, ICB has so far consumed a relatively small part of total project expenditure.

ICB Cluster - Planned Expenditure US$ - 2009 & 2010

Workplan Item	2009	% 2009	2010	% 2010
Project Staff	$151,000	14%	$355,000	18%
Training & W-Shop	$245,000	23%	$400,000	20%
Other (Grants)	$25,000	2%	$700,000	35%
Equip & Furniture	$345,000	32%	$260,000	13%
Contracts	$229,100	21%	$285,000	14%
Overhead Share	$74,900	7%	$0	0%
Total	**$1,070,000**	**100%**	**$2,000,000**	**100%**

The mission noted a marked increase in

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[9] Ministry of CHT Affairs, Regional Council, (Regional) Development Board and the three Hill District Councils.

[10] Operational 'capabilities' refers to people-skill-sets, infrastructure, vehicles and equipment.

[11] The Circle System, Upazila and Union Councils and related Line Departments and local NGOs.

activities ($634,381) in 2008 and notes the project plans to further increase ICB activities to some $1 million in 2009 and $2 million in 2010.

This reflects renewed project commitment to ICB results. But it also indicates the improved operating environment of such ICB activities.

The mission attempted to check progress against the logframe indicators/targets. As some of these were not SMART and most were ambiguous, an exact assessment was not possible, but it was possible to assess progress against the obvious intention behind each indicator/target, While project reporting capacity under represents the full scale of ICB results, the mission was able to verify the cluster has achieved some progress against four and significant progress against five of its 11 targets. **Error! Reference source not found.** provides insight which institutions were reached by which ICB activities, while Annex 13 reflects on progress against logframe results and indicators.

Table 10   Achievement against targets/indicator

Result Indicator	Achievement against "intended" target
Active participation of 90% of key representatives in meetings and high level consensus reached	Significant. Progress
80% of senior and most operational CHTI's staff know and understand mandates, rules of business and capable to link strategies with the regional development plan	Significant progress
Timelines (yearly) of Institutional Self Assessments (ISA) produced by each Institution	Not yet.
6 Human Resource Development performance based training plans developed and implemented	Some progress.
All capacity building initiatives include 60% of existing women staff members	Achieved.
50 % more community focused development projects are initiated and successfully implemented by CHTIs by 2009	Not yet. Starting soon under other components
80% of key staff are trained and 75% of them apply their skills	Significant progress; most GoB regular training still
Prioritized lists of technical assistance and logistical support needs established and procured	Significant progress (see Annex 12)
50% increase of number of interactions between CHTIs and communities	Some progress. No baseline.
6 selected outreach activities are piloted	Some progress.
All targeted CHTI undertake up-to 4 research/policy studies per year after 2007	Unclear.

Important ICB results are actually also achieved through the other CHTDF components, notably CE, but since recently also health and education. Increased involvement of HDCs, RC and MoCHTA in planning and implementation of components, and, equally important, the continuous engagement and strengthening of Union, Upazila and District level planning and implementation agencies and mechanisms(UnFC, UzAC, DPFC), have contributed to creating a more integrated institutional system. Institutions learn, through involvement in CHTDF, valuable lessons about opportunities, their limitations, strengths and mandates, as well as about coordination and cooperation. The HDC Rangamati is learnt to have widened participation in their own District Development Coordination Committee beyond the HDC councillors and administrators to include e.g. NGOs and headmen, reportedly in following of the CHTDF's UnFC, UZAC and DPFC models.

Figure 9   Training   Outputs

Since 2007, the range and volume of activities and results has clearly improved. Much of this is probably due to better staffing and more focus. But it might also reflect the improving operational context. The mission was unable to assess whether the project could have achieved more ICB results with less resources or through more efficient activities in absence of activity wise expenditures and comparable projects. The lack of progress and results monitoring, the staff turn-over rate and the fact that ICB is done under different components certainly handicaps the project in achieving focus, synergy, and ultimately efficiency.

10.3 Institutional Capacity Building Effectiveness

In achieving significant progress against five to nine of its 11 targets, ICB results have improved the capacity of five[12] target institutions to "function as development agencies in service to [poor] people".

Though baselines are missing, and project capacity to monitoring progress is weak, reported results and mission field visits and indicate the ability of CHT institutions to act as effective development agents in 2009 is significantly stronger that their probable baselines in 2003.

A common vision of CHT has been developed - through workshops attended by all key institutions - and senior staff in these institutions possess an improved understanding of what each institution should be doing and how each needs to inter-relate with the others. While significant obstacles to implementing much of the vision remain, staff at all levels have improved their understanding of CHT specific mandates and rules.

Similarly ICB results have done much to clarify confusing or conflicting mandates and rules of business between and within target institutions. A number of key issues have been solved. Others remain to be solved. But at least senior and junior officials know better where the problems lie and what needs to be done to solve them.

ICB results have also clearly supported the evident increase in harmony and inter-action in and between the various ethnic communities of the CHTs. While data to support assessment of project effectiveness, mission interviews suggest all activities have significantly contributed to the reported reduction in political/ethnic tensions and improved inter-communal understandings and respect[13].

A significant factor working against project effectiveness, however, is the lack of institutional integrity within hill district council leadership. So long as these entities remain appointed, and only by five councillors, and so long as line agencies for the transferred subjects still manage most of their programmes outside the control and coordination of the HDCs, the capacity of HDCs to direct a unified administrative process and oversee all district development will remain weak no matter how much ICB support they receive. The flow and administration of development resources - staff and money - will remain divided

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[12] Engagement with CHTDB will remain limited till its future, its control structure, and its mandates are sorted out

[13] Some Purpose level indicator need to be moved up to the Overall Objective (impact) level.

between HDC and DC/UNO teams. The capacity of these capable institutions to work together in the service of the CHT people will not be realised or strengthened.

10.4 Institutional Capacity Building Impact

Assessment of project impact on the wider policy and good-governance environment is complicated by the lack of logframe defined indicators at 'Overall Objective' level. The mission suspects, however, that the project as a whole is contributing to the attainment of more impact than it can currently measure.

The mission feels the impact of growing institutional capacity and confidence, which the project is assisting at district and sub-district levels, is enabling GoB and its external partners to channel increasing flows of staff and money resources into the CHT. But the capacity of the project and its partners to track such critical 'developed capacity' indicators and to adjust approaches to learnt lessons is lacking.

The impact will remain however limited as long as true decentralisation does not take place, and although there is a specific CHT angle to that, the national decentralisation scenario and trends applicable to all the country's districts and upazilas are more important than whether CHTIs will be really empowered or councils elected. In fact, the hill districts are ahead of the rest of the country. The project should hope that the present CHT decentralisation experiment successes, if any, will positively influence the national trends, which in return might allow further meaningful decentralisation in the CHT.

10.5 Institutional Capacity Building Sustainability

In the past six years, the institutional context has not been extremely challenging. Unless the status, mandates and rules of the HDCs are clarified and solutions approved and empowered the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project's capacity building efforts will remain weak. This is particularly so at district where HDC resource-flow management and project exit strategies remain weak.

At lower levels, the sustainability of ICB results look better, but not secure. As discussed in more detail elsewhere, the capacity of project managed PDCs and related health, education and economic services, are still dependent on direct project funding and management. The project is progressively passing sub-district implementation to local, project funded NGOs. This may significantly reduce operation costs, with significant loss of quality. But until the capacity of one or more district level entities, such as HDC or Line Departments, can be built to take over funding and management of district wide service-delivery activities, the sustainability of the project's sub-district activities will remain at risk.

The project needs to study more what other external funding sources - such as UNICEF and ADB - are doing to address their needs for sustainable exit strategies. But it is doubtful if the scale and quality of project services can be absorbed by national entities - public and private - in the current context. Only when hill district councils become elected, and this needs to happen in 2010, and subject transfer is followed up by meaningful decentralisation, the opportunity to build better (institutionally-based) exit strategies will improve, as the capacity of HDCs to attract and oversee larger resource flows - from GoB, AID and private sector sources - will rise significantly. So the key finding is that will achieve sustainable impact until PA stakeholders underline obstacle to HDC capacity building - the lack of elected district assemblies.

10.6 Institutional Capacity Building Conclusions and Recommendations

10.6.1 Conclusions

The project, partly through its ICB component, and partly through sector activities, has contributed to stronger institutions and institutional cooperation and coordination. Through a more systematic approach, rigorous planning and monitoring and integration with sector components, it is possible to further improve achievements. The fact that progress on ICB, and more importantly meaningful implementation of the Peace Accord and national decentralisation policies, is slow, can also be seen as a blessing in disguise, as it allows institutional growth to be gradual instead of precipitous.

Annex 14 discusses issues and possible solutions to the presently missing elected oversight of district administration.

10.6.2 Review ICB Stakeholders

As seen to some extent from the CHT Institutional Map (see Annex 11), ICB is working in a complex institutional environment. What ICB expects to measurably achieve in each stakeholder group needs to be better defined. More precisely, what each group expects from ICB and what ICB expects from them - as supportive mental, material and/or financial contribution - to achieve project Purpose and Overall Objective needs to be clarified. This should be done in early 2010. Among other things, this exercise needs to clarify the project relationship with the DB and DC/UNO team. But it also needs to assess if organisations like the CHT Commission need to become better partners.

10.6.3 Support for (elected) HDCs and Civil-Service to Streamline District Administration

While the problem of conflicting and confused mandates and institutional relations (see

Annex 15 for detailed discussion) is likely to persist until councils are elected and decentralisation is operationalised, the ICB team must be ready and resourced to support the reformation of a single administrative team, under the HDC, as soon as assemblies are elected. Failure to support a rapid unification of the twin administrations, soon after election, risks perpetuating the current system and undermining the capacity of elected council to fulfil their PA envisioned duties.

10.6.4 Define CB-ICB Baselines - Measure Results & Impact

CB-ICB cluster strategies are now due for review and refinement. As part of the re-design process, the project also needs to define measures by which it can qualify and quantify baselines and track CB-ICB progress. This will be a challenging task. See Annex 15 for detailed discussion.

10.6.5 Empower Circle System Intelligence

ICB has done much to strengthen Circle system capacity to implement its government sanctioned role. This awareness, skill and logistical strengthening need to continue. In addition, it is recommended the project finds ways to assist the Circle system bring its core mandate - tribal land management and arbitration - into the 21st century. See Annex 15 for detailed discussion.

10.6.6 Envelop All Service Delivery within a CB-ICB Shell

At present, the capacity of the ICB cluster to direct, oversee and monitor the institutional capacity building activities inherent in the project's service-delivery clusters - Health, Education and Economics - is weak. The reason lies in the initial project design which made strengthening of Peace Accord-related CHTI a core objective. At present a more integrated CHT institutional structure emerges where cooperation between UNO/DC system institutions work more closely with the HTIs, notably the HDCs. Therefore it is time to change to a unified CB-ICB cluster that develops a Policy, Oversight and M&E 'shell' within which all other service-related ICB activities will operate.

This policy shell will enable CB-ICB team members to guide and support service-cluster leaders in strengthening their ICB related activities. It will also enable the project to systematically monitor ICB impact and the progressive hand-over of project service-delivery activities to GoB or private sector bodies.

Furthermore, the shell concept might prove useful if the project decides to step back from direct service delivery and pass training, management and supervision of local NGOs to expert INGO and/or commercial agencies. In this case, the shell might offer the project a concept by which it retains overall management of the CB-ICB shell. This will enable the project to ensure partner measurably strengthen local CHT capacity to progressively take over management of all service-delivery activities by the end of 2013.

11   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1   Component-wise Conclusions

- Confidence Building: The project has a stabilising effect through its widespread presence, its continuous engagement with nearly all stakeholders and its support to crisis management by the national government GoB and the international community. The specific confidence building activities are opportunity driven and lack proper and monitoring and delineation with other components. The lack of detailed plans, monitoring and expenditure reports and the fact that a substantial part of the CB budget has been funded by third parties make it impossible to find out why this component has made high expenditures while its most costly subcomponents (land, forestry, refugees) did not even start. The project has no detailed contingency plans and budgets in place that would prepare the project and potential donors for if new Peace Accord-related opportunities arise.

- Institutions: Strengthened institutions and institutional network at para (2700), Union (75), Upazila (20), district (3), regional and national level through continuous and increasing involvement in implementation and through capacity building measures. The major impacts come from the sector components, and ICB component activities would benefit from result monitoring and integration with the other components.

- Community Empowerment: Capacity built for 2179 para communities, of which 607 with a PNDG, to plan and implement development activities, and to access banks, extension and input supply structures. After three to five years CHTDF, many PDCs are not yet ready to continue on their own, while at the same time capabilities and independence do not seem to increase with continued engagement by CHTDF. The project has to assess whether a shift from high-pressure QIF implementation to other aspects of community empowerment will produce the required result, or that the project has to continue its patron-role for very much longer.

- Economic development: Economic results of more than 5000 CE projects (reaching 2179 PDCs and 200,000+ people) are so far minimal for the majority of PDCs. Various IGAs with selected members of 120 PDCs and 18 weavers groups are only one year old, but results are so far disappointing. Much more would have been achieved if the economic development component had focused on providing proper expertise, technical and marketing support for QIF projects and IGA products. The mission does not see it as a problem that the project could not start youth employment and tourism activities.

- Education: The project supports 150 schools, some of which multi-lingual, with enrolment of about 8500 students. The project is still in the initial stages, and seems to meet needs and demands, but very little is available in terms of either baseline or achievements on its (44!) indicators to evidence the need and the benefits. The project has taken steps to address sustainability issues, but as long as the government and the PEDP-II do not have a CHT-specific or tribal education plan that goes beyond a set of principles, more effort is required to make community schools sustainable.

- Health: Seven CHTDF-medical teams have run satellite clinics in 35 locations of six Upazilas. The clinic catchment areas are covered by an additional 419 CHSWs based at village level. The project has dealt with more than 600,000 cases. The project is expanding to nine more upazilas through collaboration with HDCs and NGOs. The only impact that is evident, e.g. from clinic visitors' feedback, is confidence building. Although villagers obviously benefit from these services, the project does not have or collect evidence of its health impact. The reduction of malaria cases during the first year might be partly due to CHTDF is probably more attributable to the free distribution of mosquito nets by BRAC/Global Fund. The component has been designed as an emergency or peace dividend

project, but the government will also under normal circumstances never be able to replicate the expensive direct UNDP-operation. The project would have benefited from a more modest design with stronger links to CE/PDCs, government, local NGOs and ICDP.

- The following table is an attempt at an overview of component evaluation by criterion. Evaluation is based on quality and quantity at household level and the whole CHT (2700 PDCs is a lot for the CHT, 150 schools not yet). Summarising results in a table like this is risky as it is difficult to catch a complex situation in a + or □ and as it might lead to endless fruitless discussions. It should however not be seen as "final judgment", more as an indication of where at this moment in time the mission thinks improvements are possible and where more discussion is needed.

Criteria (measurable?)	CE	ED	Ed	H	I	CB	T	
Relevance for confidence building	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	**High**
Relevance of design	+/□	-	+	□	□	?	□	**Moderate**
Efficiency	-?	-	?	-?	?	?	-?	**Low?**
Effect on economy	□	-	-	-	-	-	-	**Low**
Effect on service delivery	+	-	□	+	□	-	□	**Moderate**
Effect on Institutions	+	-	□	□	□	-	□	**Moderate**
Impact on peace & confidence	+	-	□?	+?	+	+	□	**High**
Sustainability	□	-	□	-	□	?	-	**Low**

Note: - low, □ moderate, + good

11.2 Conclusions on Project as a Whole

11.2.1 Sources of Information

The mission has observed numerous positive results, but many key results cannot be evidenced.

- Overall, the mission was unable to find a proper listing of the number of activities, numbers of beneficiaries, and results, and to compare these with targets and expected results. Data are scattered and not related to each other.

- The project follows neither EC standards (logframe approach, reporting against logframe targets and result indicators) nor UNDP standards (results-based management). Both the EC and UNDP standards, respectively the project cycle management guidelines and results-based management, focus on results and reporting on results. The mission of course recognises the problems of the project, i.e. multiple donors and a Prodoc of many years ago, and has allowed the project to provide us any logframe against which it wanted to be evaluated. The project submitted the logframe titled "Logical Framework: Promotion of development and confidence in CHT (CHTDF Phase III Logframe)" as the one it should be evaluated against (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). The indicators reported against in the latest (interim) report to the EC however could not be found in any of the different EC and Prodoc logframes shared with the mission. More importantly these indicators lacked any of the required specificity, measurability and timeboundness. Also practically none of a long list of the project's result indicators in the CHTDF Phase III Logframe is reported against.

- The project works on assumptions that its interventions have the desired result, but wherever the mission itself was able to process available data, it got often mixed results. The inability of the project to know what it is achieving and at what cost and at what risk cannot but lead to low efficiency and high risks in the area of effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

- The absence of proper monitoring systems and practices affects reporting to and evaluation by the donor, but more importantly it affects the management of the project. The lack of

monitoring makes it impossible for the management (and donors) to know what is being achieved and what course of action is required.

- The project set up a Planning and Monitoring unit fully staffed with national and international staff. It failed to deliver and is currently being re-structured and re-staffed. The fact that CHTDF has had problems with Dhaka-level monitoring staff is however not the most important reason for the data and monitoring failure, because each component could have easily monitored its own activities and results, on basis of whatever project document or logframe the project thinks suitable.

- The project missed a major opportunity for good monitoring by commissioning a large socio-economic baseline survey that was wholly disconnected from the logframe and planning documents. Moreover, various sector staff commented that they were either not consulted in the design or did not see their recommendations incorporated. Sectors are still struggling to produce relevant baseline data.

- The project has been inconsistent in monitoring, learning lessons and self-improvement. E.g. only a fraction of the Evaluation 2006 recommendations (notably on monitoring and CE improvements as the other components had not taken off yet) were implemented. This can be perfectly right if these recommendations had been considered irrelevant in hindsight or if valid reasons had been given and documented, but neither is the case. The project did not reasons for discarding those recommendations, except for rejecting the proposal to temporarily halt expansion to work until necessary improvements had been made. The mission feels that the most important recommendations are still valid, or even more valid, in 2009 and has had to repeat many of them.

- Also the evaluation, as a result, has spend disproportionate amounts of time on data collecting and processing, instead of random checks of the project's own monitoring findings, and as a result it has had less time and fact basis to come to detailed and clear conclusions and recommendations on various CHTDF aspects.

11.2.2 Gender and Environment

The 2006 mission had conducted a gender and an environment assessment on basis plans provided by the project, and listed activities that the project would conduct. The understands that those (internal EC-) assessments were not binding for UNDP, but important parts have been neglected and chances missed to make the project more gender friendly. They have been attached again as Annex 16 and

Annex 17, and can be easily adjusted to the present situation and needs.

The project has certainly paid attention to gender in different ways. It has increased its gender mainstreaming capabilities through a separate cluster. This has led to more gender focus and several initiatives since 2006. The component has led to PNDGs in CEP and to the CHT Women's Organisation Network (CHTWON), which is one year after its start registered with the government.

The mission has under the CE chapter described how PNDGs are not properly supported and monitored. It also notes that CHTWON, still fragile and donor-led, seems weakly integrated in the rest of the project, maybe even diverting gender staff resources from PNDG monitoring and support and the necessary mainstreaming in other components.

The cluster needs more support to work effectively with each cluster and to focus on advocacy at institutions level. CHTDF should also avoid that CHTWON becomes just another NGO rather than a pressure group that targets CHTDF and related institutions.

As for environment, it is advisable that the project conducts as yet Environmental Impact Assessments or Examinations, as part of feasibility studies, for all relevant economic activities, notably livestock and agriculture activities. The mission took note that the project is planning a general project level EIA soon, with as yet unknown scope and extent.

11.2.3 Relevance of the Design

The UNDP umbrella of the project provides consistency and protection for the whole project and its partners. This is much appreciated by all stakeholders. CHTDF and UNDP presence is under the present circumstances still all-important for peace, stability and development.

11.2.3.1 Facility or Project

CHTDF has been formulated as a development facility, but is in fact a large complex set of projects, to which CHTDF adds components as opportunities and funding occur. All key components are directly implemented by CHTDF, partly through local NGO-contractors. As a result UNDP-CHTDF has at the one hand to provide expertise in sectors relatively foreign to it, while it misses the opportunity to engage organisations with more expertise for specific sectors and limit itself to coordination, m monitoring and to sectors where it has expertise. At the other hand, if CHTDF the Facility mobilises funds for new components or project enlargements, it automatically reduces the time and resources that CHTDF the Project can spend on already committed activities. The donors, who before agreed with CHTDF about a programme and its staffing and management set up, have no control over whether e.g. management and administration will divert more time to the new project at the cost of the earlier agreed commitments. Problems the mission has noted with regard to slow administration, slow decision making in economic development and the lack of monitoring rigour, cannot have been helped by the fact that concerned components depend on support and decisions from a strained central management and administration.

It is valid to ask:

- whether clusters should be delegated to others with more sector expertise

- whether others can do the same with less resources

- whether the project should be split up in components with their own management and financial administration, leaving facilitation to few managers in the Dhaka office

- whether addition of new projects to the same team that cannot manage EC commitments is a wise thing

11.2.4 Review of Alternative Funding and Implementation Modalities

The mission did not find alternative implementation options to the present UNDP-framework that could guarantee the same level of coordinated confidence building. The alternatives are:

4.   The present implementation arrangement, partly delegating work to GoB, consultants and NGOs through contracts and letters of agreement. The project will continue to have the same strengths (coordination, confidence building, continuation) problems with quality delivery, monitoring, project-facility conflicts, procurement, cost efficiency and sustainability.

5.   One EC project with mostly the same format and components, implemented by MoCHTA supported by Technical Assistance (combination of UNDP, consultants, INGOs). This alternative could provide more sector expertise and maybe at less cost. Changing to this alternative however would not be possible without disruption and risk of losing built-up trust and confidence, and complications for accommodating non-EC funding. It would also be difficult to arrange GoB agreement within a phase of CHTDF for which UNDP has just agreed an extension with GoB.

6.   Splitting off of certain components to directly EC-funded projects, implemented by consultants and international organisations/INGOs. Components that might qualify are firstly economic development, health and education. The project's core and guarding the framework would stay with UNDP. This alternative could provide more sector expertise, maybe at less cost and strengthen UNDP's role as facility/facilitator and governance and peace building expert. Separate projects that have the same focus and direction as the core CHTDF and are closely coordinating with it will probably strengthen the position of CHTDF as well as the peace process. Having eggs in different CHT baskets moreover will spread risks. It would further avoid the procurement and cooperation problems that UNDP has had with ICIMOD, multilateral organisations and partner NGOs. Changing over to this alternative would not be possible without a tedious and maybe confusing change over process, and without a risk to project unity. Ideally the Prodoc with GoB would become a tri-partite Prodoc.

Under the circumstances the present set-up has to be continued at least for the next few years, as discontinuation of a project machinery that is set to continue in the same way for many more years, will have only adverse consequences. The mission however thinks the project will gain in strength and cost efficiency, if gradually the service delivery clusters will be delegated to other organisations with more sector expertise, that are allowed to manage their own implementation and administration within a UNDP guiding framework that keeps all components directed towards confidence building and economic development. This would leave institution building and confidence building with UNDP, while Community Empowerment might be done through a UNDP-led conglomerate of INGOs and NGOs. This change over process can be completed within Phase IV.

11.2.5 Efficiency

11.2.5.1 Size and Image

CHTDF is the biggest and most visible development-related institution and operation in the Hill Tracts with € 3-4 million budget per year, 43 vehicles and various speed boats, and more than 1000 staff employed directly or indirectly. Most institutions in the CHT are in one way related and dependent on CHTDF. It is logical that, in spite of this dependency, it is easily accused of faults ranging from bureaucracy and corruption to the increase of vegetable prices. The mission found indications that its image has eroded over the years since 2006. The project should take steps to become less vulnerable to image and relational problems, not so much by extra PR and making more people dependent as is done sometimes, but by streamlining its operations, involving third parties, and continuous vigorous self-critical review and improvement.

11.2.5.2 Staffing and Expertise

The mission understands how difficult it is to bring together a team and group of partners that have management and sector expertise, commitment, nationality and ethnic balance, and understanding of and ability to operate in the challenging CHT situation. It is of the opinion that the project has been able to achieve the optimum levels on these requirements within the team and partner group, from

para level to national level. The only exceptions are the lack of senior technical expertise in monitoring and evaluation and (non- health and education) technical sectors.

11.2.5.3 Operations

The mission noted that a number of partners and project staff from more than one district complain about the slowness of operations. The mission did not have the time, access and resources to evaluate this properly, but found the remarks important enough to recommend CHTDF to review the situation if it is not already doing so.

Only a quick and dirty qualitative comparison could be made with NGOs of two districts. The following table provides feedback from NGOs about fund reimbursement, and shows that UNDP-CHTDF speed is considered to be in the bottom-third of donors in terms of speed. CHTDF management rightly replied that other donors were probably less strict, but the few cases mentioned appeared to concern more lack of priority for smooth field implementation.

Table 11   Reimbursement Speed (feedback Bandarban and Rangamati NGO partners)

Faster(11):	UNICEF, WFP, ADB, DANIDA, ICCO, RIPP/UNDP, Manuser Jono Foundation(EC), Concern, NGO Forum, UCEP, Hope-87(EC)
Same(4):	UNDP-CHTDF, BRAC/NFP, EED Germany, PKSF, IRG
Slower(2):	Global Fund (BRAC), NGO Affairs Bureau(DANIDA)

11.2.5.4 Finance

The mission was, for the same reasons of shortage of time and data, also not able to honour suggestions by few outsiders to conduct a thorough assessment of procurement expenditures. The mission noted that CHTDF was brought in to image problems by a recent New York-imposed rather steep staff salary hike at a time that it was turning down NGO requests for modest salary hikes. Whereas salaries of Upazila based NGO and UNDP staff used to be comparable few years ago, UNDP Upazila staff earns now a multiple of comparable NGO staff. For the evaluation mission it is further very difficult to assess operations beyond observations on the seemingly rather easy use of resources like electricity, vehicles, and speed boats. Whether the operations are efficient, also when compared to other organisations, or can be improved is difficult to judge in the absence of detailed financial information.

The mission intended to get an overview of all the project's expenditures as a context budgets and EC-expenditures from which the role of EC funding can be understood. financial data gathering however led to different data sets (see Annex 18) which could not be well compared with the recent financial status report as submitted to EC to justify a no-cost extension(excluding health). This report is summarised in the table below,   and   given   in   more   detail   in

Annex 18.

Table 12   Phase III Expenditure versus Budget 2007-2009

Budget for the Action; CHTDF	Budget Phase III 07-09	Cumulative Expenditure till Sep'09	Remaining Balance
A	b	c	d=b-c
Expenses	(€)	(€)	(€)
1. Subtotal Human Resources	4,150,241	3,810,788	339,453
2. Subtotal Travel	54,600	48,928	5,672
3. Subtotal Equipment and supplies	484,500	461,900	22,600
4. Subtotal Local office/Action costs	570,000	461,633	108,367
5. Subtotal Other costs, services	125,230	107,468	17,762
6. Other:			
6.1 Subtotal Economic Opportunities	1,307,000	479,705	827,295
6.2 Subtotal Institutional Capacity Building	1,262,750	259,824	1,002,926
6.3 Subtotal Education	1,115,490	871,460	244,030
6.4 Subtotal Community Empowerment	6,228,118	6,560,794	(332,676)
6.5 Subtotal Confidence Building	1,573,500	518,101	1,055,399
6. Subtotal Other	11,486,858	8,689,884	2,796,974
7. Subtotal direct costs of the Action (1-6)	16,871,429	13,580,600	3,290,829
8. Administrative costs	843,571	735,108	108,464
9. Total eligible cost of the Action (7+8)	17,715,000	14,315,708	3,399,293

Juggling around with budget codes and expenditures without having to go for official rebudgeting is a genuine need and tool for each project and financial manager in order to make the project function smoothly, but some of the expenditures raise confusion. The details in the annex show e.g. that €142,000 have been spent on youth employment, while that subcomponent was not implemented, and that €5m was spent on QIF instead of the budgeted €3m. The project also overspent support staff budget by €1m, while underspending the technical staff budget by €0.7m.

When we compare what the project has spent as a whole (except health) during 2007-09 and compare with what EC has funded(see Annex 18 bottom of page), we find that EC seemingly has funded 72% of all expenditures, as little 31% of confidence building and 36% of institutional capacity building and as much as 90% of operations cost.

It is advisable that UNDP and EC sort out any confusion and find a system from which CHTDF can easily show each donor what their place is in the total project and budget An audit, preferably one that includes office management, procurement and subcontract management as well as a carbon footprint audit, could help the project to review and increase efficiency. The audit UNDP is planning for early 2009 is one of the alternatives that might serve the purpose.

11.2.6 Effectiveness

Due to lack of result monitoring in most sectors detailed assessments were not possible, while for some components that started one year ago (education, parts of economic development) it was still too early. Where raw data was available, notably in CEP empowerment and economic development, processing by the mission shows some positive results, some very limited and mixed results, and the realisation that the project is not yet achieving what it intended to. The mission also observed probable positive results that were not monitored by the project. Anecdotal evidence of positive results in conflict prevention and institutional development were mentioned by various external parties. The positive attitude and trust from local people in CHTDF for their community empowerment and health activities also can be taken as circumstantial evidence of positive results.

11.2.7 Impact

The project has had a positive impact on the confidence built over the years in the CHT among people and institutions. This confidence is not yet enough for many communities to deal confidently with outsiders perceived as adversaries, for institutions and communities to settle conflicts and other problems, but there is a gradual increase in awareness, knowledge, skills and capabilities required for settling all the outstanding issues. It is however a fragile confidence that can be easily affected by political shifts, by eruption of local conflicts generated by parties that consider themselves potential losers, by failure of empowerment and economic development activities or by the withdrawal of intensive but unsustainable programmes like the health satellite clinics.

The overall evaluation highlights that the project is important for stability and confidence building. The mission believes that the details and strengths of individual components are as important as the overall peace building goal. Assuming that sector programmes are often considered just tools for peace building, these tools still have to be relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable, because with bad tools peace will be at risk. If PDCs fall in to discord over fund misuse once their executive committees can decide about what happens with the bank balance, if cows die in an epidemic or do not fetch a good price due to market oversaturation, if health services collapse once aid stops, if enrolment rates do not increase, this all will seriously affect confidence and peace.

11.2.8 Sustainability

The project was advised in 2006 to develop exit strategies for different scenarios, for each component, community and institution that the project was involved with, but unfortunately did not follow up. With such strategies the project would have been in a better position to estimate what might be achieved, and how long its various commitments would have to last.

The fragility of impacts discussed above is for a big part due to sustainability problems. If CHTDF would have to withdraw right now, much of what is built up will vanish, although one can imagine that many communities will not lose part of their new found confidence in dealing with projects and outsiders, and that involved institutions like Unions and Upazila agencies might continue in some way and at least for some time to benefit from and work with the network of communities and actors with which they worked for the last few years. Whether HDCs, MoCHTA and RC will sustain the new improvements will be more doubtful, because they depend more on commitment from the government and are also more vulnerable to changes in staff. Until the government adopts well funded tribal health and education plans, the CHTDF health services and many of the schools would very probably have the same problems to continue as e.g. the clinic of MSF-Holland when they left in 2006 and Koinonia when their EC funding ended recently.

The project would have been in a better position to estimate what might be achieved, how it could withdraw from its ongoing commitments and how long its commitment would have to last, if it had formulated exit strategies for different components and target groups under different scenarios. This would have helped the project to develop more sustainable mechanisms.

12   RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides the general component recommendations plus a repetition of all the recommendations given under each component chapter, for easy reference. It closes with project-level recommendations.

12.1 Community Empowerment

12.1.1 CE, Overall

1. Stop to expand to new PDCs till the project has sorted out its challenges. The mission does not agree with the project's statement that in this situation only CHTDF can assist these Paras. There are indeed still tensions in the area, but it is a post-conflict situation, not a conflict situation. The fact that numerous other organisations can work in the same areas proves this. CHTDF was the first sizeable programme in the CHT after CHTDB/ICDP, but it is not the first and only programme that can bring peace dividend to the people. Many others work in the area and are appreciated by the people. The fact that most activities by CHTDF and others do not concern emergency aid and peace building but regular development activities also proves this. The urgency issue is also very relative. If the other deserving paras are impatiently waiting, they have been doing so for 5-6 years and one more year won't make a difference.

    a. Phase out capable PDCs and promote these PDCs with other development actors.

    b. Make a detailed assessment and map about where exactly CHTDF is working, who is covered by other programmes and who of the rest is most deserving, and who should be targeted because of strategic reasons (e.g. remote areas, Bengalis).

    c. If proper assessment shows that delayed entry in not-yet-covered PDCs undermines peace, promote the entrance by third projects like those of BRAC, ADB, and CHTDB, narrowly coordinating with them.

    d. Form anyhow an alliance with other development actors striving to synchronise objectives, approaches and coverage. CHTDF with its mandate, size and clout could easily play a role of facilitation and coordination among agencies and help other agencies to enter deserving areas

2. Design and implement support and phase out strategies for each para, for each ward or cluster of paras and for each union. Strategies should specify what has to be done in terms of empowerment, technical assistance, and coordination with and support to other projects, including the new food security and ADB projects, planning to work with these paras

3. Technical/economic/environmental/social(poverty, gender) assessments per intervention for different target groups and scenarios

4. Appoint international and national technical and community empowerment specialists to guide the component and train and support partner NGOs.

5. Monitor for results for at all levels, including participatory monitoring, both PDCs/PNDGs

6. Review the role of QIFs in the empowerment strategy and see whether the time spent by staff and PDCs on the QIF process are justified vis-a-vis those spent on other empowerment aspects (e.g. gender, benefit distribution) and technical quality. At the same time the project is advised to review whether the pressure and approach of the QIF process has affected empowerment of especially the weaker/less exposed PDCs.

7. The reworded sentence will reflect what we really meant: the project is advised to review the proportion of CE staff/resources spent on the QIF process

8. Transform relations with local NGOs from managed contractors to mature partnerships and capacity building.

9. Detailed recommendations from the relevant chapter are repeated herewith

12.1.2 CE: Empower

- *Empower communities*

- Ensure participatory and systematic monitoring for results (so far training did not make this happen)

- Facilitate the creation of strategic and feasible plans through expertise-backed technical support

- Prioritize income generation as a basis for empowerment; diversify options for QIF utilization

- Ensure women access to all project resources and benefits, including incomes and influence on decision making, with simple community monitoring system of gender equality

- Categorise PDCs and PNDGs by capability, opportunity and duration of past engagement, and draft potential exit strategies for each category

- Plan with each community how to phase out direct support and control, while continuing back up

- Plan mainstreaming of the most capable PDCs and PNDGs as registered institutions on a pilot basis, and systematically monitor to learn lessons for the other PDCs

- Recruit an international and national community empowerment expert as a permanent technical adviser

- *Empower local institutions*

- Draw a road map per Union and Ward to hand over CHTDF tasks of community funding, support and audit to local institutions;

- Enhance local institution capacities and political will for bottom up, pro poor and community centred planning and development

- For sub-Union/supra-PDC level planning and monitoring - not for management or finances - consider ward-level councils in which PDC representatives sit with UP ward members and headmen. Projects above four lakh Taka might be done through project implementation committees, under those ward-level councils.

- *Empower partner NGOs*

- Start phasing over from treating NGOs as contractors to treating NGOs as development partners. Organise dialogues on objective; integrate lessons from their and others' experiences.

- Change contracts for next round of NGOs to allow more ownership for the development processes, to allow a percentage of the budget to be spent on initiatives that the NGOs and their PDCs see as necessary.

- Rigorously review current contracting and fund disbursement procedures which create disruptions in NGO financial and human resource management

12.1.3 CE: Concentrate on creating an enabling environment

- Feed communities' and local partners' decision making with professional feasibility assessments (technical, economic, social, environmental impact) for each type of intervention (cattle breeding, cattle fattening, bananas, lychees, mangos, MAPs, gravity water supply, etcetera). Contract it out to a reputable international-national value chain development consultant consortium/firm.

- Create /enhance market linkages, local service providers(village technicians, contractors, traders), and linkages with NGOs and other service and resource providers

- Study the options for creating a pool of private sector service providers; earmark project funds to support the creation and development of local businesses during a few years

- Seek progress on land issues at local levels, for example by linking up with Bandarban HDC initiatives (to secure lands for a mix fruits gardening project)

12.1.4 CE: Make project monitoring compliant with international standards

Design the monitoring system in coherence with the objective of empowerment and the necessity of exit strategies

- Focus data collection on a limited number of SMART indicators

- Assess and support PNDGs and PDCs with the same tools and objectives

- Organize data analysis so as to create intelligence and enable debates on alternative strategies

- Seek intelligence from various partners like NGOs or advisory committees

- Ensure that the analyses are shared with all partners, in priority the ones who collect data

Keep expenditures transparent and under control

- Each unit manager should be responsible for recording , monitoring and reporting on her /his expenditures

- Structure the expenditures record in coherence with expected results and indicators

- Organize four times a year managers meeting focused on expenditures monitoring and control

12.2 Recommendations Economic Development

12.2.1 ED: Overall

10. Limit first to CEP product value chain development (extension, inputs, services, processing, marketing)

11. Eliminate youth employment and tourism subcomponents and try first to make CEP-based economic development a success

12. Limit all ED to CE product value chain development: extension, inputs, services, processing, and marketing. Activities should include establishment and training of service providers (barefoot technicians, input sellers, indigenous traders), marketing studies, collection points, collection point management committees (made up of producers, not UP officials, NGO staff or traders), linkage development (exchange visits to traders, bazaars, whole sellers, input suppliers)

13. Hire a consulting firm with South-east Asia, South Asia and value chain development expertise to make subsector analyses for each product presently promoted through CE and ED with full technical, economic, social, environmental analyses. The consulting firm team should have as a whole sufficient expertise in working with indigenous people, in working in CHT-like areas and in working on all links in the concerned products' value chain.

14. Review each IGA. Consider a more bottom-up approach for weaving, limited support to mushrooms (incl. spawn production by Ashika), and just monitoring for MAPs, briquettes. Ginger should be integrated in AFSP.

15. Involve international value chain development expert organisation for implementation. This can be INGO, INGO-NGO combination, or combination of INGO and consultant firm.

16. Ensure that Danida project adds as yet thorough sub-sector analyses and technical experts

17. Detailed recommendations from the relevant chapter are repeated herewith:

12.2.2 ED: Future for present IGAs

- Evaluate the presently initiated IGAs after one year (Summer 2010), discontinue those with limited or no success and promote the replicable successes, if any, through the CE component.

- Consider a more bottom-up approach for weaving, taking the women's interests and capabilities as basis for slow but steady business development

- Consider limited support to mushrooms. This could include spawn production by Ashika under condition that Ashika converts to a commercial enterprise or forms a completely independent enterprise.

- Just monitor MAPs and bio-briquettes for one year, and decide

12.2.3 ED: Food Security

- Ensure that Danida and EC Food security projects are based on thorough sub-sector analyses and work with senior experts at project and district level.

- Ensure that the influx of new QIFs from Danida and EC Food security projects (and ADB) does not undermine empowerment and economic development achievements

12.3 Education Recommendations

12.3.1 Education, Overall

18. Conduct CHT- and target area baselines, strategy reviews on basis of baseline findings(area and approach choices), monitoring system, achievements so far and safeguard gains before further expansion

19. Emphasise sustainability: registration, PEDP-II, Tribal Education Plan, exit strategy per school

20. Look to post-5 year education provision

21. Consider inclusion of adult literacy pilot programming, to be based on a survey

22. Detailed recommendations from the relevant chapter are repeated herewith:

12.3.2 Education, Sustainability

- PEDP-II/Tribal Education Plan. The project should continue close coordination and provide MoPE and PEDP-II with information, data and pilot results required for developing a nationally accepted education plan relevant to CHT and tribal people in Bangladesh.

- Political context. The project should work with partners to clarify Government plans to underpin the transfer of responsibility to the HDCs with the transfer of budgetary authority.

- School registration and incentives. One simple way of encouraging this would be by developing incentives for schools completing the first and subsequent steps of registration.

- Teacher training. The project's work in teacher development, particularly in Multi Language Education and child-centred learning, should be integrated in the curriculum of the region's two teacher training institutes.

12.3.3 Education, Post Grade 5 schools

- The project should initiate sooner than later a debate with the HDCs, Ministry of Primary Education and sector partners about the provision of education in CHT beyond Grade 5.

12.3.4 Education, Enrolment rates / Gender Parity

- The project should strengthen its data collection; it should establish for each present and future school catchment the population, the school age children's population, presently available schools, present ethnicity- and gender disaggregated enrolment rates. These data should guide the targeting and intervention design and be the basis for simple though comprehensive monitoring system on trends in enrolment, drop-out or absenteeism.

12.3.5 Education, Multi Language Education

- The project should establish a mechanism to monitor the educational impact of the MLE schools, and how children in those classes have adapted to formal education in the Bangla language compared with their peers entering Bangla language schools without the induction to formal education through the MLE classes.

- Present top-down approaches in the education sector in attitudes towards minority groups should also be subject to close monitoring

12.3.6 Education, Adult Literacy

- The project should continue in its plans to begin adult literacy work in 2010, and engage with the Government's Adult Literacy campaign due to start in January 2010 and with other actors. Timely action and coordination with community empowerment are important

- A strong institutional partner, with demonstrated competence in adult literacy work, should be engaged to take literacy forward, in a limited number of those paras with both PDCs and SMTs.

12.4 Health Recommendations

12.4.1 Health, Overall

23. Health planning needs to be strengthened through:

    a. Development of a shared baseline and monitoring system

    b. Better coordination with other health service actors

    c. A full-fledged strategy review and revision for increased sustainability

24. These steps should be addressed before further expansion is considered, as this will otherwise magnify the existing problems

25. Detailed recommendations from the relevant chapter are repeated herewith:

12.4.2 Health, Sustainability

- Political context. The project should work with both HDCs, RC and MoHFW to clarify government plans to underpin the transfer of responsibility to the HDCs with the transfer of budgetary authority. This, though, should not become a condition upon which sustainability must be based, and if the transfer to the HDCs is not to happen in the foreseeable future, the discussion should take place with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

- Salary costs. The project needs to take this forward urgently, with the goal of securing budgetary provision in the next allocation of public funds in May 2010, whether with the HDCs or MoHFW.

- Running costs – drug costs, mobility costs. The recurring costs should be subject of further study by the project. For the running costs of the satellite clinics, the project should initiate this issue with the Clinic Management Committees. It should bring policies in line with national health policies and the tribal health plan principles.

- The project also needs to examine how costs such as drug supply may be met in years ahead, possibly through interim solutions such as cost-recovery (or partial cost-recovery), and strive to get assistance in this from the presently hired drug management consultants.

- To strengthen the prospects of sustainability the project should also strengthen its links with the health coordination community, especially regarding the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Tribal Health, Nutrition and Population Plan.

- The project should take immediate steps to initiate sustainability through salary support from Government. Whilst the resource allocation issue is a political matter, the project's work in community empowerment could form a foundation for mobilizing public demand for these services.

12.4.3 Health, Monitoring

- The project should move to a more strategic data capture, which should help the project and counterparts make adjustments as necessary to their work, and also generate much stronger information for advocacy purposes, whether with donors or those managing Government finances.

12.4.4 Health, Coordination

- The HDCs are developing a role in leading the health sector; the project needs to strengthen this, both by supporting the HDCs in this role, but also by building a stronger culture of coordination amongst sector partner.

12.4.5 Health, Community Empowerment

- In raising demand for better health care, the CMCs could encourage closer monitoring of the performance of facilities.

12.5 Confidence Building Recommendations

12.5.1 Ethnic Minority Culture and Rights, Dialogue and Exchange

26. The project should more clearly outline the activities and strategy in the logframe for the subcomponents.

27. Budgets for this and the other Confidence Building components should be clearly separated, creating transparency and allowing planning and contingency planning by donors and project

28. The confidence building through this component and through the other components would benefit from synchronisation to seize on opportunities within all sectors.

29. The design at present can better be based on confidence building through sector activities (mainstreaming), donor commitment for a very long period, and quickly accessible reserve funds for new opportunities. This can create clarity and renewed focus for the different sectors.

30. The project should make more effort in involving the ultimate target group, i.e. the displaced, the refugees, the victims of violence, and the settlers, in order to confront leaders with desires and initiatives at grassroots level.

12.5.2 Assistance to Peace Accord Implementation

31. Implementation strategies with tentative workplans and budgets for each Peace Accord subsector (land, elections, police, forestry)

32. The mission assumes that under the present status-quo, which is the logframe assumption, the project will not be able to book much progress as per the proposed budget, but proposes to include as yet a budget that can accommodate a more optimistic scenario. This will avoid that

the project has to find additional funding in case such a more optimistic scenario develops. Part of this budget can be formulated as contingency reserve fund, which according procedures can reach 5% of eligible cost. Exactly this same recommendation was made in 2006, but not implemented. If unused during this phase, the fund will automatically be reallocated to a next phase.

33. The mission proposes further that each subcomponent, on which the project can progress with formulation missions, shows a proper subcomponent logframe, a detailed workplan, bar chart, so as to enable proper planning and evaluation. Exactly this same recommendation was made in 2006, but not implemented.

34. The mission proposes to explore the possibility to make detailed infrastructure maps of all Unions and Upazilas with the help of satellite photos. This will fix locations of infrastructure and borders of unions and mouzas, and can help stem some of the problems resulting from the present fluid and insecure land situation.

35. The mission proposes to explore the possibility to map and study forest resources and use, as well as to study models of government, community and joint forestry management. This will help the project to formulate forestry strategies.

12.6 ICB Recommendations

12.6.1 ICB: Overall

36. Strengthen Project capacity to monitor and report the results (outcomes) of its ICB activities in target institutions and track what they achieve with and without project assistance. Use budget flows managed as indicator.

37. Clarify overall ICB strategy and formulate exit (hand-over) strategies per institution.

38. Integrate the strengthening by CE of lower level institutions (CBOs, NGOs, Line Departments and private-sector partners) and institutional networks in the strategy.

39. Further integrate UNOs and DCs (rights/laws, land, police, UNO links, etc.) in coordination mechanisms to strengthened cooperation and resolving institutional mandates and facilitating progressive exit strategies.

40. Detailed recommendations from the relevant chapter are repeated herewith:

12.6.2 ICB: Other

- The project should organise a review that better defines what ICB and its stakeholders each expect to measurably achieve in each stakeholder group. It should also clarify the project relationship with the CHTDB and DC/UNO team.

- The ICB team must be ready and resourced to support the reformation of a single (RC-HDC-DC-UNO) administrative team, under the HDC.

- ICB, Define CB-ICB Baselines - Measure Results & Impact

- As part of the re-design process, the project also needs to define measures by which it can qualify and quantify baselines and track CB-ICB progress.

- ICB, Empower Circle System Intelligence. It is recommended the project finds ways to assist the Circle system bring its core mandate - tribal land management and arbitration - into the 21st century.

- ICB, Envelop All Service Delivery within a CB-ICB Shell. At present, the capacity of the ICB cluster to direct, oversee and monitor the institutional capacity building activities inherent in the project's service-delivery clusters - Health, Education and Economics - is weak. The reason lies in the initial project design which made strengthening of Peace Accord-related CHTI a core objective. At present a more integrated CHT institutional structure

emerges where UNO/DC system institutions work more closely with the HTIs, notably the HDCs. Therefore it is time to change to a unified CB-ICB cluster that develops a Policy, Oversight and M&E 'shell' within which all other service-related ICB activities will operate. This policy shell will enable CB-ICB team members to guide and support service-cluster leaders in strengthening their ICB related activities.

12.7 Recommendations, Project as a Whole

41. Design Issues: Link all components stricter to CEP and to needs assessments and feasibility studies done at para level.

42. Design Issues: Give ICB and CB more direction and focus, by working from within the various sector components instead of in a general less focused way

Figure 10   Link components closer to CE; Do ICB and CB from within components

43. Design Issues: Decide whether CHTDF is a project or a facility (funding/policy)

    c) If facility: more components to expert INGO and GoB agencies

    d) If project: shrink to a project for which management can ensure adequate technical and social quality, administrative capability, and sound monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

44. Quality issues: To avoid effect and sustainability risks and to increase efficiency and effectiveness, the mission thinks the project should not expand to new areas or new projects/donors in the existing sectors before sorting out the present challenges CHTDF is facing:

    a) Assessments: Do or redo full-blown professional feasibility studies for each type of technical intervention for several scenarios (remote/accessible, poor/not poor, literate/illiterate, landless/Jumiya/land owners)

    b) Expertise: Improve quality by hiring and applying expertise to each intervention

    c) Monitor: Measure and prove results; set up baseline and monitoring system within each cluster. Keep baseline data very limited and directly connected to logframe indicators

    d) Exit strategies; Ensure sustainability of benefits, structures and peace impacts by first developing exit strategies per sector and per para. E.g. do you exit when a para or institution is at par with counterparts in the plains?

    e) Audit: Full blown detailed audit to sort out any lack of insight in financial data, to help the project and UNDP become faster and more efficient in operations, to help the project reduce its carbon foot print

    f) Coverage: Expand collaboration with other development actors (ADB/CHTRDP, CHTDB, BRAC, others) to cover paras that expected CHTDF to come and where no one has worked there as yet. The notion that only through CHTDF development can be achieved should probably change to one that realises (see also the choice of pictures on front cover) that development happens already without CHTDF, and mostly through communities themselves.

45. Funding: Keep funds in reserve to deal with important emerging confidence building opportunities. In that case either reduce regular programmes to free up funds and staff or make separate arrangements that will not drain management capabilities for ongoing programmes.

46. Funding: Increase EC role

    a) Stricter supervision of UNDP

    b) Capacity development for UNDP (e.g. M&E capacity building consultants)

47. Funding: The project proved that the €24 million for the last four years was too much to guarantee quality and focus. So, adjust the budget to real needs and capabilities and allocate rest amount for beyond 2014. It is unlikely that the full €24 million will be needed on top of the food facility €7.5 million and other commitments because the project will have to postpone activities till it has sorted out quality and monitoring issues, and probably have to slow down its pace afterwards, too.

48. Funding: Adjust the total project size and complexity to management capacity that can be reasonably expected (average of last six years). Project size might be expressed in an average annual budget which should logically be lower than the annual expenditures for the last Phase. Project complexity in a number of components that is not higher than the present set minus disaster risk management and scholarships. Reduce EC commitment amounts when project receives other funding to keep the total within agreed annual budget amount.

Annexes

Annex 1   Terms of Reference Evaluation Mission

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EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/multi

LOT N° 13

REQUEST N°: 2009/209906

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE
Evaluation of 'Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT'

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1.   BACKGROUND

1. a) Chittagong Hill Tracts in EC's policy for Bangladesh

The European Commission started to intervene in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in 2005 through the 'Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT' project implemented by UNDP and the Ministry of CHT Affairs (MoCHTA). The project consists of two Phases (Phase 1 from 2005 to 2006 and Phase 2 from 2007 to 2009) to which the EC, as major donor of the action, contributed with a total amount of about EUR 24 000 000. The project is expected to end in November 2009.

Allocations for these interventions in CHT were part of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2002 – 2006 which envisaged the involvement of the EC in the region in support of the consolidation of the Peace Accord through community development, confidence building and institution building measures.

CSP 2007 – 2013 intends to continue supporting the CHT to enhance social development in parallel with political stability and respect for the rights of indigenous communities. The strategy, at the same level of commitment in funds allocations, is expected to be reaffirmed by the Mid Term Review of the CSP. By capitalising on the results achieved so far and by applying the same strategy – expanding of community empowerment activities, improvement of capacity of local institutions, enhancement of economic indicators and consolidation of confidence - a further project is envisaged for a period starting from January 2011. The indicative envelope envisage for the next intervention is about EUR 25 million.

1. b) The social, geographical and political context of CHT

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are situated in the south eastern corner of Bangladesh, it has a total land area of about 13.294 square kilometres equivalent to about 10% of the land area of Bangladesh. The total population in CHT is about 1.5 million the majority of which differ from the Bengalis in terms of racial identity, languages, religion and culture, and include groups of Indian and Tibetan/Burmese origin. Some ninety per cent live in the rural areas. There are eleven ethnic multi lingual minorities in CHT. They are Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khyang, Khumi, Lushai, Marma, Mro, Pankhua, Tanchangya and Tripura.

Overall, the CHT is one of the least developed areas of Bangladesh. Poverty is widespread. Most indigenous peoples are not secured in relation to availability of food during most of the year. About sixty two per cent of households in the region irrespective of ethnicity according to calorie intake (DCI) method are living below the absolute poverty line.

The indigenous people in CHT had substantial autonomy until 1962 when the Government of Pakistan replaced the 'excluded area' status of the CHT with that of 'tribal area' and began to send people other than those of indigenous origin to the region.

In 1950, the Pakistan Government with financial assistance from USAID and the World Bank initiated the construction of the Kaptai Hydro-electric Project to meet the need for energy for industrialisation and growing domestic consumption. This project gave the government an excuse to introduce an influx of non-indigenous populations under the coverage of economic development. The creation of the Kaptai Lake has inundated 54% of the arable land of CHT. It caused displacement of over 100.000 people, mainly indigenous people, from their land.

In 1972, a delegation of indigenous CHT people submitted a memorandum to the first Prime Minister of Bangladesh demanding constitutional recognition of the indigenous people living in CHT and regional autonomy for the protection of their ethnic and cultural identity. This memorandum has never been recognized or reflected in the Constitution of the Republic of Bangladesh. Furthermore, armed groups of Bengalese from the neighbouring districts initiated forceful grabbing of land traditionally owned by the indigenous people.

These are all together generally regarded as the major causes of the armed revolt that began in the '70s and ended in the late '90s.

The government, in response to subsequent insurgencies by the indigenous people, undertook a counter strategy combining the use of military force and socio cultural intervention. Substantial numbers of the indigenous population were expelled from their land and villages coupled with transmigration of tens of thousands of landless and poor Bengalis from the plains land who were settled in plots provided by the state. The main objectives behind this were that the settlement of a large number of Bengali households in CHT would enhance the size of the population loyal to the

state and that these settlements would act as counterweight to the population demanding indigenous peoples' rights and regional autonomy. At present the ratio of Indigenous People to Bengali settlers is approximately 51:49 (1991), while in 1947 it was almost 97:3.

1. c) The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord

The Jum cultivation of slash and burn rotational agriculture practiced by the indigenous people has given them a common identity. The Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), a political party representing the Jumma indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), has been demanding autonomy in the CHT since 1972. It claims that the eleven different ethnic communities in the CHT together constitute the Jumma nation.

The nomenclature was adopted to unify the hilly people under one banner in order to counter the hegemony of the majority. More importantly, it was an assertion of their equality and an attempt to change the negative image associated with tribalism. The PCJSS also demanded that a constitutional guarantee be given to their cultural distinctiveness. It reached an agreement popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord with the Government of Bangladesh in 1997. The Accord provides limited self-rule for the indigenous people. However, after ten years of the signature of the Peace Accord this is only partially implemented. In addition sporadic but violent episodes of human rights violation continue to create tensions in the region.

The period following the Accord saw the substantial involvement by government development planners, bilateral development partners and representatives of multi lateral development agencies to carry out needs assessment missions, socio economic surveys, grassroots opinion seeking dialogues etc. This is the context in which UNDP has launched one of its largest Direct Execution (DEX) interventions in the country under the umbrella of Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) of which EC is the major donor.

1. d) The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF)

This project for the promotion of peace and confidence building in the CHT commenced in 2003 and the present phase will terminate in 2009. The total allocation of the present phase came to US$54 million. The project goal is for improved socio-economic development of the CHT in line with the principles of self-reliance, decentralisation and sustained peace. The project purpose is to reinvigorate and strengthen effective and conducive development mechanisms. The project strategies involve community empowerment, capacity building of CHT institutions, confidence building, multi-level participative planning and implementation, gender awareness raising and the adoption of partnership approaches. Remote communities are considered priorities. The executing agency is the UNDP and the co-operating Bangladeshi agency is the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs. Together with the EC, CIDA contributes to the core programme with an amount of some 15 million CAD.

A request for extension until 2013 for the cost of about USD 80 million has been submitted by UNDP to the Government. The purpose and components of the next phase are supposed to remain the same although the strategy is expected to be refocused to bring greater attention to a) capacity building of local government intuitions, b) strengthen the institutions at village levels to become centres of development in all village activities, c) greater emphasis on the facilitation role of the CHTDF as independent institution in managing and coordinating development activities in CHT, and d) establish linkages with other indigenous people in Bangladesh through the CHTDF.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

2. a) Global objective

The mission will contribute to the social and economic development of CHT in parallel with enhancement of political stability, respect for rights of indigenous communities including solutions to long standing issues.

2. b) Specific objective(s)

The objective of the assignment is to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance of the currently ongoing EC-funded project 'Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT' comprising Phase 1 (2005 – 2006) and Phase II (2007 – 2009), implemented by UNDP and the MoCHTA. On the basis of the above evaluation the mission will supply sufficient information to enable the Government and EC to make an informed opinion of the future intervention in CHT. It has to be noted that the beneficiary of the assignment will be the local institutions and the people, especially the Indigenous population, of CHT.

2. c) Requested services, including suggested methodology

With support of EC staff and by UNDP's experts who will join the mission, the team will accomplish the following tasks:

1) Evaluation:

   - To conduct an in-depth evaluation of the performance of the EC intervention in CHT implemented through UNDP by assessing relevance (including also the project design), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability

- Determine if the results contributed to the EC's overall goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development and in line with international instruments and EU policy on Indigenous People

- Assess strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and potentials of the modality of implementation of the execution of the programme (Contribution Agreement with UNDP).

- Assess the reasonability of the relationship between project costs and achieved results

- Based on lessons learned, to explore and suggest a coherent strategy including also of feasible actions, expected results and objectives for future EC supported intervention in CHT

- Analyse possible options concerning the modality of implementation, make recommendations and advice on management arrangements

- Carry out a detailed stakeholder analysis by including in the analysis also indigenous people outside CHT and explore the feasibility of a strategy for inclusion also of this population into the future programme

- Explore potential linkages with other EC and other donors/development agencies' programmes/projects and suggest coordination arrangements and mechanisms of collaboration

- Analyse and document cross-cutting issues – including gender, environment and human rights implications

- Analyse the likely resource/cost implications

2. c) Required outputs

The mission will deliver:

1) A comprehensive report which includes a) the evaluation's conclusion/findings b) recommendations for the future intervention c) proposed strategy and methodology of implementation for the future intervention.

   The evaluation report shall contain also a mission report recording the itinerary of the mission, the persons met and the institutions represented, summaries of the various meetings with stakeholders and views expressed and appropriate annexes as necessary.

2) A preliminary Logical Framework for future intervention including of relevant indicators

3. EXPERTS PROFILE

3. a) Number of requested experts per category and number of man-days per expert

The team of experts will be composed by three experts, respectively 1 expert category 1 (the Team Leader) 1 expert category 2 and 1 expert category 3

Schedule and number of working days for the assignment per expert:

Mission Stage	Working days			
	Expert 1	**Expert 2**	**Expert 3**	**Total Task-wise**
International Travel (if not residing in Bangladesh)	2	2	2	**6**
Briefing at EC and preparatory work	1	1	1	**3**
Consultations, including field visits, stakeholder meetings, workshops etc.	25	25	25	**75**
Writing of Aide Memoire	1	1	1	**3**
End-of-mission report briefing	1	1	1	**3**
After at latest 12 (calendar) days the following:				
Writing draft versions of the Evaluation report and Logical Framework	6	3	3	**12**
Commission comments within 14 (calendar) days				
Writing final version of the documents	3	1	1	**5**
Submission of final version of the documents not later than 14 days after having received comments from the Delegation				

Total days Expert-wise	39	34	34	107

3. b) Profile required (education, experience, references and category as appropriate)

Expert 1 Team Leader - policy expert; (Category 1)

This expert should have the following educational qualifications and professional experience

- University degree, minimum Master, in Social or Political Science or related disciplines

- A minimum 15 (fifteen) years of professional experience in international co-operation projects and/or developing countries in Asia

- Substantial relevant expertise in conflict prevention and rights of indigenous people

- Knowledge of International and EC Policies of Indigenous People

- Relevant knowledge of South Asia and Bangladesh

- The expert must have experience in project evaluation and designing of strategies

- Good knowledge of current EC procedures and formats

- Proven management skills

- Excellent communication skills, written and spoken English

Expert 2 - (Category 2)

This expert should have the following educational qualifications and professional experience

- At lest a Master Degree in Social Science or related disciplines

- A minimum of 10 (ten) years of professional experience in international co-operation projects and/or developing countries in Asia in the field of rights of minorities/indigenous people and/or conflict prevention

- Experience in Bangladesh is highly desirable

- Fully familiar with Project Cycle Management and Logical Framework approach

- Experience in project evaluation and designing of strategies

- Excellent communication skills, written and spoken English

Expert 3 – (Category 3)

- University degree, minimum Master in Social Science or related disciplines

- A minimum of five (five) years of professional experience in development co-operation projects in Bangladesh and/or other developing countries in the field of protection of vulnerable groups especially indigenous people

- Extensive knowledge of the sector (National/International Policies, CHT Peace Accord and legal framework related to CHT)

- Excellent communication skill, written and spoken English and Bengali. Knowledge of Indigenous languages spoken in CHT will be an asset

3. c) Working language

The working language is English. The services of an interpreter (for Bengali or other indigenous languages spoken in CHT) might be necessary during field visit.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

4. a) Starting period

The assignment should start on 23 August 2009

4. b) Foreseen finishing period or duration

The assignment should be completed by the end of October 2009

4. c) Location(s) of assignment

The location of the assignment will be mainly in Dhaka and in the three Districts of CHT (Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban). Field visits might involve light hiking to reach villages and communities in remote areas

5. REPORTING

5. a) Content

As in 2d) above, the required reporting will consist of:

1)   The Aide Memoire at the end of the mission

2)   Evaluation report

3)   A preliminary Logical Framework for the future intervention

5. b) Language

All reports are to be written in English. In addition to the number of hard copies specified below, the report is to be submitted as well in electronic form using MS Office applications, font Times New Roman and size 12.

5. c) Submission/comments timing

- All documents (Aide Mémoire, draft final reports, final reports etc, and electronic version on CD) will be sent to the Delegation of the European Commission to Bangladesh, Plot 7, Road 84, Gulshan 2, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh to the attention of the Head of Cooperation. The electronic version will be submitted be e-mail to fabrizio.senesi@ec.europa.eu

- The Team Leader has to submit an overall mission work plan (inception report) at the end of the first week in Bangladesh. The Team Leader has to send concise weekly briefing notes to the EC Delegation at the end of each week.

- The consultant needs to present a concise Aide Mémoire (not more than 10 pages – summarizing the major findings) at a debriefing meeting to take place at the EC Delegation. The Aide Mémoire has to be submitted at least 2 working days before the debriefing meeting to the EC Delegation.

- At the latest 12 calendar days after the end of the work in Bangladesh, the contractor will submit 3 hard copies and 1 electronic copy of all the documents stated in 2.d) and 5.a) in draft version to the EC Delegation. Comments on the draft final report will be made not later than 14 calendar days after its receipt by the EC Delegation.

- The final report is to be submitted (4 hard copies and 4 electronic copies) to the EC Delegation not later than 14 calendar days after receipt of the comments transmitted by the EC Delegation. The EC Delegation will be in charge of distributing the copies.

  The structure of the reports should follow the EC guidelines for Project Cycle Management, which, together with others manuals can be downloaded on the following web page: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm. All reports in hard version delivered to the EC Delegation should be printed in recto/verso.

5. d) Number of report(s) copies

- The Aide Mémoire has to be submitted in 3 hard copies and in electronic version by e-mail to the address mentioned in 5.c) first bullet point

- The draft version of the entire set of deliverables as in 2.d) and 5.a) in 3 hard copies, 1 CD and by e-mail to the address mentioned in 5.c) first bullet point

- The final entire set of deliverables as in 2.) and 5.a) in 4 hard copies and 4 CD and by e-mail to the address mentioned in 5.c) first bullet point

6. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

6. a) Other authorized items to foresee under 'Reimbursable'

The budget shall include the cost of "inter-city" travel, logistics, workshop related costs and interpretation under reimbursable items. The cost of 'intra-city' is covered by the per-diems allocations.

6. b) Tax and VAT arrangements

EC funds will not be available to reimburse tax and VAT as per provision of the EC Bangladesh Framework Agreement.

6. c) Others

The mission members are responsible for arranging all visa, hotel bookings, logistics, interpreter, secretarial support, laptops, etc. needs without the assistance of the EC Delegation. The maximum eligible per diem rate will be the published rate on the date of the Request for Services. The per diem rate is fixed for the duration of the assignment.

The Consultants should be aware of the strict visa requirements applicable for Bangladesh, to be taken into account when proposing the starting dates for the mission. Upon request, the Delegation will provide supporting letters for visa applications.

Access to CHT is restricted for foreigners who can enter only after having submitted demand to the local authorities and having received by them clearance. The European Commission will advise accordingly of the procedures to obtain permission.

The team of experts will work together with UNDP's experts who will join the mission and will actively contribute to advising and preparing the outputs.

The provision for person/days required for report writing is to fall within the agreed budget.

The Delegation of the European Commission to Bangladesh will issue its final acceptance on the basis of the final report, but it reserves the right to have the report redrafted by the mission, as many times as may be necessary.

During all contacts with the Bangladesh Authorities or any other Organisation, the consultants will clearly identify themselves as independent consultants and not as official representatives of the European Commission. In this regard all documents and papers produced by the consultants, including presentations and final report, will clearly mention on its first page a disclaimer stating '*This report has been prepared with financial assistance from the European Commission. 'The views expressed herein are those of the consultants and therefore in no way reflect the official opinion of the European Commission or the Government of Bangladesh*'.

Annex 2   CHTDF Phase III Logframe

"Promotion of development & confidence building in CHT"

(This was the logframe provided by the project when the mission asked which of the various available logframes it should evaluate the project against)

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	Assumptions
Overall Objective	**Improved Socio-economic development of Chittagong Hill Tracts in line with the principles of self-reliance, decentralisation and sustained peace**	• Standard social, economic, and employment indicators plus program based indicators used in the 2006 CHTDF baseline survey[14] • Standard governance indicators (cf. UNDP governance section) applied to CHT institutions.[15]	• CHDTF Region wide baseline and annual surveys • Monitoring reports of purpose indicators in each component • CHTIs institutional self assessments & activity reports • Research / studies of independent organisations	
Project Purposes	**Effective and conducive development mechanism in CHT reinvigorated and strengthened**	• A common vision and strategy for the CHT is developed and disseminated by 6 official institutions. • Mandates and rules of business of institutions are clarified, disseminated, approved and reinforced; more than 50% of CHTI possess community intervention approaches and knowledge transfer methodologies that are adjusted to conditions of the various CHT communities • Local producers market higher volumes and get higher prices • Optimal prices and marketing channels for village products • Increased access to and demand for basic education through non-formal community-based education • Confidence, technical skills and income generated in 1650 targeted communities • In 50% households (in 75% of most vulnerable ones) income is increased • 75 % of communities successfully and independently (without CHTDF and NGOs) implement and manage development activities • Gender equity enhanced through small community run projects • Increased interactions, mutual recognition and confidence between and among people,	• Analyses of requests for QIF instalments, bi annual Community Empowerment surveys • CHTDF and CHTIs' focal points joint monitoring • ISA reports and staff performance assessments • CHTDF tracking and coaching system • Reports of Youth Entrepreneurs Corps &Collection points management groups • Media reports	Government upholds its stated commitment towards the development of CHT No drastic deterioration in the political / security situation

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[14] UNDP will conduct a baseline survey to provide benchmarks in all 4 programme areas from August 2006 to January 2007. It is envisaged that a minimum of 5000 households will be surveyed.

[15] Governance indicators will be finalised in the initial months of implementation of the Institutional Capacity Building component, drawing also on the experience of the UNDP Local Governance Project.

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	**Assumptions**
		• different groups and institutions • Reported incidences of political / ethnic tension on declining trend		
Expected Results	*1. Six CHT Institutions function as development agencies in service to people*	• Active participation of 90% of key representatives in meetings and high level consensus reached • 80% of senior and most operational CHTI's staff know and understand mandates, rules of business and capable to link strategies with the regional development plan • Timelines (yearly) of Institutional Self Assessments (ISA) produced by each Institution • 6 Human Resource Development performance based training plans developed and implemented • All capacity building initiatives include 60% of existing women staff members • 50 % more community focused development projects are initiated and successfully implemented by CHTIs by 2009 • 80% of key staff are trained and 75% of them apply their skills • Prioritized lists of technical assistance and logistical support needs established and procured • 50% increase of number of interactions between CHTIs and communities • 6 selected outreach activities are piloted • All targeted CHTI undertake up-to 4 research/policy studies per year after 2007	• CHTDF and CHTIs' focal points joint monitoring of the process for strategy and mandates clarification • ICBF/CHTDF semestral updates on standard indicators • Proceedings on MoCHTA meetings and annual reports of other CHTIs. • Field visits reports by institutions, GoB and CHTDF to communities receiving CHTIs services • CEP bi-annual surveys and PDCs findings from self-monitoring • ISA reports and staff performance assessments • EC / UNDP / MoCHTA evaluation reports	Conducive political environment Central Govt. Concurrence CHTIs capacities are utilised to contribute to community empowerment and economic development CHTIs have the means to assume their operational responsibilities Retention of senior and junior staff GoB has no objection to the use of GIS CHTIs can assume their operational responsibilities. **Staff stability**
	2. (a) Economic opportunities enhanced for small local enterprises, youth and farmers	• *500 youth are trained in entrepreneurship skills, 70% of youth trainees are self-employed or employed; 50% of (self) employed are women* • *50% of young entrepreneurs benefit from Entrepreneurs Corps (WYEC and YEC)* • *Trainees drop-out rate below 20%* • *Women trainees drop out not higher and success rate not lower than men's* • *30 marketable skills and opportunities identified; 20 commercial items developed and marketed* • *75% of Collection Points actively used and effectively managed and use Market Info System* • *75% of trained producers practice sorting, grading, storing as trained and are active Self Help Group members*	• WYEC and YEC records • CHTDF/RC/HDC baseline reports and market surveys • UnFC baseline and PDC self monitoring findings • Collection points records • Product assessment reports • Annual evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness of Market Info System and Collection points	Markets not more instable than in the past decade Responsible profit sharing by external partners Policies and regulations do not hamper credit and investment-provisions Overall macro-economic situation does not go down and security situation does not deteriorate Commitment of Business and Finance Institutions is

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	**Assumptions**
		• *15% increased registration of local SM Enterprises and finance readily available for SMEs* • *15% new CHT-rest-of-Bangladesh business partnerships* • *100 new jobs in Community Based tourism and 30% increased income for households* • *Tourism packages replicated elsewhere* • *Environment, Social and Gender impact is positive or neutral*	• Business Promo Centre and Chambers of Commerce records • Environment, Social and Gender Impact Assessments reports	confirmed ***For tourism activities*** Compulsory police escort for foreigners abandoned CHT leaders agreement to Community Based tourism obtained
	2 (b) Literacy increased in CHT through education scheme adapted to local context	• *90% of children in the catchment's areas enrolled; 80% of the enrolled students complete minimum 3 years of schooling* • *Education material, publications and methodology developed in local languages and context* • *Education approach accepted/replicated by the GoB* • *98% of community teachers apply learnt methods* • *Non-formal teacher training included in NGOs and GoB's Primary Training Insitutes* • *80% School Management Committees sustainable and effective* • *30% of schools supported by GoB by the end of the project* • *70% of schools continue activities through contribution of communities and continuous support of NGOs* • *Education unit in HDCs functional* • *Frequency DPEO/HDC field visit to community schools* • *Successfully piloted initiatives adopted by DPEO* • *Education strategies aligned with PEDP II*	• Baseline surveys • CHTDF/UnFC reports/minutes/records • HDC/GoB reports	GoB support (both at policy and resource allocation level) on basic education in CHT does not decrease No further degradation of ethnic political environment in the region PTI management transferred to HDC GoB commitment to strengthening CHT decentralized institutions
	3. Local organizations and Communities empowered and their capacity enhanced to manage themselves their development	• *75 % of community members (women /men/ vulnerable households) know and understand their rights, have changed some of their practices, know where to get technical support, raise their voice in meetings, are involved in new community projects* • *75 % of communities manage their project monitoring alone, have diversified leadership; 70% have projects which can equally benefit men and women* • *75% of PDCs and 75% of women-headed PDCs manage alone technical and financial aspects, generate significant profits, hold regular meetings without external facilitator, start new projects with QIF* • *65% of communities actually receive support by CHTIs*	• PDCs feedback on findings from their own project monitoring (through PRA) • NGOs and CHTDF Technical Officers/Training Specialist assessments of training effectiveness and impact • Interviews of Line Agencies officials	Attitudes of institutions and officials will not deteriorate No drastic deterioration in the political/security situation Staff and methodology of local administration will not change GoB upholds its stated

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	**Assumptions**
		• *In 75% of communities projects women have increased influence on collective decisions* • *In 50% of communities women have emerged as leaders* • *In 50% of CHTIs intervention approaches and knowledge transfer methodology are adjusted to conditions of the various CHT communities.* • *75% of communities where traditional leaders play supportive roles*	• Minutes of the UzST/UzAC and DPFC meetings and Focus groups • CHTDF analysis of all requests for 2nd and 3rd instalments • Gender analysis of projects per sector • Interim and Final evaluation reports	commitment towards the democratic development of CHT Resistance to the aspect of gender equity and social change does not increase Markets not more instable than in the past decade Climate conditions similar to the past decade

	4. Confidence is bult to solve the long-standing problems critical to sustainable development an peace in the CHT	• *Hill Tracts' oral and written histories, indigenous customs, practices, arts, laws and culture studied, recorded and disseminated*
		• *Up to 6 media materials produced per year available for the larger public of the country*
		• *All CHT institutions initiate follow up actions of the dialogue processes*
		• *High level of consensus on dialogue topics and high diversity of participant's backgrounds during formal/informal meetings; all criteria of participant's selection are strictly applied (diversity of ethnic backgrounds, representative of participants, relevance of their mandates); at least 30% participants are women*
		• *24 sports camps organised attended by not less than 50% participants; high public participation during tournaments*
		• *CHTDF/UNDP maintain dialogue at national level with exploratory and preparatory measures guided by GoB; at least one official and public meeting per issue before 2009*
		• When active technical support is possible:
		  - *Several Land cases processed by Land Commission*
		  - *360 police working in CHT trained in policing practices and human rights by the end of the project period*
		  - *HDC (+RC) elections held*
		  - *20 Community Forestry projects piloted*
		  - *30% of the participants/beneficiaries of pilot forest and land management initiatives are women*
			• CHTDF documents and reports
			• Screening of media coverage of minority issues
			• Monitoring of progress made by socio-cultural institutes and community based organizations promoting minority rights and culture
			• Results and impact of study tours jointly evaluated by CB management team and other components
			• CHTDF-CB unit's reviews of feedback papers from exchange visits participants
			• Case studies
			• Quarterly progress analysis by CHTDF management
			• Land Commission reports
				Overall socio-political atmosphere is conducive
				
				Level of tolerance does not decrease further
				
				International interest on CHT does not decline
				
				GoB give green light to institutions to assume their mandated and responsibilties
				
				Achievements of other components of the CHT programme
				
				GoB's sustained concurrence
				
				No increase in communal and political violence
				
				Level of discords between institutions does not increase
				
				Sufficient number of women with relevant managerial authority in target institutions

Activities	Means	Cost in Euro
INSTITUTION CAPACITY BUILDING		
• *Individual workshops with CHTIs on developing institution's vision; prepare report on workshops, discuss it in plenary and disseminate it*	CHT Common vision and strategy formulation	22,500
	CHT mandate and rules of business support	43,200
• *Prepare and discuss with all relevant stakeholders Draft paper on "Common Vision and Strategy", than finalize and publish it*	Institutional capacity self assessments	202,000
• *Form high level task force to review existing rules of business, redraft mandates, disseminate among relevant institutions and stakeholders*	Human resource development	50,000
	Technical assistance and logistic support	189,500
• *Conduct higher\regional\national level workshops, discussions and finalization of findings*	Organisational design assessment & resource plan	23,000
• *Finalise the Mandates & Rules of Business and seek approval by GoB, publish and disseminate it*	Outreach activities CHTIs	40,000
	Policy development and regional/district planning	148,400
• *Develop draft Institutional Self Assessment (ISA) toolkit and pilot it*	Research policy fund	68,000
• *Training of field staff for facilitation and tracking of ISA implementation*	ICB technical and ICT support	296,000
• *Baseline on gender equity for ISA's gender indicators*	Technical backstopping	180,000
• *Develop Human Resources Management Plan (HRDP) for each institution*	Core human resources	286,000
• *Develop training modules on Human Resources Development Plan for ToT*	Equipment and office cost	287,000
• *Development of technical and logistical support plan (TLSP) and provide logistics*		
• *Training to CHTI on HRDP and TLSP*		
• *Develop Plan for Change and operationalise it*	**GROSS TOTAL ICB**	**1,835,600**
• *Develop community outreach strategies for CHTIs and pilot outreach activities*		
• *Establish Planning Cells in MoCHTA and RC and equip them*		
• *Establish Research and Policy development cells in MoCHTA and RC*		
• *Recruit staff by MoCHTA and train them in regional and sub-regional planning and programming*		

REGION WIDE INITIATIVES (ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES – EDUCATION)		
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES:	**ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES**	
• *Develop Youth market analysis and development of gender sensitive training modules*	Youth employment promotion	258,500
• *Apprenticeship and training on basic and advanced entrepreneurship*	Marketing and infrastructure programmes	294,000
• *Establish Youth Entrepreneurship Corps*	Private sector development	229,000
• *Basic Self Help Formation, organization and capacity building*	Community based tourism	525,000
• *Construction of Collection Points and connecting roads*	Core human resources:	268,500
• *ToT on management of collection centre, group marketing, post harvest handling*	Equipment and office costs:	182,000
• *Training for farmers, marketing groups and NGOs*		
• *Set up marketing technical unit in the CHT RC*	**TOTAL EOP:**	**1,757,000**
• *Exchange visit of PDC members to pilot market activities*		
• *Studies and research on market opportunities and trends*		
• *Formation and promotion of women groups, youth groups and weavers groups*		
• *Establish CHT Business Promotion/Facilitation Centre*		
• *Strengthen CHT Chambers of Commerce and Business Associations*		
• *Establish production units for: handmade paper, indigenous textile manufacturing and exports, agro-processing, bee keeping.*		
• *Training on IT, electrician*		
• *Job placement unit and linkages with major enterprises*		
• *Develop of tourism packages and market linkages strategy and set up tourism centres*		
• *Establish local tourism associations and train staff*		
• *Documentation of best practices in tourism*		
EDUCATION:	Local implementing partners contract	137,000
• *Union Nirbahi Officer/Upazila Advisory Committee briefed; Unions selection; selection of PDCs*	Education planning, community mobilisation/advoc	219,600
• *Union Parishad/UnFC oriented to education strategy and facilitated to develop plan*	Teacher training and support	142,000
• *Community Bases Model Schools established and functioning*	Multilingual education initiatives	316,890
• *Education Task Groups formed*	Access to education programme	300,000
• *Schools' curriculum and educational material printed and disseminated*	Core human resources	125,000

• *Teachers' training*	Equipment and office costs	223,500
• *Form School Management Committees (PMC)/Primary Teachers Associations (PTA) training*		
• *Training to HDC primary education units staff*	**TOTAL of Education:**	**1,463,990**
• *NGOs subcontracted*	**GROSS TOTAL EO & EDUCATION:**	**3,220,990**
COMMUNITIY EMPOWERMENT		
• *Select, orient and organize Para Communities*	Quick Impact Fund	3,546,560
• *Formulate Community Based Capacity Building document*	Sub Contracts - Backstopping CE	410,058
• *Participatory monitoring and assessment of first 600 PDCs; sharing lessons learned*	Backstopping 19 partner NGOs	1,149,500
• *Provide/coordinate technical and operational support for designing 1650 small projects*	Local Gov. Community Outreach Support Services	243,000
• *Collection and dissemination of CHT Best Practices Hand Book*	Community Management/ and Skills programmes	145,800
• *Provide QIF Micro Grants to 1650 PDCs*	Environmental Mgmtt & Conservation initiatives	121,500
• *Create linkages with Economic Opportunities Components and market assessment, management of market opportunities*	Community Based Disaster Management	121,500
• *Regular meetings and workshops with all project support committees (UnFC, UzAC/UxST,DPFC)*	NGO Capacity Building initiatives	194,400
• *Training on confidence building, non-literate skills, leadership, organizational, participatory and management skills*	Strengthening Traditional and Elected Leaders	145,800
• *Exchange visits among communities*	Gender Mainstreaming activities	150,000
• *Regular PRA exercises with special focus on self-reliance and needs of women*	Core HR	2,883,371
• *Develop technical training programme for women members of PDCs*	Equipment and office costs:	625,200
• *Dialogue meetings with traditional and elected leaders*		
• *Identification and assignment of appropriate roles of traditional and elected leaders and organize training courses*	**GROSS TOTAL COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT:**	**9,736,689**
CONFIDENCE BUILDING		
• *Create an "Advisory Committee" for promotion of minority rights and culture*	National, Regional, Community Level Dialogues	96,000
• *Consultation, workshops on promotion of cultural diversity and implement initiatives*	Community Forestry	160,000
• *Publications i.e. "Oral/Written History", dictionaries, grammar on ethnic languages*	Minority Rights & Cultural Diversity Programmes	220,000
• *Consultation, sensitization and mobilization of stakeholders preparation of "Concept notes/Position papers" and dissemination to increase mutial recognition beteween and among people and institutions*	Capacity Building for Police in CHT	225,000
• *Consultation with stakeholders and team formation for exchange visits*	Incentives Programme (Sports4Peace, Awards)	187,500

• *Exchanges visits and debriefing thorough workshops*	Returned Refugees, IDPS and Ex-combatants	250,000
	Confidence Building Fund -Land & Elections	220,000
Land		
• *Consultation and negotiation with GoB on activation of Land Commission*	Community Exchange Visits	50,000
	Study Tours	165,000
• *Regular support to functioning of Land Commission*		
• *Facilitation and mediation (where possible) to resolve Land Disputes cases*	Human resources	386,000
	Equipment and office costs	118,650
• *Awareness generation, sensitization and mobilization on land rights issues*		
• *Collation/preparation of reports and dissemination*		
Police	**GROSS TOTAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING:**	**2,078,150**
• *Consultation with GoB CHT institutions and UNDP Police Reform Programme*		
• *Training*		
• *Documentation and dissemination*		
Electoral Commission		
• *Consultation with relevant stakeholders*		
• *Negotiation with Elections Commission an GoB*	**Summary budget**	
• *Sensitization initiatives on HDC elections*		
• *Technical assistance in preparing voter list in CHTHDC elections*	**Subtotal direct cost of the Action:**	
• *Documentation and dissemination*		
Refugee Task Force	**Administrative costs (5% of total direct eligible costs of the Action):**	**16,871,429**
• *Consultation with relevant stakeholders and preparation of strategy*		
• *Establish a CHT Returned Refugee, Internal Displaced People and Ex-combatants Special Fund Advisory Committee, involving GoB CHT institutions and representatives of beneficiaries*	**Total eligible cost of the Action (direct + administrative):**	**843,571**
• *Rehabilitation initiatives for displaced people.*		
Community Forestry		**€ 17,715,000**
• *Consultation with relevant stakeholders*		
• *Selection of pilot communities and implement pilot programme*		
• *Preparation, Dissemination of reports*		
PRE CONDITIONS	Continued GoB commitment towards socio-economic development	
	The Peace Accord is not cancelled	

Annex 3   Mission Itinerary and Persons Met

(JT-John Tacon, SS-Simon Strachan, MM-Marie Therese Mayoux, AvR-Arend van Riessen)

October'09	
04 Sunday	**EC Dhaka:** Milko van Gool-Counsellor/Head of Cooperation, Fabrizio Senesi-PO, Nadia Rashid-PO Health **CHTDF-Dhaka:** Patrick Sweeting(Director), Prasenjit Chakma (Deputy Director), Prasanta Tripura (Chief Serv.Delivery), Andre Louhanapessy(Programme Officer), Lysanna Howard(Asst Director)
05 Monday	**CHTDF- Dhaka:** discussions and documentation study, field trip planning **UNDP Dhaka:** Stefan Priesner- UNDP Country Director **Dhaka Restaurant:** dinner with CHTDF-related donors and development actors (e.g. ADB, Danida, CIDA, EC, CHTDF, UNDP)
06 Tuesday	Travel to Rangamati **CHTDF-Rangamati:** Presentations and discussions *Project Overview* (Patrick Sweeting - Project Director, and team), *Community Empowerment and Economic development* (Biplab Chakma- CEP CL, Robert Stoelman - Chief Implementation, Stamina Khyang- ED);
07 Wednesday	**CHTDF-Rangamati:** Presentations/discussions *Capacity Development* (Mira Mariano, TA), Khushiray Tripura(DC Bandarban), Priyatar Chakma (DC –Khagrachari), Oishwarja Chakma (FC-Rangamati)), *Knowledge management* (Nasheeba Selim-CL), *Confidence Building* (Prasenjit Chakma - Deputy Project Director, Hossain Shahid-CL) *Education* :Shwe Aung Prue-CL, Nic l'Anson-TA**,** Prashanta Tripura- Chief *Health:* Dr. Rabiul Alam- CL, Pierre Claquin –TA, Prashanta Tripura-Chief
08 Thursday	**CHTDF-Rangamati:** Presentations/discussions Disaster Management: Jayesh Khisa-CL *Gender*: Jhuma Dewan-CL *Implementation and Coordination Issues:* Rob Stoelman -Chief, District managers, Chiefs
09 Friday	Day Off
10 Saturday	Travel to Khagrachari (All) **Madhya Lemuchari Para, Maischari Union, Mahalchari Upazila:** PDC/PNDG members, Tube wells, Rice mill, fishery, cows (with CHTDF UzC, FS, and NGO Khagrapur MS Khagendra Tripura, UPC, CF) (All) **Banok Training Centre, Khagrachari Sadar:** 1st year and 2nd year CHSW trainees **from** Laxmichari and Matiranga (All)
11 Sunday	**Shashantila Para, Guimara Union, Matiranga Upazila:** MLE Classroom activity, SMC, Mothers Group and PTA, Female UP Ward Member, with Zabarang UEO T. Chakma, PC D.Tripura, CF Tripura, M&EO D.Tripura, MLE Off K.Tripura, and CHTDF ES Khisa, CHTDF UzHC Parvin (JT, MM, AvR) Rabi Sundar Para, Belachari Union, Matiranga Upazila: PDC, PNDG, tube wells, fruits (JT,MM,AvR) **Belachari Union, Matiranga Upazila::** Satellite Clinic, Dr Shaheen, mobile clinic team, SC Mgt Committee, patients(JT,MM,AvR) **Barnal Union Parishad Office, Matiranga Uz**: UnFC, incl. Abdul Matin- UP Chair, UP members, headmen, teacher, PDCs, PNDGs, CHSW, CF, ALO NGO(JT,MM,AvR) **Matiranga UNO Office**: UzAC. Dr. Md. Mustafizur Rahman-UNO, Md. Hamidul Islam-Uz Education Officer, Mr. Nasir Uddin-Uz Agriculture Officer, Uz Livestock Off, SA Engineer- Public Health Engineering, 6 UP Chairmen, 2 headmen, CHTDF CEFS, EFS(JT,MM,AvR)
12 Monday	**Ruilui, Sajek Union, Baghaichari Upazila, Rangamati:** CHTDF sub-office, 2 PDCs (Middle (Lushai) and Lower(Tripura) Rui Lui), incl. headman, karbari, 3 CFs Hilehili (AvR) **8 No. Para Satellite Clinic, 8 No. Para, Sajek Union, Rangamati**: Satellite Clinic, doctors, CHSWs, patients, Dt Health Coordinator Mr Sayem; SC Management Committees incl. Gyanamoy Chakma-

	President (AvR)
	Viza Nandaram Para, Sajek Union, Baghaichari Uz: PDC/PNDG, fruit garden, cows(AvR)
	Sajek Union, Baghaichari Uz: very short interactions with four roadside PDCs: Ret Katanu, Ulluchara, Gongaramu, Balughat(AvR)
	Bangaltali Clinic, Sajek, Baghaichari Uz, Rangamati: MSF Clinic, doctors and team(AvR)
	CEP Office, Zabarang Kalyan Samity, Panchari: PNGO office and staff. Tapan Bikash Tripura, UPC-CE, Zabarang, Parimal Chakma- M&E Officer, Zabarang(MM&JT)
	CHTDF-Panchari Office: Office and staff, incl. Riten Talukder-CE field supervisor(MM&JT)
	Kongchairee Para, Latiban Union, Panchari: PDC and PNDG, QIF, Romel Marma-CF, Zabarang(MM&JT)
	Uttar Headman Para, Perachara, Khagrachari: Mushroom cultivators, bio-briquette makers, ginger cultivators, Md. Abdul Kayum- Economic development field supervisor (MM&JT)
13 Tuesday	**ALO Head Office, Khagrachari: CHTDF:** Priyatar Chakma-District Coordinator, Mostafa Kamal-Advisor to KHDC, Sugata Talukder- District Community Empowerment Expert, Md.Abdul Kayum-Economic Dev. Field Supervisor, Ela Rani Chowdhury-District Education Expert, Dr. Shaheen-District Medical Officer, Mamun-CEFS; **NGOs:** Dayananda Tripura- Zabarang UPC-Ed, Binodan Tripura-Zabarang PC, Arun K Chakma-ALO CEP, Sahla Prue Marma-ALO UPC, Ripon Chakma-Trinamul ED, Abirat Chakma-Trinamul UP, Tripura-Khagrapur MS UPC (MM,JT,SS,AvR)
	BRAC, Khagrachari Sadar: BRAC representatives(SS)
	Hill District Council, Khagrachari: Tarun Kanti Ghosh-CEO, Abdur Rahman Tarafdar-EO, Animesh Dewan-Councillor (JT& AvR)
	Khagrachari Sadar: Raja Saching Prue Chowdury, Mong Chief (JT& AvR)
	Travel to Chittagong
14 Wednesday	Travel to Bandarban
	Bandarban Sadar: Kushiray Tripura, District Coordinator, and individual sector staff
15 Thursday	**Thowaingya Para, Rowangchari Upazila:** PDC, PNDG, MLE school. Kratui ching Marma- CF, Hilly Homes, Utpal Bikash Tangchangya- CEFS (MM)
	Bandarban Hill District Council: Meeting with CHTDF team (Salim) in HDC (JT)
	Bandarban Sadar: Meeting with UNO (JT).
	Bandarban District: Meeting with DC (JT)
	Bandarban District CHT Development Board: Meeting with AE Md Mozibul Alam (JT)
	Rowangchari Sadar UP Office: Meeting with UnFC members(MM)
	Hilly Home, Upazila Office: Meeting with 18 CFs of Hilly Homes(MM)
	Meraiprue Para, Taracha Union, Rowanchari: PDC (20 male and 8 female members), fruit garden, primary school, SMC (AvR&SS)
	Taracha Mukh, Taracha Union, Rowanchari: Mobile Clinic, CHSWs, SCMC(SS)
	Amtali Marma Para, Sualok Union, Sadar: 3 beekeeping households, PDC members(AvR)
	Raicha Tali, Bandarban Sadar Union, Sadar: 10 mushroom producers, PDC members(AvR)
16 Friday	Day Off
17 Saturday	**Preyoshing Para, Thanchi Union, Thanchi:** Toymu staff (Sukanta Tripura-UPC, Mentang Mro-CF, Dowmyashing Marma-Assistant Training Officer), PDC, Jum, fruit garden, Koinonia school (JT & AvR)
	Thanchi Upazila Sadar: Khamlai Mro, Chairman –Thanchi Upazila(ex-UP and UnFC Chairman); UnFC; Weaver group members of Sadhu Joseph and Mariam Paras; Moshi Tripura-CO-CCDB (JT & AvR)
	Chikka Karbari Para, Rajbila Union, Bandarban Sadar: PDC and PNDG. Md, Nazim Uddin-CEFS, Bandarban Sadar(MM)
	Faruk Para, Sualok Union, Bandarban: Weavers group(Bawm community), Vannum Siam Bawm-EDFS and a local trader(MM)
18 Sunday	Hoitan Khumi Para, Bolipara Union, Thanchi: PDC members, cows(JT&vR)

	Kurang Para, Chimbuk, Bandarban Upazila: cooperative market of Mro community(JT&AvR)
	Bandarban Circle: Bohmong Circle Chief Mr. Aung Shwe Prue(All)
	Bandarban Sadar: 20 CFs from TOYMU-Thanchi & Ruma, GRAUS-Sadar, Ekata-Lama(MM)
	Hill District Council, Bandarban: HR and resource flow discussions with Swemenju Marma - Personal Secretary to the Chairman and HDC Head of Finance (JT).
	Bandarban Sadar: CHTDF staff: Md. Nazim Uddin –CEFS, Ching Shing Prue –UzC, Rupashree Newar – CEFS (all Sadar), Provat Chandra Tripura – UzC and Nue Mong Prue- CEFS, Timothy Khyang – CEFS(all Lama), Khemajon Tripura- CEFS, Dhiman Tripura – CEFS (all Ruma), Mong Kya Thing – CEFS, Prodip Panjee Tripura– EFS (all Thanchi), Paiching U Marma-EFS, Utpal Bikash Tangchangya-CEFS (all Rowangchari), Apul Tripura-District Economic development Expert, Vannumsiam Bawm-EDFS, Priyatar Chak (Education expert), Flora Barua-Dist. Disaster Preparedness and management officer and Thangzual Lushai-Office assistant to District Coordinator (many also met individually in office) (MM, JT, SS)
	Persons met in the meeting with PNGO: Dendoha Jolai Tripura and Raja Kishor Tripura-Hilly Homes, Dinendra Tripura and Sukanta Tripura – TOYMU, Md.Alamgir Reza and Ajit Kanti Das-Ekata, U Kya Shing Marma and Loi Mong Chak- GRAUS.(AvR)
19 Monday	**Bandarban Hill District Council:** Kya Shwe Hla Marma-Chairman-BHDC, Md. Muzibur Rahman-Councilor, Kya Sa Prue Marma- Councillor, Swemenju Marma-Personal Secretary to the Chairman (All)
	Bandarban Sadar Upazila Office: Persons met in the UzST meeting: Mr. Anupam Barua-UNO-Bandarban Sadar, Ms. Begum Rokeya-Family Planning Officer, Ms. Mahmuda Sultana-Livestock Officer, Mr. Monjur Hossain-Deputy Engineer, Dr. Arun Jit –Medical Officer, Bandarban Sadar Hospital, Mr.Debesh Chandra Das-Project Implementation Officer, Mr. Mahbubur Rahman-Cooperative Officer, Mr. U Kya Shing Marma-UPC, GRAUS, CFs and PDC Executives of different Paras (MM & JT)
	Bandarban Sadar: Zirkaung Sahu, World Vision (AvR)
	CHTDF Bandarban: Final de-briefing (All)
	Travel to Rangamati through internal road
	Rangamati: (Chief Implementation) All
20 Tuesday	**CHTDF Conference room, Rangamati:** EDs and project staff of PNGOs: Tarun-Sadar(T.Chakma, L. Chakma, H. Chakma), RDA- Baghaichari(R.Chakma, P.K.Chakma, A.Chakma), Taungya-Belaichari & Rajasthali(S.Chakma, D.Khisa, R.R.Tripura, T.Chakma, R.Karim), CIPD-Sadar (J.L.Chakma, B.Chakma, S.Dewan), Hilehili-Baghaichari(B.K.Chakma, J.Chakma, S.B.Chakma), SAS-Education Juraichari(S.B.Chakma, A.D.Chakma, N.K.Chakma, P.Khisa)(AvR)
	CHTDF, Rangamati: CHTDF Rangamati district staff (MM)
	Meeting with CFs of Rangamati Sadar: 17 CFs from Sadar & Rajasthali Upazilas (MM)
	Rangamati: CHT Women Organisation Network (MM, SS)
	CHTDF, Rangamati: individual meetings with component/cluster staffs (All)
	BRAC: (SS)
	Rangamati: Taungya and CIPD(Education NGOs) (SS)
	Rangamati: Civil Surgeon (SS)
21 Wednesday	Kadamtalibagh, Subalong Union, Barkal Upazila: PDC(MM)
	Barkal Sadar: Meeting with A.K.M. Tariqul Alam, UNO, & UzST/AC (MM)
	Kengachari Union, Bilaichari Upazila: MPCC, Traditional leaders, UnFC (JT)
	Bilaichari Sadar: Mr. Sohel-UNO and UzST/AC, Dipannita Chakma-UzC, Sukanta Chakma-UPC-Taungya, Joy Khisha-CEFS (JT)
	Farua Union, Bilaichari Upazila: Pochora Non-govt. MLE School(Tanchangya) SMC, Teachers and Mothers group of, Karbari, community, Arun Darshi Chakma- UPC-Education Project-SAS, Chumki Chakma-EFS (SS)
	Gochara Non-Govt School: SMC, Teachers and community people(SS)
	Sugarchari Para, Sapchari Union, Sadar: PDC, mushroom, bio-briquette, bee hives(AvR)
	Kalabunia Para, Kutukchari Union, Sadar: PDC, 2 bee keepers, 1 ginger cultivator(AvR)
	Rangapani weaver group, Municipality: Six members, a.o. Tulana Chakma-President(AvR)

	Rangamati Sadar, Ashika NGO, Outlet and Mushroom Spawn centre: Biplab Chakma-ED, Reboty Ranjan Chakma-PC and staff(AvR)
22 Thursday	**CHTDB:** Abdul Basset (JS, Vice Chairman), Shambunath Somaddar(DS), Tapan Kanti Gosh-DS/Manager ICDP (JT&AvR)
	CHTDF: individual meetings with component/cluster staffs
	CHTDRP-I(ADB): Debadatta Khisha-PD (AvR&JT)
23 Friday	Day Off
	CHTDF: individual meetings with component/cluster staffs
24 Saturday	**CHTDF:** individual meetings with component/cluster staffs
25 Sunday	**Rangamati Hill District Council:** Mrs Rashid, Uday Shankar Mutsuddi, Shamim Ahmed, Biswaketu Chakma-all Councillors, Dipak Chakrabarti-CEO, Arunendu Tripura-PRO, Anjalika Khisha-ex-GO officer, Sagarika Roaza(CHTWON), Dipika Khisha, DPEO, Dhiman Khisa (NGOs), Sujit Dewan(Headman Association), Abdul Momen-Accountant, Dilip Dey-Chief Executive Engineer, Chowdury (DAE), Chakma (DLS), Chowdury (Reg. Council) (JT, AvR)
	CHTDF: Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings with component/cluster staffs
26 Monday	Travel: Rangamati - Dhaka via Chittagong
	EC, Dhaka: Fabrizio Senesi (All)
27 Tuesday	**CHTDF:** individual meetings with component/cluster staffs
	MoCHTA: Dipankar Talukdar – State Minister, Bir Bahadur- Chairman CHTDB
	MoCHTA: Md Abul Hossain-Joint Secretary, Rahman Dty Chief Planning(JT, AvR)
	RC Guesthouse: Gautam Chakma and K.S. Mong (RC Councillors) (JT&AvR)
28 Wednesday	**CHTDF, Dhaka:** Patrick Sweeting, Lysanna Howard(All)
	CHTDF: Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings with CHTDF management, chiefs, clusters, UNDP CD (All)
29 Thursday	**EC, Dhaka:** Fabrizio Senesi (AvR)
	Dhaka: Hein Bijlmakers, IPM Expert ASPS II-Danida (AvR)
	UNICEF, Dhaka: Dr. M.G Mostafa, ICDP Manager, UNICEF (MM)
	CHTDF: ICB Data issues - Hossain Shahid Sumon (CB-ICB Cluster leader), CHT Governance - Luc Spyckerell (UNDP governance review consultant) - (JT)
30 Friday	**Dhaka:** Bill Collis (Worldfish), Kelley Stevenson(SC) (AvR)
31 Saturday	Reporting
November'09	
1 Sunday	**CHTDF:** CHTDF presentation on future by Management and Chiefs
	DANIDA: Arifur Siddique (AvR)
	CIDA: Alan Leber, First Secretary (Development) (AvR)
	CHTDF: CB-ICB data review with Prasenjit Chakma (JT)
2 Monday	**EC, Dhaka:** First debriefing with EC officials (Milko van Gool, Fabrizio Senesi, Nadia Rashid(Health), Massimo Larosa(Food Security), David Hill(ECHO), …… (Education), ……….(…)
	UNDP, Dhaka: Renata Dessallien, Stefan Priesner, Patrick Sweeting, Prasenjit Chakma
3 Tuesday	Reporting
4 Wednesday	**At PEDP-II-ADB:** Tham Moenjak, Advisor (M)
	EC, Dhaka: Fabrizio Senesi(Debriefing Abdus Sabur) (AvR)
	At CHTDF: Yasmin Siddiqi, WRM Specialist ADB(CHTDRP-II), Prasenjit Chakma (CHTDF), Fabrizio Senesi(EC) (JT&AvR)
5 Thursday	**Sheraton Hotel, Dhaka:** Debriefing with EC, full CHTDF team and UNDP CD (All)
	EC, Dhaka: Koen Duchateau(First Secretary) & Massimo LaRosa(Second Secretary) (AvR)
6 Friday	**Departure** Marie Mayoux, Arend van Riessen

7-12	**Dhaka:** Reporting Simon Strachan, John Tacon **11: CHT Commission, Dhaka**: Hana Shams Ahmed (Coordinator) - (J)
12 Thursday	**CHTDF-Dhaka:** Final Debriefing senior team - Patrick Sweeting (Director), Prasenjit Chakma (Deputy Director), Prasanta Tripura (Chief SD), Andre Louhanapessy (Programme Officer), Lysanna Howard (Asst Director) - (SS & JT) **Departure** John Tacon Simon Strachan remains for other work with CHTDF

Note: Excluding confidential meetings with individual civil society members

Annex 4   Logical Framework Suggestions for CHTDF Phase IV

MISSION SUGGESTIONS, FOCUSING ON RESULT INDICATORS

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
Overall Objective	**Improved Socio-economic development of Chittagong Hill Tracts in line with the principles of self-reliance, decentralisation and sustained peace**	*The project has to specify this general description of indicators, copied from Phase III:* • Standard social, economic, and employment indicators plus program based indicators used in the 2006 CHTDF baseline survey • Standard governance indicators (cf. UNDP governance section) applied to CHT institutions.[16]	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	
Project Purposes	**Effective and conducive development mechanism in CHT reinvigorated and strengthened**	*The project has to review which of the component indicators listed under results actually deserve to be listed under purpose indicators. For reference the sometimes unspecific purpose indicators of Phase II have been copied:* • A common vision and strategy for the CHT is developed and disseminated by 6 official institutions. • Mandates and rules of business of institutions are clarified, disseminated, approved and reinforced; more than 50% of CHTI possess community intervention approaches and knowledge transfer methodologies that are adjusted to conditions of the various CHT communities • Local producers market higher volumes and get higher prices • Optimal prices and marketing channels for village products • Increased access to and demand for basic education through non-formal community-based education • Confidence, technical skills and income generated in all targeted communities • More than 50 % of PDC HH (75 % of most vulnerable HH) have increased income • More than 50 % of communities independently (without CHTDF and NGOs) implement and manage development activities 3 years after the first QIF instalment • Gender equity measured, monitored and enhanced through all CHTDF components. • Increased interactions, mutual recognition and confidence between and among people, different groups and institutions	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	Government upholds its stated commitment towards the development of CHT No drastic deterioration in the political / security situation No major disruption by natural disasters

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[16] Governance indicators will be finalised in the initial months of implementation of the Institutional Capacity Building component, drawing also on the experience of the UNDP Local Governance Project.

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		• Reported incidences of political / ethnic tension on declining trend		
Expected Results	*1. Six CHT Institutions function as development agencies in service to people*	• % of CHTI for which logframe-indicator specific gender- and ethnicity-disaggregated baseline survey is conducted (baseline: 0%; target: 100%) • % of CHTI for which annual ICB indicator survey is conducted (baseline: 0; target: 100%) • % of all their area's development budgets and expenditures for which MoCHTA, RC and HDCs play a managing or coordinative role (baseline: unknown; target 80%) • % of all MoCHTA, RC and HDC community focused development projects that is based on bottom-up planning (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) • % of ten most important remaining conflicting mandate issues, as listed by national workshop, that is solved or for which a solution is formulated that is acceptable to all concerned stakeholders (baseline: 0%; target: 50%) • % increase in the annual number of meetings (and cooperative actions) between RC, HDC and CHTDB (baseline: ..../year) • % increase in the annual number of meetings between DCs, UNOs and HDCs(baseline: unknown; target: 100%) • % increase in Upazilas where Circle and CHTDB representatives actively participate in monthly UNO development coordination meetings (baseline: 0%?; target: 50%) • % increase in HDC and RC annual revenue collection (baseline: Tk ...crore; target: 100%) • % increase in annual budget handled by RC and HDC (baseline: Tk ...crore; target: 300%) • % of CHTIs that conducted Institutional Self Assessments (ISA) and implemented two of the five highest priorities of their institutional development plan (baseline: zero; target: 80%) • % of CHTI staff that received job-relevant training which is tailored to the CHT environment and needs (baseline: 0%; target: 75% at any chosen moment) • % of trained female middle and senior cadre staff in all CHTIs (Baseline: 5-10 % of all staff?; target: 30% of all staff) • No. of monitoring visits to CHTDF field activities by middle cadre and senior HDC officials per year (baseline: unknown; target: 4 per staff per year) • % of trained CHTI staff using computers as per personal computer use plan developed	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	Conducive political environment Central Govt. Concurrence CHTIs capacities are utilised to contribute to community empowerment and economic development CHTIs have the means to assume their operational responsibilities Retention of senior and junior staff GoB has no objection to the use of GIS CHTIs can assume their operational responsibilities. **Staff stability**

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		during training (baseline: unknown ; target: 80%) • No. of visits to Resource Centre (baseline: 0; target: unknown)		
	2. (a) Economic Development: opportunities enhanced for farmers and small local enterprises	• % target group categories (environment, education, access, ethnicity, gender, support level) for which logframe-indicator specific gender-, ethnicity- and area-disaggregated baseline survey is conducted (baseline: 0%; target: 100%) • % target group categories for which annual ED indicator survey is conducted (baseline: 0; target: 100%) • % of target group categories for which 20 proven marketable products and skills have been identified (baseline: 0; target: 100%) • % of supported marketable skills and products for which feasibility studies, including environmental, social and gender impact assessments, have been conducted for different target group categories (baseline: 0%; target: 100%) • % of trained farmers practicing cultivation/husbandry methods as per project's extension message(baseline: unknown; target: 75%) • % of trained producers practice sorting, grading, storing as trained(baseline: unknown; target: 75%) • % Women trainees and % of women trainees applying trained skills (baseline: unknown; target: not lower than men's) • % PDCs and % of PNDGs that can sustainably obtain and pay for the required inputs and services (baseline: unknown; target: 95%) • % of PDCs and % of PNDGs of which members cooperate on storing and marketing(baseline:<5%; target: 50%) • % of Collection Points in good condition and actively and effectively managed and used (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) • % of ethnic households that receive market prices equal to Bengali farmers and traders (baseline: unknown; target: 90%) • % of involved wholesale traders that have ethnic background (baseline: unknown; target: 50%) • Number of new marketing/service jobs generated per PDC through project activities (baseline: 0; target: 1) • % of PDC and % of PNDGs member households that earns more than Tk 1000 extra per year as a result from CHTDF-supported economic activities (baseline: <5%; target: 50%)	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	Markets not more instable than in the past decade Responsible profit sharing by external partners Policies and regulations do not hamper credit and investment-provisions Overall macro-economic situation does not go down and security situation does not deteriorate Commitment of Business and Finance Institutions is confirmed ***For tourism activities*** Compulsory police escort for foreigners abandoned CHT leaders agreement to Community Based tourism obtained

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		• % of PDC and % of PNDGs members that consider their economic QIF a success (baseline: unknown; target: 95%) • % participants in non-agric. activities, weaving, CHT Award Scheme that increase their annual sales by 50% or more (baseline: unknown; target: ..%) • % PDCs in which poorest 25% earns equally to PDC average from new products (baseline: unknown; target: 50%)		
	2 (b) Education: Literacy increased in CHT through education scheme adapted to local context	• % of target schools and upazilas for which logframe-indicator specific gender- and ethnicity-disaggregated baseline survey is conducted (baseline: 0%; target: 100%) • % of target schools and upazilas for which annual ICB indicator survey is conducted (baseline: 0; target: 100%, gender disaggregated) • No. of school catchment areas' where net and gross enrolment rate is resp. 90% and Y% (baseline: unknown; target: 100%, gender disaggregated) • No. of target schools where absenteeism rate is below national levels (baseline: unknown; target: X%, gender disaggregated) • No. of target schools where competencies assessments show equal or higher levels than national standards (baseline: unknown; target: 100%, gender disaggregated) • No. of CHTDF-supported schools where 80% of the enrolled students complete minimum 3 years of schooling (baseline: unknown; target: 90% ,gender disaggregated) • No. of ethnic groups for which education material, publications and methodology are developed in local languages and context (baseline: 7; target: 11) • % of trained community teachers apply a minimum agreed level of learnt child centred teaching methods (baseline: unknown; target 75%) • % of all relevant NGOs and GoB's Primary Training Institutes that include non-formal teacher training (baseline: unknown; target: X%) • % School Management Committees that are trained, effective and sustainable (baseline: unknown; target: 90%) • % of schools that are supported by GoB by the end of the project (baseline: unknown; target: 30%) • % of non-GoB supported schools that can continue activities after the project through contribution of communities and continuous support of NGOs (baseline: unknown; target: X%) • % target communities satisfied with service provided by education department • No. of Upazila with improved management systems for education service delivery	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	GoB support (both at policy and resource allocation level) on basic education in CHT does not decrease No further degradation of ethnic political environment in the region PTI management transferred to HDC GoB commitment to strengthening CHT decentralized institutions

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		(baseline: 0; target: unknown)		
		• No. of HDCs that can independently manage the education program (baseline: 0; target: 3)		
		• No. of community schools that are visited at least annually by DPEO/HDC field (baseline: unknown; target: 50%?)		
		• Successfully piloted initiatives adopted by DPEO		
		• Education approach accepted/replicated by GoB		
		• Education strategies aligned with PEDP II		
		• Tribal Education Plan elaborated and adjusted as per CHTDF experiences and lessons		
	2 (c) Health: Health, Nutrition & Population (HNP) in the CHT improved	• % of Satellite Clinic catchment areas for which logframe-indicator specific gender- and ethnicity-disaggregated baseline survey is conducted (baseline: 0%; target: 100%)	• Baseline studies	
		• % of Satellite Clinic catchment areas for which annual logframe indicator survey is conducted (baseline: 0; target: 100%)	• Annual monitoring surveys	
		• Maternal Mortality Rate in the target upazilas (baseline: X; target: Y% of X)	• Pre-final evaluation survey	
		• Infant Mortality Rate in the target upazilas (baseline: X; target: Y% of X)	*• Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	
		• Contraceptive prevalence rate (baseline: X; target: Y% of X)		
		• % children under 1 year in target upazilas within X hours distance from Government Health Services (baseline: unknown; target: X%)		
		• Ratio of malaria cases treated by CHSW and by Mobile Clinics (baseline: 0% : 100%; target: X%:Y%)		
		• No. of District(Upazila?) Offices that meet CHTDF-GoB defined set of improved health delivery management system criteria (baseline: 0; target: 3)		
		• % of communities in target areas (upazilas?) effectively serviced by CHSW (baseline: unknown; target: X%)		
		• % of communities satisfied with service provided by CHSW (baseline: unknown; target: 100%)		
		• % of patients that seek treatment in local health facilities compared to those seeking no treatment or treatment outside upazila (baseline: X; target: 150% X)		
		• Patient satisfaction with standards of care (baseline: X%; target: Y%)		
		• % of CHTDF-GoB defined list of relevant stakeholders mobilized and reinforced in the CHT in order to implement HNP activities outlined in the Tribal Health Plan (baseline:		

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		unknown; target 100%)		
		• Regional Council (RC), three Hill District Councils (HDC) and three Civil Surgeon's offices adopt a 5 year planning for the development of the health sector (baseline: 0; target 1)		
		• A systemic approach related to the selection criteria, salaries, activities, follow-up and supervision of the community health workers (CHSWs) has been adopted in the all CHT (baseline: 0; target 1)		
	3. Local organizations and Communities empowered and their capacity enhanced to manage themselves their development	% of project (PDCs and PNDGs) communities for which logframe-indicator specific gender, poverty and ethnicity-disaggregated baseline survey is available (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) % of project (PDCs and PNDGs) communities for which annual indicator survey is conducted (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) a. % of community members (%women , %men, %vulnerable households) know and understand their rights, have improved their health seeking practices, raise their voice in decision making fora and influence collective decision. (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) b. % of community members (%women , %men, %vulnerable households) access CHTDF resource, benefit from CHTDF projects, have increased incomes (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) c. % of PDCs and % of PNDGs who manage and monitor their projects, including technical and financial aspects, without CHTDF support 3 years after their first QIF instalment (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) d. % of PDCs and % of PNDGs who for whom exit strategies are established 3 years after their first QIF instalment, based on a participatory study of their strengths, weakness, needs and opportunities e. number of technical studies made on economical and environmental feasibility of projects f. % of PDCs and % of PNDGs who access banks, extension and input supply structures without NGO support 3 years after their first QIF instalment (baseline: unknown; target: 100%) g. % of PDC projects and % of PNDG projects which generate satisfactory profits as compared to funds and labor invested, 3 years after their first QIF instalment h. % of PDCs and % of PNDGs who receive support and backup from NGOS and Unions and local institutions 3 years after 3 years after their first QIF instalment	• Baseline studies • Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	Attitudes of institutions and officials will not deteriorate No drastic deterioration in the political/security situation Staff and methodology of local administration will not change GoB upholds its stated commitment towards the democratic development of CHT Markets not more instable than in the past decade Climate conditions similar to the past decade
	4. Confidence is bult to	a. % of CHTI for which logframe-indicator specific gender- and ethnicity-disaggregated	• Baseline studies	Overall socio-political

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
	solve the long-standing problems critical to sustainable development an peace in the CHT	baseline survey is conducted (baseline: 0%; target: 100%) b. % of CHTI for which annual ICB indicator survey is conducted (baseline: 0; target: 100%) • Minorities, Culture, Exchange and Dialogue c. The number of Tribal groups, represented by leaders and area representatives during workshops, that feel their' oral and written histories, indigenous customs, practices, arts, laws and culture studied, are satisfactorily recorded and disseminated (baseline: 0; target: 11) d. The number of ethnic groups that have taken at least 2 concrete steps to promote/preserve minority rights and culture, including enhancements like gender-balanced property inheritance rights e. The annual number of media materials on with balanced CHT information that are available for at least X million of the larger public of the country (baseline: unknown; target: 6) f. Ratio of ethnic communities attending CHTDF supported exchange and cultural events (baseline: unknown; target: X%) g. The no. of exploratory and preparatory GoB-supported public dialogue events at national, regional, district and upazila level in which each of a mutually agreed list of outstanding issue is discussed (baseline: unknown; target: 1 time for national and regional level, and once in each district and upazila) h. The number of joint activities and exchanges with local communities in a mutually agreed list of potential conflict locations (baseline: unknown; target: 1 per year) i. The number of dialogue and exchange events in which all participant selection criteria are strictly applied (ethnic and gender diversity, stakeholder representativeness, mandate relevance) j. No of PDCs, and number of PNDGs committees and officials that are trained on alternative dispute resolution, which have actively been involved in dispute resolution k. No. of senior GoB staff and civic leaders involved in study tours and workshops that agree on a mutually agreed set of ethnic conflict lessons learnt l. %. of senior GoB staff and civic leaders who participated in study tours, that submitted a personal trip report with post-conflict confidence building intentions. m. %. of PDCs who participated in study tours, that submitted an own trip report with post-conflict confidence building lessons learnt and plans. • Gender n. Sets of gender equity targets developed through dialogue for all CHTDF, CHTDF-	• Annual monitoring surveys • Pre-final evaluation survey • *Other means as defined by project or copied from Phase III logframe*	atmosphere is conducive Level of tolerance does not decrease further International interest on CHT does not decline GoB give green light to institutions to assume their mandated and responsibilties Achievements of other components of the CHT programme GoB's sustained concurrence No increase in communal and political violence Level of discords between institutions does not increase Sufficient number of women with relevant managerial authority in target institutions

	Intervention Logic	*Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs)*	*Sources and Means of Verification*	*Assumptions*
		components and institutional stakeholders like agencies and committees (baseline: 0; target: 100%)		
		o. No. of CHT institutional stakeholders achieving gender equity targets (baseline: 0; target: X%)		
		p. No of local CHT women volunteers, supported by CHTWON, active and contributing towards development in the CHT (baseline: unknown; target: X) • Land Commission Assistance		
		q. Assessment, plan, budget and resource mobilisation plan prepared to be ready for support opportunities under different scenarios (baseline: 0; target: X)		
		• Refugee task Force Assistance		
		r. Assessment, plan, budget and resource mobilisation plan prepared to be ready for support opportunities under different scenarios (baseline: 0; target: X)		
		• Police Assistance (training in policing, human rights)		
		s. Assessment, plan, budget and resource mobilisation plan prepared to be ready for support opportunities under different scenarios (baseline: 0; target: X)		
		• Support to HDC and RC Elections		
		t. Assessment, plan, budget and resource mobilisation plan prepared to be ready for support opportunities under different scenarios (baseline: 0; target: X)		
		• Community Forestry		
		u. Assessment, plan, budget and resource mobilisation plan for community forestry pilots prepared to be ready for support opportunities under different scenarios (baseline: 0; target: X)		

Annex 5   CHTDF Organizational Charts, summaries adapted from CHTDF information

CHTDF Organization Chart

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                    │ National Steering Committee │
                    └─────────────────────────────┘
                    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                    │     Project Director(1)      │
                    └─────────────────────────────┘
        ┌──────────────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────────────┐
        │   Technical Advisers     │  │      PM&E (vacant)       │
        │  Education, Health(2)    │  │  Assistant to Director   │
        └──────────────────────────┘  └──────────────────────────┘
        ┌──────────────────────────┐
        │    Program Officer       │
        │    UNDP Liaison          │
        └──────────────────────────┘
```

Policy and Confidence Buildng Deputy Project Director	Service Delivery Chief(1)	Implementation Chief(1)	Operations Chief
Policy and Conf Bldg Cluster	Health	Economic development	SMU
CHTDF Institution	Education	Disaster management	Business Services
Advocacy, Knowledge Mgt		Human Resource Development	HR — Finance — Procurement
Gender		Community Empowerment	Administrative Services
Environment		Bandarban District Office (50)	Transport — Admin — IT
Capacity Development		Rangamati District Office(40)	
Scholarships		Khagrachari District Office(50)	
Ops Support Unit			

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                              ┌──────┐
                              │ NSC  │
                              └──────┘
                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │  Management  │
                          └──────────────┘
              ┌────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────┐
              │   Gender   │              │ Knowledge Management│
              └────────────┘              └─────────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────┐            ┌─────────────┐
              │ Institutions │            │ Scholarships│
              └──────────────┘            └─────────────┘
          ┌─────────┐  ┌──────────┐
          │  HDCs   │  │    RC    │
          └─────────┘  └──────────┘
          ┌─────────┐  ┌──────────┐
          │ MoCHTA  │  │ Circles  │
          └─────────┘  └──────────┘
```

CE	Econ Dev	Education	Health	Confidence Bldg
UnFC — UzAC	INBAR — ICIMOD	INGOs — HDCs	HDCs — CS, UzHO	Task Force — Land Commission
Line Dept — APSP		DPEOs, UzEO	15 UzHC X CHSWs	Election Com — Police
	3 Contract NGOs			Forestry Dept
20 Contract NGOs		3 Contract NGOs	6 UNDP SC — 9 NGO SC	
2700 PDCs	120 IGA PDCs	150 Schools 150 SMCs	X SCMC — X SCMC	
	Prabartana			
	20 Weaver Group			

Annex 6   Non-CHTDF NGOs working with CHTDF communities, Rangamati 2008

Greenhill	Water & Sanitation	137	12%
CIPD	Micro Credit, Rice Banks	17	
Paddakhep	Micro Credit & Ed.	49	
BRAC	Micro Credit, Health &Ed	7	
IDF	Micro credit & Solar	76	
BRAC	Micro Credit	121	
Grameen Bank	Micro Credit	65	
ASA	Micro Credit	90	
BRDB	Micro Credit	21	
CODEC	Micro Credit	46	44%
MSF,WFP	Health, Food	8	
BRAC	Health Care	12	
BRAC	Health	11	3%
Taungya	Education, Forest preservation	18	
BRAC	Education	55	
SAS	Education	18	
UNICEF	Education	113	
Ahsania mission	Education	65	
ICDP	Education	24	
BRAC	Education	10	
CHTDB	Education	6	
ADB	Education	6	
Ahsania Mission	Education	5	28%
Gramin Shakti	Solar Panel	30	
Ashika	Livelihoods	12	
CARITAS	Horticulture	20	
Green Hill	Rights education	50	
JMF & 17 other NGOs	various	33	
Total projects	for 846 PDCs	1125	

Annex 7   Project Success and Failure according PDC members (Bandarban)

	Community initiated project component name	QIF Contribution (Tk.)	Community Contribution (Tk.)	Opinion PDC meeting on Project success (D.10)			
				Total PDC Member respondents	% Success	% Failure	*Don't know/ No answer/ absent*
1	5.4 | Sanitary Latrine	564,830	140,510	544	**0%**	**0%**	*100%*
2	1.7 | Sugarcane cultivation	245,900	140,600	264	**0%**	**0%**	*100%*
3	4.8 | Spray machine	44,953		21	0%	**100%**	*0%*
4	7.11 | Puller van	5,100	0	44	0%	**0%**	*100%*
5	2.4 | Duck rearing	897,372	201,930	949	**6%**	**13%**	*81%*
6	10.1 | Handloom	243,050	44,500	340	**9%**	**87%**	*4%*
7	1.9 | Nursery	531,450	79,400	432	**21%**	**45%**	*34%*
8	1.4 | Ginger cultivation	14,431,660	3,191,300	4,833	**22%**	**72%**	*6%*
9	4.2 | Power tiller trolley	30	5	42	24%	**76%**	*0%*
10	1.6 | Vegetable gardening	208,987	64,600	117	**26%**	**74%**	*0%*
11	2.5 | Goat rearing	7,974,039	1,530,656	4,377	**28%**	**17%**	*55%*
12	9.3 | Entrepreneurship	1,834,100	248,696	668	**31%**	**54%**	*15%*
13	2.7 | Pig rearing	3,794,207	1,340,160	2,814	**33%**	**24%**	*43%*
14	2.8 | Poultry	605,670	106,700	591	**36%**	**14%**	*49%*
15	5.1 | Water Filter	380,050	33,060	375	**37%**	**17%**	*46%*
16	4.3 | Rice mill	4,204,866	567,007	2,987	**41%**	**38%**	*20%*
17	12.1 | Forestry	646,435	281,108	236	**46%**	**11%**	*43%*
18	4.1 | Power tiller	3,313,218	411,003	2,886	**47%**	**25%**	*28%*
19	9.2 | Small shop	1,396,106	129,339	296	**50%**	**31%**	*19%*
20	4.6 | Pump machine	1,057,391	65,735	538	**51%**	**19%**	*30%*
21	1.5 | Turmeric cultivation	2,380,408	649,698	688	**54%**	**36%**	*10%*
22	3.3 | Fish cultivation Creek/dam	10,018,398	1,394,495	2,626	**55%**	**22%**	*23%*
23	4.4 | Paddle Thresher Machine	1,139,909	200,729	491	**55%**	**33%**	*12%*
24	1.1 | Mixed fruits gardening	10,531,365	3,046,166	3,609	**57%**	**23%**	*21%*
25	3.2 | Fish cultivation in ponds	4,208,032	820,670	1,197	**57%**	**32%**	*11%*
26	7.3 | Engine Boat	1,890,003	145,939	885	**58%**	**23%**	*19%*
27	8.1 | Rice Bank	14,247,458	2,856,279	4,866	**62%**	**20%**	*17%*
28	5.5 | Gravity Flow system	410,014	32,310	49	**63%**	**37%**	*0%*
29	7.2 | Rowing boat	809,651	12,771	904	**68%**	**27%**	*5%*
30	2.6 | Goyal/ Buffalo rearing	2,098,400	242,490	554	**71%**	**29%**	*0%*
31	2.1 | Cattle rearing	111,451,677	14,423,285	20,796	**75%**	**16%**	*9%*
32	6.4 | Generator	164,346	14,104	317	**76%**	**18%**	*6%*
33	4.5 | Seed sowing machine	124,600	15	34	82%	**18%**	*0%*
34	9.1 | Candle factory	188,340	20	34	82%	**18%**	*0%*
35	1.11 | Watermelon cultivation	118,410	143	24	83%	**17%**	*0%*
36	1.8 | Arum cultivation	371,125	23,031	63	**86%**	**14%**	*0%*
37	6.2 | Solar Panel installation	2,654,972	228,223	225	**86%**	**14%**	*0%*
38	1.3 | Paddy cultivation	508,410	56,063	74	**95%**	**5%**	*0%*
	Bandarban Total	**162,421,477**	**31,722,324**	**60,888**	**54%**	**25%**	*21%*

Annex 8   Confidence Building Overview of Progress

Result OVI (CHTDF logframe)	Sub-Component Outputs (Descr. of Action list)	Activities progress 2006-2009 (relevant items listed by CHTDF on mission request)	Result Progress comment (mission)
Minority Rights and culture			
Hill Tracts' oral and written histories, indigenous customs, practices, arts, laws and culture studied, recorded and disseminated	*3 studies on indigenous customs, practices, arts, laws*	*Compendium of CHT laws developed; handbook on roles and responsibilities of Headmen and Karbari developed; Study on health-seeking behaviour of Mro people; Oral history of displaced persons under process.*	*Un-SMART result OVI formulation and lack of monitoring makes meaningful evaluation impossible*
Exchange and Dialogue			
All CHT institutions initiate follow up actions of the dialogue processes *High level of consensus on dialogue topics and high diversity of participant's backgrounds during formal/informal meetings; all criteria of participant's selection are strictly applied (diversity of ethnic backgrounds, representative of participants, relevance of their mandates); at least 30% participants are women*	*18 nat./reg. dialogues/meetings*	*3 national and 1 international festival organised; Three 2-day district level and One 3-day regional level workshop of grassroots leaders done.*	*Undoubtedly some good results* *No comprehensive report with activity details and results available* *Follow-up action, consensus and participation are not systematically monitored*
	32 grassroots dialogues	*3 Upazila level workshops organised; 75 technical information dissemination workshops at Union level done. 75 experience sharing workshops at Union level done;*	
	2 study tours (2*14p.)	*8 foreign study tours*	
	129 exchange visits in CHT	*108 exchange visits (average 15 participants in each)*	
	9 exchange visits outside CHT	*3 (Sirajganj, Tangail and Sylhet)*	
24 sports camps organised attended by not less than 50% participants; high public participation during tournaments	*24 sports camps/tournaments*	*1 through small grant to regional sports association; On average 5 traditional sports events supported every year during Boi-Sa-Bi festivals through micro-grants;*	*Much less than planned. Unknown result*
Up to 6 media materials produced per year available for the larger public of the country	*18 media materials for larger public*	*2 documentary movies ; 1 TV talk show aired*	*Much less than planned. Unknown result*
	9 awareness workshops with media and civil society		*Apparently not done*
		200+ rallies and gatherings organised at Union and Upazila levels in observation of World indigenous Peoples Day, Women's Day, Environment Day, Water Day, Victory Day and Independence Day.	*Unplanned activities*
		Small grants fund for NGOs (sports, culture)	*Unplanned activities*
(Others, unplanned)			
		Socio-economic baseline survey	*Limited reliability and usefulness*
		Compilation of best practices (pre-2006)	*Good initiative, but limited use: general character and English language*

		Active involvement in crisis management. 20+ high level visits (Ministers, MPs, Ambassadors) organised to defuse tensions	*Important CB result and project function; not in logframe as such*
		Two studies on the rodent crisis (2008)	*Unplanned, but relevant*
		Active involvement in disaster response (rat flood)	
		Environmental Impact Assessment under process	
Land, Elections, Refugees, Police (Peace Accord Implementation)			
CHTDF/UNDP maintain dialogue at national level with exploratory and preparatory measures guided by GoB; at least one official and public meeting per issue before 2009	*Program Implementation Strategies(3)*	*No Peace Accord "sector" implementation strategies*	*No strategies for Land, Elections, Refugees for different scenarios*
When active technical support is possible:	*Technical and logistical support plans(up to 5)*	*Logistics support to Refugees & IDPs Task Force under process; Logistics Support to land Commission withheld; One water treatment plant for Khagrachari police*	*Roughly optimal*
Several Land cases processed by Land Commission	*Creation of special fund(2)*		*Budgets reserved for Land, Elections and Refugees were used for other purposes*
360 police working in CHT trained in policing practices and human rights by the end of the project period	*Training of police on policing and human rights (360 p.)*		*Not reported on*
HDC (+RC) elections held		*Assisted UNDP Democracy and Governance Cluster during elections*	*Unplanned, relevant*
Forestry			
20 Community Forestry projects piloted *30% of the participants/beneficiaries of pilot forest and land management initiatives are women*	20 CF projects piloted		Not reported on

Annex 9   Check on Confidence Building Assumptions and Risks

Assumptions and Risks	Status
Overall socio-political atmosphere is conducive	Although the situation has improved since the last election, the socio-political atmosphere has not been conducive for most of the time, with a particular deterioration of peace accord implementation prospects during the caretaker government.
Level of tolerance does not decrease further	The level of tolerance has on average not increased or decreased, although numerous incidents in Khagrachari show a decrease in conflict pockets of that district
International interest on CHT does not decline	International interest on CHT has not declined. It might even have increased with the revival of CHT Commission.
GoB give green light to institutions to assume their mandated and responsibilities	During most of the period Land Commission and Refugee Task Force remained inactive. The new government has recently reactivated these bodies, but their first steps have not been supported by all. GoB formed Peace Accord Implementation Committee.
Achievements of other components of the CHT programme	Achievements of the other CHTDF components have been very supportive of confidence building, notably community empowerment, health service delivery and the increased cooperation among institutions.
GoB's sustained concurrence	GoB's concurrence has not been continuous during the period; political support varies with the change of government and with the change of political and bureaucratic leadership at MoCHTA.
No increase in communal and political violence	Communal and political violence has increased during 2006-2009 compared to the previous years, but levels have reduced recently
Level of discords between institutions does not increase	Discord between institutions has probably decreased, thanks also to cooperation with CHTDF. CHTDB and the Army are exceptions. Increased cooperation between UNDP and UNICEF will be a condition for increased engagement with CHTDB.
Sufficient number of women with relevant managerial authority in target institutions	The number of women with relevant managerial authority in target institutions is extremely low and has not increased or decreased. (The mission doubts whether this is a useful or important assumption or condition to confidence building. Although women managers might make a difference this has not been substantiated or subscribed to by anyone, let alone with proof that a certain percentage ("sufficient") would make a difference

Annex 10   ICB: Institutions reached by ICB Activity

ICB activity	RC	HDC	LDpt	UzLD	UNO	CC	UP	UnFC	TF	DB
supported		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-
HRD Staff training at GO institution		25	150							
Headman training						All				
Karbari training						Few				
Circle training						All				
Gender through CEP				X			X	X		
Organ development workshop 2		X	X	X						
Dt Part. Plan Guideline workshop		X	X	X		X	X			
Dt supervision & monitoring guidelines		X	X	X		X	X			
Dt revenue workshop		X	X	X		X	X			
OD/Organogram workshop		X	X	X		X	X			
Public audit workshop		X	X	X		X	X			
Cap Bldg Need assessment		X	X							
Cap Bldg training (new)										
English		X								
computer		X								
Logistics, procurement		X	(X)			X				
Citizens Charter		X	X	X						

Annex 11   ICB: CHT Institutional Map

CHT Institutional Map

Annex 12   ICB: CHTI Equipment Project (UNDP) and CHTI (Self) Procured - 2005 to 2009

Delivered (2005-09)		MoCHTA			Task Force			RC			R-HDC			C-Circle			K-HDC			M-Circle			B-HDC			B-Circle			Total		
Year	Items	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total
2005	Minibus	1		1																									1		1
2006	Vehicle (4x4)	2		2				2		2	1		1				1		1				1		1				7		7
2006	Desktop Computer	3		3				6		6	2		2	1		1	2		2	1		1	2		2	1		1	18		18
2006	Printer	1		1				3		3	2		2	1		1	2		2	1		1	2		2	1		1	13		13
2006	Photocopier	1		1				1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	8		8
2006	Digital Camera	1		1				1		1	1	2	3	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	8	2	10
2006	Laptop Computer	1		1				2		2	1		1				1		1				1		1				6		6
2006	Scanner	1		1				1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	8		8
2008	Motorbike											1	1					2	2		2	2								5	5
2008	LAN system								1	1								1	1											2	2
2009	Vehicle (4x4)				1		1																						1		1
2009	Outboard Engine											1	1																	1	1
2009	Generator											1	1																	1	1
2009	Air Conditioner	4		4																									4		4
2009	Scanner	1		1																									1		1
2009	Printer	8		8								3	3																8	3	11
2009	Photocopier	2		2																									2		2
2009	Desktop Computer	7		7					1	1		4	4		1	1													7	6	13
2009	Laptop Computer	3		3								2	2					2	2		2	2							3	6	9
2009	Digital Camera	3		3					2	2																			3	2	5
2009	FAX Machine	3		3																									3		3
2009	Media Projector	2		2					1	1														1	1				2	2	4
2009	Video Camera	2		2																									2		2
2009	Television	1		1								1	1																1	1	2
2009	Spiral Binder	1		1																									1		1
2009	Computer Table	8		8											1	1					1	1		2	2		1	1	8	5	13
2009	Fax Table	3		3											1	1					1	1					1	1	3	3	6
2009	TV Table	1		1																									1		1
2009	Chair	11		11											12	12					12	12		12	12		8	8	11	44	55
2009	4 Drawer Cabinet	2		2											1	1					1	1		2	2		1	1	2	5	7
2009	P/copier Cabinet	2		2											1	1					1	1		1	1		1	1	2	4	6
Total Items:		75		75	1		1	16	5	21	9	15	24	5	17	22	9	5	14	5	16	21	9	22	31	5	12	17	134	92	226
		UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total	UNDP	Self	Total

Annex 13   ICB: Achievements against Logframe Results and Indicators

Note: CHTDF reported achievements could not always be verified by the mission

Result/Indicator	Achievement
Purpose OVI	
A common vision and strategy for the CHT is developed and disseminated by 6 official institutions.	Not yet there.
Mandates and rules of business of institutions are clarified, disseminated, approved and reinforced;	Not achieved yet; but present testing of their mandates and rules of business by institutions essential for future
more than 50% of CHTI possess community intervention approaches and knowledge transfer methodologies that are adjusted to conditions of the various CHT communities	Not yet there
Increased interactions, mutual recognition and confidence between and among people, different groups and institutions	Major achievement by all components of CHTDF
Result	
1. Six CHT Institutions function as development agencies in service to people	Not there yet. CHTIs, except CHTDB, gain valuable experience
Result Indicators	
Active participation of 90% of key representatives in meetings and high level consensus reached	(1) Yes, but also unclear. Too unspecific indicator. CHTDF: At least 90% of key institutional representatives have actively participated in key meetings. From start to 2009, a sample of project monitored meetings reveals the number of development meetings has increased 74%, 'issues-discussed' has risen 108% and 'decisions-taken' is up 115%.
80% of senior and most operational CHTI's staff know and understand mandates, rules of business and capable to link strategies with the regional development plan	(2) Unclear. CHTDF: ICB facilitated workshops have enabled key CHTI staff to improve their understandings of operational mandates and rules - though many issues sit unresolved on desks at the national level.
Timelines (yearly) of Institutional Self Assessments (ISA) produced by each Institution	(3) Not yet. CHTDF: CHTI capacity to produce annual self-assessment plans has not yet been achieved. But ongoing activities are expected to initiate these important processes before end of 2009.
6 Human Resource Development performance based training plans developed and implemented	(4) Not yet. CHTDF: CHTIs are now able to better define their HR capacities and development training needs. This improved capacity has, in turn, enabled ICB to more effectively tailor training inputs to client-identified needs.
All capacity building initiatives include 60% of existing women staff members	(5) Yes. CHTDF: All ICB assistance has sought the full support of female staff. A review of training course attendance, for example, reveals more than 75% of each institution's female staff has been reached.
50 % more community focused development projects are initiated and successfully implemented by CHTIs by 2009	(6) Not yet. No baseline. CHTDF: Developing RC/HDC and lower level institutional capacities has enabled the project to progressively increase the degree that these institutions are involved in the oversight and management of community services funded by the project. In addition, the project has also been able to progressively channel more assistance funding - for

	equipment, training and service delivery - to RC and HDCs accounts. These direct budget support transfers are supported by Letter of Agreement (LoA) protocols, signed by both parties. Implementation of these funds is overseen by the project implementation committees (PICs).
80% of key staff are trained and 75% of them apply their skills	(7) Probably yes. CHTDF: Quality training has been delivered to more than 80% of key male and female staff in all high level institutions, including DB. It has also covered key government servants in technical Line Departments.
Prioritized lists of technical assistance and logistical support needs established and procured	(8) Equipment yes, TA not yet. CHTDF: The procurement of essential office equipment - from vehicles to computers - has been guided by the growing capacity of CHTIs to define priority needs within available budget limits. Procurement of equipment is being increasingly handled by the institutions themselves. An annex provides a table of equipment prioritised and produced to date.
50% increase of number of interactions between CHTIs and communities	(9) Not yet. No baseline. CHTDF: CHTI capacity to oversee district wide development, can also been seen in the increased interaction - two way - with lower level institutions at particularly at union and Upazila levels. But the extent of increase cannot be report due to the lack of baseline.
6 selected outreach activities are piloted	(10) Unclear. CHTDF: In support of increased collaboration between all development-actors at all levels, in each district, ICB has also piloted more than six outreach activities. In particular, this work has built development capacity in all three Circle systems, 47 local NGOs through skill development and awareness strengthening course, material and equipment. Some infrastructural support has also been provided to the Circles system in the form of Multi Purpose Community Centres of which 10 have been constructed to date.
All targeted CHTI undertake up-to 4 research/policy studies per year after 2007	(11) Not yet. CHTDF: To support bottom-up capacity and links, the project has setup and trained good-governance 'facilitation' forum at district, Upazila and Union levels17. While these forum parallel existing, locally sustainable forum, they have enabled the project to 'kick-start' better-governance and better support of community-based needs.

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[17] See Annex CHT Institution Map 'Project Facilitation Forum'

Annex 14   ICB: Missing Elected Oversight of District Administration

The project is now in a parliamentary period that offers unique opportunities to develop strategies that assist national stakeholders fulfil their outstanding commitments to the Peace Accord. Of these, the most important with regard to improving the impact and sustainability of project assisted development management capacity building is the formation of elected district councils.

Publically accountable local government has progressed well in the CHT despite the political/ethnic tensions. From the lowest level of elected assemblies - the Poura/Union Parishads (town/parish councils) - up to the next administrative level - the Upazila Parishads (sub-district councils) - elected councils increasingly oversee the decisions and actions of local government its development partners. But currently elected oversight fails to reach the next, most critical, local government level - the district.

Lack of Elected Oversight in District Governance (2009)

CHT Area	National Gov		Local Government																	
	CHT (elected)		District Council (appointed)					Upazilla Council (elected)					Poura/Union Council (elected)							
Est Pop 1.5 m	District	MP	Cncil	Chair	Vice-C	Memb	Total Ds Cncillor	Cncil	Chair	Vice-C	Memb	Total Uz Cncillor	Cncil	Chair	M/F Memb	Added Fem	Total Un Cncillor	Ward	Town	Village
Rangamati	1	1	1	1		4	5	10	10	20	51	81	51	51	459	153	663	459	2	2,044
Khagrachari	1	1	1	1		4	5	8	8	16	37	61	37	37	333	111	481	333	3	1,424
Bandarban	1	1	1	1		4	5	7	7	14	31	52	31	31	279	93	403	279	2	1,482
CHT Total:	3	3	3	3		12	15	25	25	50	119	194	119	119	1,071	357	1,547	1,071	7	4,950

Key > ☐ Appointed Councillors   ☐ Elected Councillors

While this is the case throughout Bangladesh, the formation of elected district councils is a Peace Accord (PA) agreement - possibly the most crucial. The GoB has made efforts to fulfil this agreement. Council buildings have been constructed and civil-service administrators posted. But councillors have never been elected. Successive government have simply appointed five-person 'councils'. As a result, the hill district councils (HDC) still lack the legitimacy and related capacity to direct and oversee the flow of central government resources to District, Upazila and Union identified priorities.

Senior civil-servants within the district's 'traditional' administrative and technical ministries remain reluctant, if not resistant, to working under the un-elected HDC assemblies. As far as they are concerned, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) is the overall head of local government. This poses a serious obstacle to the building of efficient, effective and sustainable institutional capacity within the HDCs. This in turn undermines confidence in the PA and project exit strategies. One of the pre-conditions for the ending of the reluctance of the DC/UNO team to bring their considerable development management capabilities under hill district council oversight would be that district councillors are elected by the resident population.

Before elected-assembles can be formed, however, the key factors behind the 'missing' elections have to be understood. Firstly, no district in Bangladesh has an elected council. In 61 districts, the DC/UNO system oversees development under the direction of the national assembly. So neither government nor civil-service has experience of forming and empowering district councils, apart from what has been tried in the three hill districts. Secondly, if additional elections were held in the hill districts to replace appointed councillors with elected ones, the elections would undermine the elected status of Upazila and Poura/Union representatives and district MPs[18]. Newly elected HDC Chairs and district MPs would represent the same constituency. Though they would represent district needs in different councils, they would probably clash over decisions to address those needs. Similarly, newly elected HDC Members would probably threaten the role of existing Upazila and Poura/Union councillors. Little wonder, then, why past governments have failed to take this PA agreement forward. But rather than the acceptance of the ineffective status quo, the project must assist

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[18] The national parliament draws one representative (MP) from each CHT district.

stakeholders identify and pilot solutions. While mission time did not permit more and better drafted options, an outline solution to the administrative challenge can be seen in the following section[19]. One to address the latter 'governance' challenge follows here:

Potential Solution to Lack of Elected Oversight in District Governance (2010?)

CHT Area	National & Local Governance Constituencies																				
	National Gov		Local Government																		
	CHT (elected)		District Council (elected)					Upazilla Council (elected)					Poura/Union Council (elected)								
Est Pop 1.5 m	District	MP	Cncil	Chair	Vice-C	Memb	Total Ds Cncillor	Cncil	Chair	Vice-C	Memb	Total Uz Cncillor	Cncil	Chair	M/F Memb	Added Fem	Total Un Cncillor	Ward	Town	Village
Rangamati	1	1	1	1	2	28	31	10	10	20	51	81	51	51	459	153	663	459	2	2,044
Khagrachari	1	1	1	1	2	22	25	8	8	16	37	61	37	37	333	111	481	333	3	1,424
Bandarban	1	1	1	1	2	19	22	7	7	14	31	52	31	31	279	93	403	279	2	1,482
CHT Total:	3	3	3	3	6	69	78	25	25	50	119	194	119	119	1,071	357	1,547	1,071	7	4,950

Key > [dashed box] Potential 'Two-Hat' Representatives   [yellow circle] 'Two-Hat' Required Steps   [solid box] Existing Elected Representatives

A potential solution to the need for fully elected district assemblies is to avoid further elections. While this might sound illogical, the above chart shows how fully elected councils can be formed without further elections through a 'two hat' strategy in three steps:

(1) Request the three elected national MPs to also head their respective district councils as Chair[20].

(2) Request the 75 elected Upazila Chairs and Vice-Chairs to also become district Councillors, under the Chair.

(3) Request the Chairs to each select two Vice-Chairs, of their choice, from the pool of councillors.

In keeping their existing titles and duties, district Chairs and other Councillors would be required to wear 'two hats' if they agreed to pilot this strategy. If implemented, it would produce three fully elected assemblies - one of 31 councillors in Rangamati, 25 in Khagrachari and 22 in Bandarban.

Uz Chair & Vice-C Profile Sep 2009				
Total	Tribal	Other	Fem	Men
75	49	26	25	50
100%	65%	35%	33%	67%

If actioned today, the three MP/Chairmen would all be male and tribal. The profile of Vice Chairs and Members would be 65% tribal and 33% female. This does not exactly match the profile prescribed in the PA. But it is very close and more democratic.

Regarding PA critical inter-community, bottom-up development the 'two-hat' strategy also offers the potential to install and empower representatives of each and every community ward[21] inside the most important decision-making body of local government - the district council.

Though a technically simple solution, implementation will require considerable care and attention. After first obtaining the support of the PA signatories and all other key national stakeholders, a secondary challenge would be the MPs and Upazila councillors themselves. Each MP, for example, is already busy with Parliamentary and regional (MoCHTA, CHT-DB, Task Force) affairs. Upazila leaders are similarly busy with other duties. But provided MPs they are free to select Vice-Chairs who can manage affairs in their

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[19] Support (elected) HDCs and Civil-Service to Streamline District Administration.

[20] The mission prefers to avoid the term 'Chairman' as this incorrectly infers the post is for men only.

[21] Wards constitute the lowest level consistency of local government elections.

absence from the district, it's likely MPs will agree to wear 'two hats' to support the PA and avoid further elections. For similar, reasons, support can be expected from Upazila leaders.

Once formed, elected HDCs would offer the required legitimacy to fulfil their core PA mandate - the oversight of unified local government and the monitoring of all public and private sector services.

Once fully operational, the elected District Councils would also have the legitimacy and capacity to elect the Regional Council, as agreed in the PA. While this step is obviously secondary, it further underlines the need for PA signatories to address the primary need for elected HDC assemblies, and for the CB-ICB cluster to deliver assistance where required.

Annex 15   ICB: Recommendations, details

Support for (elected) HDCs and Civil-Service to Streamline District Administration

Despite the GoB transfer of administrative oversight of various 'subjects' from the DC/UNO system team to a parallel team of civil-service administrators in the HDCs, there remains confusion about which team is responsible for what.

Not only does the flow of GoB resources not match transferred subjects, most flows still reportedly fall under the oversight of the DC/UNO system. So while HDCs officially oversee of 60% of total subjects, they report capacity to oversee only a fraction of related planning and expenditure. For example, the Ministry of Health now channels some resources through HDCs to pay some district level staff. But most MoH funding remains unknown to HDC administrators as it flows directly from MoH to district accounts under DC/UNO oversight. Available resource flow data indicates few district funding sources, other than lightly funded MoCHTA, are putting any funds under the oversight of HDCs. Those that do, still channel the majority of their funds through the DC/UNO systems or their own oversight system as in the case of CHT-DF. The current status of two, overlapping administrations in one district is not only resource and wasteful, it is also deprives district councils the ability to direct and oversee district development. While this problem is likely to persist until councils are elected, the ICB team must be ready and resourced to support the reformation of a single administrative team, under the DC, as soon as assemblies are elected. Failure to support a rapid unification of the twin administrations, soon after election, risks perpetuating the current system and undermining the capacity of elected council to fulfil their PA envisioned duties.

ICB Monitoring

But the mission provides the following chart to outline areas from where such measures need to be drawn. The pink 'heart' of the wheel is the core of any institutions. If capacity is not built there, and built first, the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of assistance to outer areas will remain weak. Once formulated, the revised framework of CB-ICB measures will enable the project to track and report progress more

effectively. Monitoring should not, however, be limited to measuring what 'they' do for 'us'[22]. It must also capture what 'they' are doing for 'themselves'. At village level, PDC monitoring will need to remain in place even after the project CEP service delivery ends. At higher levels, the capacity of councils at Union, Upazila and District levels to debate and reach decisions without the involvement of project or partner staff will also need to be monitored. The ability of each district to raise and spend development funding effectively also needs to be monitored, if the project is to track the impact of its ICB activities. One likely impact measures would be changes in the flow of total GoB and AID (ABD, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, etc) resources into CHT districts, through their RC, DB, CHT-DF, HDCs, DC/UNDO and Line Department partners. Currently the project only measures resources (LoA) it provides to institution. This is good. But ICB needs to measure total resource flows from all sources to all CHT partners. As with all measurements, impact monitoring is not something the project has to do itself. But it must build the capacities of partners to fulfil this need. In the case of resource flows, MoCHTA's capacity to get and share information form/with the Ministry of Finance needs to be strengthened. Similarly the capacity of HDC administrators to follow total resource flows at district, Upazila and union levels also needs urgent strengthening.

Empower Circle Intelligence System

One potential area would be to assist the Circle system to document tribal knowledge of existing land holdings - both disputed and un-disputed. As this 'baseline' information will be required by the Land Commission, at some stage, project assistance would support both Government and Circle system needs. But care must be taken to ensure information is formatted to address the differing needs of both institutions.

Such a format would likely be tabular in nature and include rows for the area of land in question and columns for administrative areas, propriety household or village, current productive and social assets (house, well, canal, mill, etc) and current use (home, fixed or shifting crops, fruit trees, forest, etc).

Ideally this Circle database would include global grid references which Headmen/Karbaris could be trained to generated with the aid of a simple GPS tracking device[23]. When related GIS software becomes available[24], Circle maps could then be generated. But land holding details should be the initial priority, not maps. And even associated land coordinates can be added later. ICB should not procure mapping software (for the CHT-RC) without discussing ABD's similar plan.

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[22] Where monitoring is happening this seems to be the current practice.

[23] An optional extra on some mobile phones.

[24] CHTDF and ADB projects plan to supply GIS software to the RC in 2010.

Annex 16   Gender / WID Impact Assessment Form 2006

Project title: **UNDP CHT Development Facility Bangladesh (CHTDF)**

GENDER / WID IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM

Project title: UNDP/CHTDF Phase III

                    Improved socio-economic development of the Chittagong Hill Tracts

PROJECT CATEGORY

A.1   WID non applicable   No

A.2   WID applicable   Yes

        a)   Is the group affected

                i)   mostly or wholly composed of women/girls ?   No

                ii)   composed of men and women equally   Yes

        b)   Check the 4 conditions for gender integration
                How many are satisfied?

                -        **Three but not all (gender oriented)   3 Yes**

GENDER / WID IN PROJECT CYCLE MANAGEMENT / THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

        B.1   Objectives

        Whose needs and interests are targeted in the immediate objectives?

	Women	*Men*
Practical needs	**1. Community empowerment component** • **Decreased workload** • **Increased food consumption**	▪ **Decreased workload Increased food consumption** ▪ **Increased cash income**
Strategic needs	**1. Community empowerment component** • **Access to decision making positions and influencing role in committees** • **Exposure to new places and initiatives** **2. Other components** • Access to qualification in work places • Access to entrepreneurship and skills • **Exposure to new places and ideas**	**Access to new decision making positions in newly formed CBOs.** **Access to new operational responsibilities** **New opportunities for skills development**

B. 2   Outputs

Women practical needs

        • water supply and sanitation infrastructure in many community projects
        • agricultural and livestock projects,

Women Strategic needs

        • one third of executive members of village development committees and of facilitation committees members are women,

- Specific training and coaching for women committee members to enable them to contribute more to the decision
- Exposure : one third of participants in study tours abroad and exchange visits within the region are women , 50% of sports camps participants are women
- In CHT institutions, a baseline gender equity survey will be conducted, gender indicators included in institutions self assessments. All training sessions include 60% of existing women staff members.
- Half of young entrepreneurs who succeed after training will be women; Women Young entrepreneurs corps formed.

Men's needs

A majority of village projects decrease men workload (agricultural machinery)

Projects increase the proportion of cash in household incomes, thus men power over the household consumption pattern.

Two thirds of most decisions making positions and beneficiaries from project activities (skills development, exposure) will be men.

B.3   Inputs

The recruitment of a full time Gender Program Officer is being processed; s/he will screen all program implementation methods and the monitoring system, and revise the current Gender Action Plan which is now only partly implemented.

Are already planned and budgeted:

- Women and girls needs and priorities assessments in each village through PRA exercises with separate groups.
- A gender impact study per project sector will to measure costs and benefits from each activity
- A gender survey (Human resource component) in the 6 key CHT institutions.

B.4 Monitoring and evaluation

A precise monitoring system of the empowerment process with systematically segregated gender indicators has recently been developed by CHTDF management and field staff. These indicators are included in details in the component Logframe, thus they will guide the entire component monitoring program and evaluation.

Other components have integrated as many gender segregated indicators as possible. Activities will take place in institutions where the gender balance is poor. This problem will be addressed among many other capacity issues but seems, so far not considered a high priority.

ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PROJECT CYCLE.

THE OECD /DAC CRITERIA

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	<u>Preparation of components 1 2, and 4</u> **(Institutions, Economic opportunities, confidence building)**	<u>Midterm review of component 3</u> **Community empowerment** **(cf. Evaluation report March 06)**
C1	Women's needs have not been assessed during projects preparation	Women's needs have not been assessed during projects preparation, including during PRA sessions. This is being corrected following evaluation mission's recommendations
	Their participation in project implementation will be encouraged; minimum ratios are set for each action; effectiveness of training will be assessed per gender.	Committee's composition is balanced. Actual participation in implementation committees varies between villages, but is constantly encouraged by project facilitators
	Constraints have not yet been thoroughly identified but studies are planned in institutions.	Constraints have been accurately identified in a, so far, informal way. Within CHTDF staff, constraints to recruitment of qualified women have been studied and appropriate corrective action taken (long term internship to qualify local female professional)
	Gender expertise is planned and budgeted for all phases after the design phase which had none.	A gender expert was in place for a short time. A new recruitment is being processed.

Annex 17   **Environmental Impact Assessment Form 2006**

UNDP CHT Development Facility Bangladesh (CHT DF)

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM

a) Project title & country: UNDP CHT Development Facility, Bangladesh

b) **Project screened as type:** CATEGORY … (with uncertain environmental adverse impact)

c) **Was any of the following EIA actions undertaken?** A separate EIA or Environmental analysis within an overall feasibility study (with ToR): No. ADB carried out an environmental assessment for the whole region within a regional planning exercise in 2002. This is not sufficient for the activities as initiated with aid by the project. The mid-Term evaluation advised to undertake individual feasibility studies including EIAs for each type of activity undertaken by village communities with grants from CHTDF. Notably the livestock and agricultural development activities deserve to be assessed, because the environment's carrying capacity is considered low. Such activity-specific EIAs still have to be elaborated and planned by the project.

d) **List major environmental impacts of the project (positive and negative) identified by the EIA:** No EIA was undertaken. The project has provided grants for communities to undertake their development activities of their own choice and more than half have chosen to buy cows and goats, while more than 25% chose intensified cultivation of cash crops like ginger, turmeric, bananas, and pineapple. The Mid-term Evaluation mission has asked the project to undertake as soon as possible impact assessments, as the hilly Jum lands in the CHT are regarded to have a low carrying capacity and high soil degradation risks.

e) List the principal mitigating measures which will be undertaken during project implementation: The project has planned to do EIAs as part of the activity-type technical feasibility studies and budgeted for yet unspecified environmental management activities at community level. The project is proposed to work closely with the EC-funded Chittagong Hill Tracts Natural Resource Management (CHARM) project, which studies exactly the same issues.

f) **Is there an environmental monitoring plan for the project?** No.

g) **If the answer to "f" was "no": Will the project draw up such a plan?**

Such a plan is not required for the project as a whole, because most of the activities do not impact on the environment. It is expected that environmental monitoring plans will be drawn up on basis of EIAs for specific sector activities like cow rearing or ginger cultivation.

h) **List consultations carried out with local communities during project preparation.** Consultations were carried out with the local communities during the development of the CHT Development Facility programme but none were specifically environment focused. The upcoming activity type-specific EIAs will be done in consultation with concerned communities.

Annex 18   CHTDF EC Expenditure versus EC Phase III Budget (€)

Budget for the Action; CHTDF	ALL Years	Cumulative Expenditure 2007 to 15 Sep'09	Remaining Balance	Planned to spend as yet by CHTDF	Total planned expenditure upto 3rd July 2010
Expenses	Costs (€)	Cost (€)	Cost (€)	Cost (€)	Cost (€)
A	**B**	**c**	**d=b-c**	**e**	**f=c+e**
1. Human Resources					
1.1 Salaries (gross amounts, local staff)					
1.1.1 Technical (40 persons/year)	1,419,000	681,294	737,706	146,080	827,374
1.1.2 Technical - short term	22,500	54,126	(31,626)	-	54,126
1.1.3 Administrative/support staff (60 persons/year)	528,000	1,544,780	(1,016,780)	-	1,544,780
1.1.4 National UNVs (32 persons/year)	247,500	149,933	97,567	66,571	216,504
1.2 Salaries (gross amounts, expat/int.staff)			-	-	-
1.2.1 International staff (4 persons/year)	1,402,500	869,411	533,089	69,479	938,890
1.2.2 International UNVs (6 persons/year)	495,000	255,024	239,976	54,753	309,777
1.3 Per diems for missions/travel			-	-	-
1.3.1 Abroad (staff assigned to the Action)	5,400	10,409	(5,009)	-	10,409
1.3.2 Local (staff assigned to the Action)	25,700	243,740	(218,040)	-	243,740
1.3.3 Seminar/conference participants	4,641	2,071	2,570	2,570	4,641
Subtotal Human Resources	**4,150,241**	**3,810,788**	**339,453**	**339,454**	**4,150,241**
2. Travel					-
2.1 International travel	15,000	11,715	3,285	3,285	15,000
2.2 Local transportation (Dhaka-Chittagong-CHT)	39,600	37,213	2,387	2,387	39,600
Subtotal Travel	**54,600**	**48,928**	**5,672**	**5,672**	**54,600**
3. Equipment and supplies					
3.1 Vehicles	82,000	90,573	(8,573)	-	90,573
3.2 Motorbikes	15,000	27,746	(12,746)	-	27,746
3.3 Office equipments			-	-	-
3.3.1 Furniture (desk, chairs, etc.)	112,500	94,223	18,277	9,704	103,927
3.3.2 Computers and communication (incl. accessories)	120,000	122,966	(2,966)	-	122,966
3.4 Others (Miscellaneous)	105,000	79,026	25,974	10,262	89,288
3.5 VSAT system for sub-offices	50,000	47,366	2,634	2,634	50,000
Subtotal Equipment and supplies	**484,500**	**461,900**	**22,600**	**22,600**	**484,500**
4. Local office/Action costs					
4.1 Vehicle/motorbike maintenance costs	148,500	134,443	14,057	14,057	148,500
4.2 Office rent	115,500	88,889	26,611	26,611	115,500
4.3 Consumables - office supplies	115,500	101,874	13,626	13,626	115,500
4.4 Other services (tel/fax, electricity, internet)	115,500	62,247	53,253	53,253	115,500
4.5 Subcontracts (Security)	75,000	74,180	820	820	75,000
Subtotal Local office/Action costs	**570,000**	**461,633**	**108,367**	**108,367**	**570,000**
5. Other costs, services					
5.1 Publications					-
5.1.1 Best practices handbook follow-up	15,130	-	15,130	4,111	4,111
5.1.2 Newsletters, flyers, reports	1,100	6,612	(5,512)	-	6,612

5.2 Studies, research	20,000	11,336	8,664	2,705	14,041
5.3 Auditing costs	2,000	5,085	(3,085)	-	5,085
5.4 Evaluation costs	12,000	6,095	5,906	2,406	8,500
5.5 Costs of conferences/seminars	12,500	11,433	1,067	1,067	12,500
5.6 Training			-	-	-
5.6.1 Office human resource strengthening	22,500	9,321	13,179	4,679	14,000
5.7 Visibility actions			-	-	-
5.7.1 Supporting cultural organisations and festivals	25,000	48,381	(23,381)	-	48,381
5.7.2 Media visibility (tv co-productions, newspapers)	10,000	4,316	5,684	2,684	7,000
5.7.3 Media events (Europe day, world indigenous day)	5,000	4,891	109	109	5,000
Subtotal Other costs, services	**125,230**	**107,468**	**17,762**	**17,761**	**125,229**
6. Other:					
6.1 Economic Opportunities (EOP)					-
6.1.1 Youth employment promotion initiatives	258,500	141,688	116,812	99,136	240,824
6.1.2 Marketing and infrastructure support (collection centres, agro process)	294,000	57,267	236,733	136,733	194,000
6.1.3 Private sector development programme (Business Promotion and Facility Centres)	229,500	50,750	178,750	128,750	179,500
6.1.4 Community Based Tourism (Development of tourism packages and pilot programmes)	525,000	-	525,000	-	-
6.1.5 Community Livelihoods Support and Cultural Industries		230,000	(230,000)	130,000	360,000
Subtotal Economic Opportunities	**1,307,000**	**479,705**	**827,295**	**364,619**	**974,324**
6.2 Institutional Capacity Building (ICB)					
6.2.1 CHT common vision and strategy formulation	22,550	21,985	565	565	22,550
6.2.2 CHT mandate and rules of business support	43,200	22,417	20,783	20,783	43,200
6.2.3 Institutional capacity self-assessements	202,000	8,604	193,396	171,222	179,826
6.2.4 Human resource development	50,000	72,174	(22,174)	-	72,174
6.2.5 Prioritized technical assistance and logistical support	189,600	44,953	144,648	144,648	189,600
6.2.6 Organizational Design Assessment & Resource Plan	23,000	5,736	17,264	17,264	23,000
6.2.7 Outreach activities CHT institutions	40,000	6,664	33,336	33,336	40,000
6.2.8 Policy development and regional/district planning for CHTIs	148,400	9,212	139,188	139,188	148,400
6.2.9 Research policy fund for issue based research	68,000	-	68,000	68,000	68,000
6.2.10 ICB technical/ICT support programmes	296,000	21,884	274,116	274,116	296,000
6.2.11 Subcontracts for technical backstopping	180,000	46,195	133,805	133,805	180,000
Subtotal Institutional Capacity Building	**1,262,750**	**259,824**	**1,002,926**	**1,002,927**	**1,262,750**
6.3 Education					
6.3.1 Local implementing partner NGO contract	137,000	129,274	7,726	7,726	137,000
6.3.2 Education planning, community mobilization and policy advocacy	219,600	90,334	129,266	129,266	219,600
6.3.3 Teacher training and support	142,000	123,784	18,216	18,216	142,000
6.3.4 Multilingual Education initiatives	316,890	182,954	133,936	88,822	271,776
6.3.5 Access to Education initiatives	300,000	345,114	(45,114)	-	345,114
Subtotal Education	**1,115,490**	**871,460**	**244,030**	**244,030**	**1,115,490**
6.4 Community Empowerment (CE)					
6.4.1 Micro-grants for Communities					-
6.4.1.1 QIF 1st Instalment	582,200	1,755,341	(1,173,141)	-	1,755,341

6.4.1.2 QIF 2nd Instalment	1,155,960	2,460,283	(1,304,323)	-	2,460,283
6.4.1.3 QIF 3rd Instalment	1,808,400	1,068,802	739,598	-	1,068,802
6.4.2 Sub Contracts - Community Empowerment (International NGO/24 months)	410,058	25,759	384,299	-	25,759
6.4.3 Sub Contracts - Community Empowerment (19 Local NGOs)	1,149,500	853,678	295,822	-	853,678
6.4.4 Local Governance Capacity Development			-	-	-
6.4.4.1 Local Governance Community Outreach Support Services	243,000	15,405	227,595	-	15,405
6.4.4.2 Community Management and Skills Development programmes	145,800	74,670	71,130	-	74,670
6.4.4.3 Environmental Management & Conservation initiatives	121,500	49,273	72,227	-	49,273
6.4.4.4 Community Based Disaster Management prgrammes	121,500	35,052	86,448	-	35,052
6.4.4.5 NGO Capacity Building initiatives	194,400	23,879	170,521	-	23,879
6.4.4.6 Strengthening the Role of Traditional and Elected Leaders	145,800	80,471	65,329	-	80,471
6.4.5 Gender Mainstreaming activities	150,000	118,180	31,820	-	118,180
Subtotal Community Empowerment	6,228,118	6,560,794	(332,676)	-	6,560,794
6.5 Confidence Building (CB)					
6.5.1 National, Regional and Community Level Dialogues	96,000	55,717	40,283	40,283	96,000
6.5.2 Community Forestry- Programme strategy preparation and subcontracting	160,000	2,092	157,908	332,908	335,000
6.5.3 Minority Rights and Cultural Diversity Programmes	220,000	155,573	64,427	64,877	220,450
6.5.4 Capacity Building for Police in CHT	225,000	-	225,000	-	-
6.5.5 Incentives Programme (Sports4Peace, Awards)	187,500	77,836	109,664	100,664	178,500
6.5.6 Returned Refugees, IDPS and Ex-combatants- Preparation of Strategy and Rehabilitation Programme	250,000	-	250,000	179,877	179,877
6.5.7 Confidence Building Fund -Land & Elections	220,000	7,500	212,500	181,675	189,175
6.5.8 Community Exchange Visits (CHT and CHT-Plains)	50,000	132,498	(82,498)	-	132,498
6.5.9 Study Tours (post-conflict, indigenous issues)	165,000	59,885	105,115	105,115	165,000
6.5.10 Civil Society Small Grants Fund		27,000	(27,000)	50,000	77,000
Subtotal Confidence Building	1,573,500	518,101	1,055,399	1,055,399	1,573,500
Subtotal Other	11,486,858	8,689,884	2,796,974	2,666,974	11,486,858
7. Subtotal direct costs of the Action (1-6)	16,871,429	13,580,600	3,290,829	3,160,829	16,871,429
8. Administrative costs	843,571	735,108	108,464	108,464	843,571
9. Total eligible cost of the Action (7+8)	17,715,000	14,315,708	3,399,293	3,269,292	17,715,000

Annex 19   Financial Data (provided by CHTDF Financial section)

All Clusters - Expenditure to Sep-09

Donor	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All Years	
AUSAID						$115,070	-$6,999	$108,071	0.2%
Australia			$85,446	$28,214	$40,530	$50,107	$64,047	$268,343	0.6%
BCPR									
BCPR EQ							$415,993	$415,993	0.9%
CANADA						$26,549		$26,549	0.1%
CARE						$97,091		$97,091	0.2%
CIDA						$4,235,430	$2,070,499	$6,305,929	13.4%
EC			$2,840,186	$5,748,704	$7,905,065	$6,993,552	$5,862,455	$29,349,963	62.4%
Japan									
Norway			$584,592	$611,058	$415,759	-$1,010		$1,610,398	3.4%
TRAC		$1,847,687	-$203,935	$553,593	$724,561	$2,653,550	$121,214	$5,696,669	12.1%
USA		$1,758,750	$500,000	$624,937	$284,781	$661		$3,169,128	6.7%
All Donors		**$3,606,437**	**$3,806,289**	**$7,566,506**	**$9,370,695**	**$14,170,999**	**$8,527,208**	**$47,048,134**	100%
% of total:		8%	8%	16%	20%	30%	18%	100%	
Year on Year Change:			6%	99%	24%	51%	-40%		

All Projects - Expenditure to Sep-09

Cluster	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All Years	
Capacity				$33,068	$129,040	$849,956	$18,650	$1,030,715	2.2%
CEP				$2,358,615	$6,361,901	$4,823,364	$2,587,997	$16,131,877	34.3%
Confidence			$1,509,981	$578,272	$223,591	$1,846,423	$296,955	$4,455,222	9.5%
Disaster							$415,961	$415,961	0.9%
DM							$32	$32	0.0%
Economic			$554,400	$22,869	$28,607	$659,958	$577,625	$1,843,460	3.9%
Education				$28,324	$2,181	$1,041,748	$918,517	$1,990,770	4.2%
Gender						$84,684	$90,706	$175,389	0.4%
Health				$653,570	$585,866	$923,830	$2,009,199	$4,172,464	8.9%
NRM			$541,827	$6,873				$548,700	1.2%
Operations		$3,606,437	$1,200,081	$3,884,914	$2,039,509	$3,941,036	$1,611,567	$16,283,545	34.6%
All Clusters		**$3,606,437**	**$3,806,289**	**$7,566,506**	**$9,370,695**	**$14,170,999**	**$8,527,208**	**$47,048,134**	100%
		8%	8%	16%	20%	30%	18%	100%	

An attempt at comparing EC and total CHTDF Expenditures (sources: columns b,c,d CHTDF report to EC, column e from CHTDF)

Description	Euro Budget EC 07-09	$ Budget EC 07-09	$ Expense 07-09	$ Claimed/ Reported to EC 07-09 (@1.4$/€)	EC Budget surplus/ shortage	% of Expense funded by EC
a	b	c	d	e	f	g
Subtotal Operations	**5,384,571**	**6,999,942**	**7,592,112**	6,847,004	**2%**	90%
6.1 Economic Opportunities (EOP)	1,307,000	1,699,100	1,266,190	671,587	**60%**	53%
6.2 Institutional Capacity Building (ICB)	1,262,750	1,641,575	997,646	363,754	**78%**	36%
6.3 Education	1,115,490	1,450,137	1,962,446	363,754	**75%**	19%
6.4 Community Empowerment (CE)	6,228,118	8,096,553	13,773,262	9,185,112	**-13%**	67%
6.5 Confidence Building (CB)	1,573,500	2,045,550	2,366,969	725,341	**65%**	31%
Subtotal Other	**11,486,858**	**14,932,915**	**20,366,513**	12,165,838	**19%**	60%
TOTAL	**16,871,429**	**21,932,858**	**27,958,625**	20,041,991	**9%**	72%

Annex 20   Comments on Draft Report and Replies by the Mission

(Fiche Contradictoire)

A. COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT by EU Delegation and replies by the Mission

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
1	1. Introduction	The European Commission (EC) has assisted Phase III (2006 to 2009) with € 24 million	Phase I (2002 -2004) mainly preparatory work; Phase II (2005-2006); Phase III (2007-2009) **To correct**	Will be corrected
2	2.1.2. Availability of documents	• for UNDP a logframe is only a type of hoop through which to jump to get donor funding and which can be generally forgotten once funding is obtained and activities started • The project reports at present not against the indicators in the logframe/document agreed with EC but against the very unspecific UN-GoB Prodoc targets	The report has a number of comments which seem 'precipitated'. With regard to this specific one in the first bullet point, while acknowledging that the mindset of the CHTDF management with regard to the LFM still need to mature, it seems to ignore that during the life of the project the LFM went through 4 updates, and was the basis for discussions (with stakeholders) during the regular workshops in preparation of the Annual Work-plan. With regard to the second bullet point the LFM has been used by UNDP for EC reporting (the mission was given the last report). **Both bullet points need re-wording. The ironic tone of the comment in the first bullet point, (like many others all over the report) is quite inopportune and must be avoided in the entire report.**	Will be corrected
3		• The logframe outline attached is only the mission's own idea	The report does not contain any LFM attached. **To attach the LFM outline**	As yet added
4		• The Dhaka-based managers do not always have correct information about field realities, notably about PNDG monitoring and PDC control over their bank accounts	This reference concerning a specific issue (the control over bank account) is not relevant here which is about general issues. **Suggest deleting.**	Although not unimportant, it will be deleted as per suggestion
5	3. Sectors and Components	Although the original structure is not used anymore, the project is in effect still divided in the original	Here and in other sections the report addresses this issue quite critically probably without trying to understand the reasons for the management to use still the original	This is just an observation, and the mission did not mean or does not read any criticism in this and other related statements as the background was well

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
		components for Community Empowerment, Institutional Capacity Building(ICB), Region Wide Initiatives (RWI) and Confidence Building (CB)	components-wise structure. If this remark is maintained the report must explore the reasons behind this which are mainly related to the need to comply with the ProDoc signed by the GoB and to the need not to bring modifications to it during extension because of the risk of blocking the entire process of approval. This happened during approval of the first ProDoc (in 2005) and was about to happen again for the extension in 2009. This lack of attention of the report to sensitive issues affecting the context in which the project has been designed, extended and is being implemented is surprising. **If the report wants to maintain this sentence, it should be integrated with appropriated justifications**.	understood. The need to report to GoB against the Prodoc is obvious. Also we understood the problem of making reports that adhere to the Prodoc as well as the EC LFM. We have added a sentence to confirm this
6	4.3 CE design and relevance	During the previous phase, the volatility of the political climate and the setbacks in the implementation of the Peace accord made confidence building even more necessary than six years ago	Previous phase... than six years ago; the sentence is not clear. Is the 'six years ago' the previous phase? **To clarify**	Will be clarified. The "six years ago" refers to the time of the original project design.
7		The programme is structured so as to cover, with the identical procedures and resources, a territory as vast as possible and a number of communities as high as possible	The report here and in other parts heavily criticizes the choice of expanding without considering or trying to analyse the reasons for this strategy. The consultants' point of view (as also expressed in the 2006 evaluation) suggesting not expanding has to be properly justified and constructively assessed in relation to the strategy for **stabilization-through-expansion**, chosen by the project. **To expand the section by taking into consideration the advice. The same is needed for other part of the report dealing with the same issue.** (see also comment No 43)	The mission fails to read criticism in this statement about the strategy. It considers this strategy very valid, just like in 2006. This statement should be read separately from the mission's opinion that CHTDF would do well to sort out perceived risks and weaknesses before expanding. See other sections.
8		*"Confidence and Empowerment justifies lack of expertise and quality outputs"* For a project that empowers 2700 paras, mostly through linkage and	This quote is quite crude and does not reflect the view of the project management. The argument is about the relevance of expansion of PDCs and not about quality of PDCs which the project tries not to neglect. Unfortunately the report seems failing to assess the real	Although the mission agrees to rephrase the statement by avoiding the term "surprising", it has a different view on the comment in general. This report statement is not about expansion, but about the lack of available specialist expertise.

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
		economic interventions, the seeming lack of rights-based approach, IGA and agricultural expertise available within the project and the lack of thorough analysis of QIF opportunities is surprising.	context and analyse appropriately the strategy chosen for this component. It should take into consideration that the risks of neglecting a strategy of expansion could be equally serious in a post-conflict context. **The paragraph is incomplete and need to be integrated with new elements related to the relevance of the 'strategy for expansion'.** If the consultants do not agree they need to analyse the strategy (of expansion for confidence building) appropriately and provide constructively, convincing suggestions against. **The sentence in quote does not reflect the view of the management and must be deleted**. (see also comment No 43)	Justification of numbers: As stated before, the report/mission agrees with the strategy to cover as many PDCs as possible. That is what confidence building in the CHT is about. Expansion: the mission is not against expansion in itself, but thinks that the project should increase quality and decrease risks before doing so. So not expanding would be a temporary measure, as also expressed during the debriefing meetings. Quality and risks: the project lacks expertise in the core sectors related to CE: rights-based approach, IGA, agriculture/livestock and marketing. The mission thinks that the project should hire and apply more expertise to increase impact and reduce risks. Risks of temporarily not expanding: the mission has also, in other parts of the report, adequately dealt with the risks of temporarily not expanding. It has argued that the "not-yet- covered" paras are already "not-covered" for six CHTDF years. Besides the fact that many "not-covered" paras are actually covered by third parties (CHTDF is not the only actor in the CHT), the mission has also advised CHTDF to cooperate more with those third parties to cover the most deserving not-covered paras, while CHTDF is still preparing itself for the next expansion.
9	4.4.1 Expenditures	Until 2006, due to miscoding, "Operations" was used as a dumping ground for bad coding, which means, that at 35% of total expenditure, it is the largest single component.	**The comment is not understandable (it utilise UN specific terminology) but in any case the tone is inappropriate must be taken away from here and any other part of the report**.	Agreed to reword the statement
10		Communities projects replicated instead of diversified	Diversification can be important but not necessary as this sentence seems to hint! The report criticizes but does not suggest to the project convincing reasons for diversification nor those for non-diversification. **To integrate by taking into consideration the motivations**	The report does neither criticise here nor argue in favour or against diversification. It observes how the project has found economies of scale. See further reply to UNDP comments and related text editing

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
			of the project and beneficiaries for selecting those projects.	
11	4.4.2	Up to 27% of interviewed PDC members in e.g. Bandarban consider their QIF project a failure	This result seems quite reasonable and in any case cannot be regarded as a failure as the report seems to indicate. Together with the poor analysis of the report concerning the general context in which the project operate (post conflict), the report systematically and surprisingly ignores that communities, before becoming beneficiaries of the project, have never be reached by any whatsoever form of development activities. This undoubtedly has an impact on results. **The sentence gives a wrong conclusion and need modification.**	Disagreed. The sentence should be read in context. The mission will elaborate the section to clarify further. The mission report does not state that the result should be considered a failure. The report also does not ignore that many paras had not been reached by development activities before, which was the main rationale for the approach in the first place**. The report states that 27%* of interviewed PDC members consider their QIA a failure, while 21% didn't or couldn't answer. 50% of QIF intervention types find less than 50% people satisfied. The report quotes this figure (regardless of it being high or low) only to support its opinion that QIA success rates* could have been higher, if proper feasibility studies and guidance would have been applied. This is a reasonable and justified conclusion. *Note: while again checking the table provided by CHTDF Bandarban, an error was found. The totals don't add up: not 61% but actually 54% of PDC-ers find their QIA a success, 25% a failure and 21% don't know or did not answer. (for other corrections see replies to UNDP comments) **Note: The original rationale notwithstanding, the report has informed in another section that the coverage situation has changed a lot since 2003, with many paras now being covered by other projects and most visited paras visibly being assisted by third parties like CHTDB/UNICEF, WFP, BRAC, CCDB, Koinonia, Churches, and Upazila line departments. The project might revisit this aspect and survey once more how many paras at present really remain not-covered.

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
12	4.4.5	Also PDCs do not have free access to their cash returns if the deposit those in bank accounts. This seriously impinges on impact as well as sustainability and should be urgently reconsidered. The project management intends to do so in the next phase. However, as local extortionists will remain active, the project might never be able to hand-over the bank accounts to the PDCs.	The two statements are not consistent. **To modify accordingly**	**Agreed.** The dilemma will be further elaborated.
13	4.5	Access to skills and knowledge: the gap is deepened by the project	Quite unusual way of assessing important results! This assertion is not substantiated by the findings. If gender situation before the project was of equality i.e. 0% male and 0% female acquiring skills (gender parity!) and after the project 40% female and 60% male, how can this be defined as a 'deepening of gender gap'? **This section in any case cannot be left as it is, as such analysis put at stake the credibility of the entire evaluation and shadow the value even of the few positive comments contained in the report. If the evaluator meant something different this need to be appropriately substantiated.**	**Agreed/Not agreed.** Benefits from the project were unequally distributed among genders. On theory: The pre-project gender situation was not equal. And even if men and women were equally unqualified before the project, some difference must have been created by training more men than women. On practice: it is more important to see what could have been achieved. For that the achievement should be evaluated against what other organisations achieve, and whether a shift to e.g. 60%f-40%m could have impacted the overall result. The project did not do such analysis, and the mission was not in a position to do this as yet. **Will be reworded; see also reply to UNDP comments**
14	PNDGs and women empowerment	The rationale and objectives of the creation of "women only" groups beside community PDCs is unclear, and vary among the component staff and stakeholders. It was probably a way to compensate the slow pace of progress towards equal access to resource and decision making within	The comment contain sarcasm, it is also a bit banal, and therefore inappropriate. **To delete or reassess in view of the positive evidence giving credit to this activity like for instance 'positive opinion by all stakeholders'.**	The mission regrets that some text was interpreted as sarcastic or banal. "Business as usual" was mistakenly put in quotation marks. We reworded the text. The report elsewhere acknowledges the positive steps in terms of gender compared to 2006. However, PNDG objectives, approach, activities,

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
		the PDC system, without disturbing "PDC business as usual". In most cases, PNDGs were presented as a bonus for successful PDCs, in rare other cases, they were a "plan B" for failing PDCs		monitoring and relevant documents have been requested several times and could not be produced. The apparent policy of PNDGs as bonus for successful PDCs or as plan B for failing PDCs is in itself not bad. We would have liked to see a written and more elaborate policy.
15	4.6	CE impact	The section demonstrates a positive impact. They are not reflected in the conclusions. Given the very negative image of the component's activities depicted by previous sections it is not understandable how this could have been achieved. Or, were comments in previous sections wrong? **This probably comes as confirmation that previous sections on this component need to be reviewed.**	The comments in previous sections were not wrong, but maybe partly misread. It has not been the intention to create "a very negative image" and the mission's opinion that more could have been achieved should not be taken as negative.
16		*'quick disbursement for slow impact on economic development'*	Quite unfortunate expression. **To delete**	**Agreed. Will be reworded.**
17	4.7 CE Sustainability	• The project should be prepared to accept that bigger groupings will not be the right exit strategy in many of its areas	This is a good suggestion. The report however does not consider crucial factors involving formation large groups in a post-conflict situation like CHT. Formation of large groups is seen quite unfavourably by powerful stakeholders in CHT.	"The report however does not consider crucial factors involving formation large groups in a post-conflict situation like CHT": Crucial factors can only be considered in the context of a plan. The report's comments are therefore only general as no concrete plan for this has been shown by the project, beyond mentioning the grouping of PDCs as an exit strategy, when the mission asked about exit strategy. "Formation of large groups is seen quite unfavourably by powerful stakeholders in CHT": This is logical. It might be both a positive and negative factor. Not only for other stakeholders, but also for the project itself the process might become too political and less manageable. Repercussions might pose a serious risk for the empowerment process. Inter-PDC cooperation should therefore be limited to and centred on economic development and services.

	Section/page	Quote from Draft Report	Comments by EC	Reply from Consultant
18		To create a pool of private sector service providers would be the best option in theory, but considering distances and other constraints hampering profitability, businesses would need subsidies	Sentence not clear. **To re-word**	Will be re-worded
19	4.8.1 CE conclusions	The Community empowerment component, although highly visible and praised by all stakeholders in the Hill Tracts, is characterized by the opacity of its actual expenditures, results and impacts	Sentence not consistent. Impact was positively assessed. 'Opacity of expenses' is ambiguous. **To modify.**	Agreed to modify, although we think it is possible that opacity and praise is possible at the same time.
20		The idea of starting another program with the same communities- i.e.to group them in new entities – implies to maintain the same level of activities	Not clear. **To re-word**	Agreed. Will be re-worded
21	4.8.2	• Seek progress on land issues at local levels, for example by linking up with Bandarban HDC initiatives (to secure lands for a mix fruits gardening project	Good suggestion! However issues related to land largely considered the crux of CHT and its people, and especially the impact on activities, particularly under CE, has not been assessed enough. This is the same for other issues involving security, displacement, use of forest areas, presence of armed forced, extortions, mobility, diffidence to external intervention, ect. Information on the impact of these forces over community, smooth implementation of activities, development in general, and capacity of the project to adapt could have been particularly useful for the purpose of the report.	We reviewed the report and adjusted texts if and where needed in the context, the confidence building or the risks and assumptions chapter. We see these issues mainly as belonging to risks and assumptions. The design assumes a status quo, i.e. the continuation of a not favourable situation. We fully understand the complications for sector components which based their approach on the local situation and the unfavourable status quo. The report has argued that the project's approaches, although not all sustainable, are relevant in the CHT context, which of course includes all the issues mentioned. It also argued that the project would have done well to tailor its component approaches to various environments and scenarios within the CHT, which also includes differences in security, land access, forest use, mobility, extortion, etc.

B. COMMENTS FROM UNDP/CHTDF and REPLIES BY THE MISSION

GENERAL COMMENTS FROM UNDP/CHTDF	Mission Replies
• The general conclusions and recommendations do not reflect the content of the evaluation report and hence do not seem to be balanced.	The mission has reviewed and revised the text where necessary
• There are extreme swings from very positive comments to very negative comments which make the report difficult to judge.	This roughly reflects how the mission sees the project, not as black or white or only grey, but black, white and grey.
• Where there appears to be a weight of evidence supporting both positive and critical analyses, the evaluators have consistently chosen the critical analyses without always substantiating their choices. This might pose questions about the extent to which the evaluation mission approached this work objectively.	The mission has dealt with the project objectively, hence both the positive and negative comments. There are however instances of injudicious language use that gave some statements a too subjective ring. This comment is further dealt with on a case by case basis, based on detailed comments.
• The CHTDF management certainly welcome the identification of areas for the projects further development, but also wish to underline the very serious efforts underway to address these.	Efforts underway have been mentioned. If any important efforts were missed out and have been listed under detailed comments, these have as yet been included.
• Maybe there has been a missed opportunity here for serious strategic discussion. It was noted that there was a reluctance by the evaluators to engage in serious discussion on strategic issues with the management team. It was almost as if the 2006 recommendations were the final say on anything of a strategic nature and anything that deviated was automatically wrong.	The mission disagrees with this assessment. There maybe was not enough serious strategic discussion, but that was not because the mission was reluctant. The mission has continuously raised serious strategic issues, and this includes the non-implementation of the most important 2006 recommendations: baseline and monitoring, technical assessments and expertise, exit strategies and sustainability. Maybe all of us were too busy to provide or find out facts and data on which to base conclusions. The fact that the mission has repeated some of its 2006 recommendations, is just because these are still valid and also because the project has not come with reasons why they should be rejected. Other 2006 recommendations were not repeated; not because the project objected to them but because the mission thought they were less relevant in 2009.
• There appears to be confusion over the role of QIFs in relation to community empowerment and economic development. This is not a	The mission is fully aware that the QIFs are instruments for both community empowerment and economic development.

matter of either/or, but rather both.	
• For education and health, we agree with most of the conclusions and recommendations – hence few comments.	-
• Unspecific and unsubstantiated feedback, such as gossip or off the cuff comments, are not helpful and can be very misleading and tend to undermine the credibility of the evaluation.	We agree that remarks that cannot be substantiated should be left out and we have adjusted the text accordingly. Maybe it was an expression of regret that we were not able to check out some of the feedback from individuals within and outside the project. We disagree that these were all gossip or off the cuff remarks.
• The interpretation of data in the report is often wrong or misleading.	We kindly disagree. See further discussion on interpretations wherever contested by UNDP in detailed comments below.
• Whereas we recognise the weakness of the monitoring system, we do not agree that this reflects a general weakness of the management system or the project as a whole. The issues of monitoring are being rigorously addressed but will not be completely in place until the first quarter of next year. The project has had a monitoring unit in place. The management team did not feel that the unit delivered adequately, which is why the issue is being addressed again. The evaluation team was briefed about this, more than once.	As stated in the report, the mission thinks monitoring should not depend on the presence or quality of one unit, but on engagement by management and all individual units. Many projects in the past have shown that without such unit they can formulate good logframe indicators and that they can monitor and report adequately against these.
• Stopping expansion in a delicate situation such as that in CHT is not an option.	1. Our recommendation has been unfortunately truncated in the report. As stated in earlier formulations and discussions, it was meant to be temporary, i.e. until the project had sorted out its problems 2. As stated elsewhere in the report, the project is not alone in the CHT and can solve certain issue through alliance, cooperation and coordination 3. As stated elsewhere, the project should anyhow justify, map, assess and prioritise para expansion

Chapter-wise comment by CHTDF/UNDP

Re	Section / Page	Quote from draft report	Comments by UNDP	Reply by evaluators
1	2.1.1 Mission Activities	*"The Paras, schools, clinics and groups were initially all proposed by the project. When the proportion of PDCs with project awards and A-rankings appeared too high, the mission requested from Bandarban onwards to increase the number of other PDCs and to include few PDCs visited during the 2006 evaluation."*	A variety of standards of PDC and of schools were selected for the evaluation team. Also, the evaluation team was facilitated to visit any PDC they wished. The sentence suggests a bias in the selection of PDC's, which is unfair. We request this sentence to be re-worded positively e.g **The evaluation team was facilitated to visit any school or PDC that they requested.**	**Will be reworded**. The teams always adjusted whenever we had specific requests. We think however there was certainly a bias towards well-performing PDCs, at least in our first district, but certainly not out of fear that we might discover bad things or so, probably more out of pride about what went well. We often felt that the team was just doing what it was used to do when it received other visitors (GoB, donors, politicians).
2	2.1.2 Evaluation Environment	*"The Phase III project logframe was incomplete for some sectors and other components had not been elaborated (SMART-ened) after the 2006 evaluation mission-facilitated start. The situation strongly confirmed the impression of the 2006 evaluation that for UNDP a logframe is only a type of hoop through which to jump to get donor funding and which can be generally forgotten once funding is obtained and activities started."*	CHTDF is working and reporting against a number of different logframes, including UNDP and the EC. The last report submitted against the EC logframe was sent mid 2009. CHTDF recognise the challenges of multiple logframes and set up a special Planning and Monitoring unit staffed with international as well as national staff at the end of 2008 In April 2009 CHTDF has been preparing a new composite log-frame for the extension period 2009-2013 for all components of the project – the final log-frame will be ready end January 2010. Whereas CHTDF recognises shortcomings in the planning and M&E processes the statement about being "a hoop…" is unsubstantiated. **In view of the above we recommend the sentence be re-written.**	**Will be reworded.**

Re	Section / Page	Quote from draft report	Comments by UNDP	Reply by evaluators
3.	2.1.2 Evaluation Environment	*The logframe attached is…………..*	No logframe was attached to the draft report.	Has been as yet attached.
4	2.1.2 Evaluation Environment	*"The Dhaka-based managers do not always have correct information about field realities, notably about PNDG monitoring and PDC control over their bank accounts."*	There is no added value in Senior managers micro-managing PDC bank accounts. Managers are all well aware of PDC control over accounts. **We are unsure what a Dhaka based manager is. The only senior manager with a Dhaka based function is the Deputy Director who is also in charge of Dhaka office. All senior managers work between all four major offices regardless of "duty station".** **Suggest comment either be dropped or explained – it cannot be left as it is; suggesting, although not openly saying, that the Dhaka managers (??) do not know what is going on. A statement that would be refuted by all managers and staff on CHTDF.**	**Will be reworded**. "Dhaka-based" was not a correct term. We referred to replies by senior staff that: - PNDG monitoring was done, while it was not. - PDCs could spend Tk 5000 without CHTDF approval, while several district staff said it was not allowed (without any reference to it being meant as temporary measure, as explained later by CE managers) - PDCs could avail freely of funds and income from a QIA once this was completed, while several district staff said this was not the case These were all important enough, if not crucial, sustainability/gender policy issues for relevant senior staff to know about.
5	4.3 Community Empowerment Design Relevance	*"Coordination and supervision of activities on one hand, problem shooting on the other hand, dominate the management system, leaving very little room to bottom up planning, participation, information sharing and debates on local results, impacts and alternative strategies."*	CHTDF spends a great deal of time in the field, meeting with communities to ensure that participation is central to the project, and working with local leaders in both formal and informal community and governance structures to maintain the project's relevance. **If the evaluators cannot justify this statement with facts then it should be**	**Will be dropped. Sentence to be redrafted.**

Re	Section / Page	Quote from draft report	Comments by UNDP	Reply by evaluators
			dropped	
6	4.3 Community Empowerm ent Design Relevance	*"Economic benefits and the creation of self reliant communities are now seen by the project as long term and not immediate objectives; they are not under control of the project."*	Two different statements in one sentence – **the latter of which needs to be clarified and then justified.** The QIF has achieved its objective in as far as it has achieved a quick peace dividend. CHTDF has spent the last 10 months on the design of technical inputs into the agricultural activities of the QIF's and have raised considerable resources to implement it**.** **CHTDF sees economic benefits as a long term aim and has taken pro-active steps to address it.**	**Agreed. Will be redrafted**
7	4.3 Community Empowerm ent Design Relevance	*"…the most common QIF-sectors (livestock, horticulture), while it has always assessed the government technical abilities and extension messages inadequate for the CHT. Line Department feasibility studies are rubber stamp exercises."*	Experience of CHTDF is that line departments do not rubber stamp our exercises. This statement needs to be proved – not just stated. If the evaluation team had read the design for farmer field schools which was prepared by UNDP over a 10 month period they would realise that active steps are being taken to strengthen the line agencies. **The statement regarding line agencies needs to be proved or deleted.**	**Will be redrafted** to reflect that we have not done a CHT-wide assessment of feasibility studies nor have discussed with CHTDF whether the few seen were representative for the whole CHT.
8	4.3	*"Several times the management has expressed that technical feasibility and*	Neither UNDP nor CHTDF have expressed that work quality is not important – the	Agreed. Inaccurate formulation: the UNDP and CHTDF remarks did not refer to work quality, and

Re	Section / Page	Quote from draft report	Comments by UNDP	Reply by evaluators
	Community Empowerment Design Relevance	*work quality are not important as the end result of confidence justifies all activities."*	statement quoted is untrue. This sentence does not do justice to a complex argument regarding the balance between speed of delivery in a post conflict setting as against time spent in perfecting technical quality. UNDP very clearly holds that the project is aimed at confidence building. To presume from this statement that other aspects of the project are not important is a gross distortion of the truth and does not deserve to be part of an "objective" evaluation report. **This sentence should be deleted as it does not reflect the complexity of the issue which was discussed.**	"not important" should have been "less important". **Will be reworded.** We do not have meeting minutes(and therefore no proof), but our own meeting notes show that UNDP and CHTDF stated that technical aspects and feasibility were less important and mistakes unavoidable because the project had to deliver peace dividend for numerous PDCs in a short time. The mission thought this was a valid approach in 2006, but not anymore after five years of implementation with PDCs.
9	4.3 Community Empowerment Design Relevance	*"The very high increase of committees formed (3872, i.e. 235% of the target) is not emphasized by the project, although the subsequent amount of work is considerable for project staff at para level: committees' formation, training, financial and managerial back up, monitoring, and reporting."*	Project does not have staff at para level. This expansion has been facilitated by increased 38 CFs in 2008 and 63 CFs in 2009. **The evaluation remarks should be re-written.**	**Agreed.** The mission saw both UNDP- and NGO-staff as project staff, but will formulate more accurately. We assume this overshooting of targets will have had reasons and consequences for staff and management, but we have not had data and time enough to assess this properly.
10	4.4.1 Expenditures	*"Until 2006, due to miscoding, "Operations" was used as a dumping ground for bad coding, which means, that at 35% of total expenditure, it is the largest single component."*	This statement is incorrect. All the expenditure in the project was reported in the ATLAS project 11503 until end of Dec 08, but from Jan 09, this ATLAS project is used to record only operations related expenses.	**Agreed. Will be reworded.**

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			There are advantages and disadvantages as to having one or 8 projects in Atlas. It was decided in 2009 that on balance it is advantageous, mainly for reporting reasons, to have 8 Atlas projects hence the original project was retained for only operations. "Dumping ground" is emotive and inaccurate and should not be used. **This statement is misleading and needs to be re-written or dropped.**	
11	4.4.1 Expenditures	*"Although PNDGs are managing 2.3 million Euros, these groups do not access the same level of inputs from the project as PDCs.* *A critical tool for empowerment, a separate bank account has been skipped."*	There is a misunderstanding here – A PDC is composed of one woman and one man from each household. However, with the objective of ensuring control over the resources by women, and where there is a PNDG, communities cannot withdraw funds without a PNDG signature, which is automatically a woman. It should also be noted that apart from the regular trainings, the women (PDC & PNDG) are provided additional trainings e.g. PNDG management, leadership, refresher on basic bookkeeping & financial management. In addition to these special trainings, CHTDF has ensured the continued regular savings in the name of women members. **These sentences are misleading and should be reworded**	**Disagreed** UNDP's response does not correspond to the point, which is clear in the report. *1. the fact that " communities can not withdraw funds without a PNDG signature" only confirms that there is only one bank account for both committees projects.* *2 PNDGs training sessions do not appear in the data provided by CHTDF. The evaluation mission only knows they took place from interviews with PNGOs staff.* We have added elsewhere: PNDGs executives have been trained in management, leadership, financial management, but PNDGs training sessions do not appear in the annual surveys.
12	4.4.1 Expenditur	*"Communities projects replicated instead of diversified."*	This is not viewed as a problem by CHTDF, but the sentence is a negative way at looking at a normal situation.	The report does not criticise here, nor indeed does it argue here in favour or against diversification. It just observes how the project

Re	Section / Page	Quote from draft report	Comments by UNDP	Reply by evaluators
	es		Communities tend not to copy each other, however, their needs, environments and potentials are often similar and they choose projects to match their needs, skills and potentials. **If the evaluators want to say that PDCs choosing similar projects is a problem then this needs to be justified.**	has found economies of scale. In theory gambling all on few horses can of course pose a risk, but that can only be assessed by proper feasibility study.
13	4.4.2 Available Resources and Technical Expertise	*"Up to 27% of interviewed PDC members in e.g. Bandarban consider their QIF project a failure, while 21% don't know (yet)."*	"Up to 27%" is not understood. It either is 27% or its not. This is only for Bandarbhan (the most isolated of the 3 districts). The figure for the other 2 districts should also be quoted. 27% not successful is a disappointing figure. 21% do not know yet because their projects are not finished. Why not say this in an objective way i.e – **In Bandarbhan district 52% of members see positive success whilst 21% are still in the process of implementation and 27% consider it a failure**	**Disagreed**. This sentence should be read in context, which is the risk of disempowerment and the importance of technical assistance and assessment. The figure is only given to emphasise that this risk might concern 100's of PDCs in the whole CHT, even if assuming that Rangamati and Khagrachari will score much better than B'ban. The paragraph is not to assess what the evaluation mission assesses to be the level of success and failure. Data for such statements are lacking. Moreover, for proper evaluation we would need a target or indicator to evaluate against, and such is not available. As for other districts, we only found these unprocessed data in a large file received from B'ban, on one of its many worksheets. We were not aware of such data from other districts. *Note 1: while again checking the table provided by CHTDF Bandarban, an error was found. The totals didn't add up: not 61% but actually 54% of PDC-ers find their QIA a success, 25% a failure and 21% don't know or were absent. See Annex 6. *Note 2: Also we actually incorrectly represented the "don't know yet" category, as this is actually

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				the "didn't answer (don't know/absent)" category. It is important that the project assesses what these terms actually mean, in order to see whether that 21% can be proportionately divided between success and failure or that all still could be added to either side.
				*Note 3: In future such assessments better include categories in between success and failure to catch the greys between the black and the white.
14	4.4.2 Available Resources and Technical Expertise	*"50% of QIF interventions find less than 50% members satisfied with the result."*	**Please clarify how you have reached this conclusion. Since in an earlier statement (see point 13) you report that less than 27% of interviewed PDC members considered the QIF project a failure.** **This sentence needs to be reworded - Overall 52% of the PDC members in Bandarban are satisfied, 27% are not satisfied and 21% haven't formed an opinion yet. The latter group most likely don't know, because the activity has just started and it is too early to comment.**	**Disagreed.** Confusion arose because it should have read "intervention types". The whole remark can be omitted to avoid confusion. This statement was completely different from the previous. This one looks at the number of all intervention types and assesses how many of those interventions had higher than 50% satisfaction levels (PDC member says "successful") We however see that this statement should also have been reworded to be more fair to CHTDF as it does not take in to account that this % will decrease once the "didn't answer"-ers will speak out. The percentage will probably be around 25-30% of QIF intervention types.
15	4.5 Community Empowerment Effectiveness	*Table 2 – PDC Assets vs Investment, 2008 situation (in Euros)*	If indeed it is 'impossible to get accurate data' (4.4.1) then how was this table compiled and does the analysis compare PDCs at the same position in the project cycle? Additionally, was cash in PDC bank accounts considered as an Asset? **Needs clarification.**	**Will be clarified.** a) This table was compiled from the CHTDF annual surveys; these concentrate on support (funds, skills training) which reach communities, and constitute only a fraction of the project expenditures. Other project expenditures, such as project staff salaries, transport costs, contracts etc. are impossible to get precisely due

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				to the accounting system.
				b) As per the title, this table shows the sum of all PDCs who received at least one QIF instalment. Other tables disaggregate results per year of PDC formation.
				c) The CHTDF survey does not check bank documents. "Cash return" refers to amounts written by PDCs in their books and do not specify whether in hand or in bank.
16	4.5 Community Empowerment Effectiveness	*"According to the 2008 annual survey, the most recent data collection exercise, the majority of PDCs who received funds between 2004 and 2008 had not enjoyed any return at the end of 2008."*	This contradicts point 13 above where the majority of PDC's felt their projects a success – furthermore - majority of PDCs did receive return, as shown in Figure 2 of the report. Additionally, it is unclear whether the data you are using in your table includes PDCs in the early stages of the Project Cycle. It is not expected that these PDCs would have received any return on their investment. Perhaps the evaluators referred to "cash" return of the community projects. If it is true, in that case, there should not be general remarks on project return. The evaluators should give specific reference of the type of projects that got cash returns. There are many projects which are not income generating projects (i.e. solar, school etc.) or the projects that do not give a quick return – e.g. cow rearing projects (at least 2 years), fruits garden (at least 5 years).	**Will be reworded.** a) This text does not necessarily contradict the earlier statement, as projects can be considered a success while only yielding returns in future. There are however indeed many contradictions in the CHTDF data that should be studied further by the project. b) Agreed. There is a contradiction. Khagrachari is the most successful, with 355 PDCs having return against 311 having no return. In total the numbers are almost equal. 51% having no return, cf; additional calculations below c) Agreed. This was the point made in the following paragraphs: "In the long run the picture will improve as the unsold PDC assets should normally fetch higher than the original buying prices, even .... 90% of assets are in form of cattle, meant to bring returns. Note: Judging by the project data, the majority are older projects.

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			This should be clarified or re-written.	
17	4.5 Community Empowerment Effectiveness	*"The focus on the poorest HHs was not an objective during project implementation, although all staff members who participated in the 2006 Logframe exercise mentioned it."*	PDC guidelines clearly specify that 1/3 of PDC executive committee members must be the poorest HHs. The savings rates are also based on the poorest ability to contribute. This statement is not correct as it is an objective for implementation. **Maybe the evaluation felt it was not strong enough – in which case this sentence needs to be reworded.**	Agreed. Will be reworded
18	4.5 Community Empowerment Effectiveness	*"However, as local extortionists will remain active, the project might never be able to hand-over the bank accounts to the PDCs."*	This contradicts later statements where UNDP is accused of not releasing PDCs to manage their own bank accounts. This is a complex and dynamic conflict environment where one model does not fit all. **This could be reworded simply by saying "In some areas it may not be possible to hand over bank accounts….**	Agreed. Will be reworded
19	4.5 Community Empowerment Effectiveness	*"CHTDF has deepened the gap between men women to large extents: in Bandarban alone 5550 more men than women have acquired skills which are critical to the PDCs (financial management for PDC exec. members, PDC management, monitoring and evaluation, organizational leadership)."*	This statement is probably inaccurate as often the same people attend different trainings (the leaders of PDC's and PNDG will attend many types of trainings). Purely in terms of numbers of people trained the CHTDF figures show that 40% of trainees are women. This is not ideal, and we are working to achieve parity. However, in a largely patriarchal society, this is not going to be achieved immediately; in such a context, achieving 40% is a solid achievement to continue	a) Agreed . The number of men and women who were trained during a specific year is indeed not known. The number 5550 will be deleted. However the point in general remains true. b) there is no base line for this or a comparison with other development organisations in the area, but we will acknowledge the 40% and the men attending gender training. c) This is inaccurate. As per the title of the table, percentages refer to the proportion of women among trainees. For example, in Bandarban, 1525 women attended the

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			building upon. (which is certainly not ideal but is being actively addressed by CHTDF) Different trainings produce different results and for this reason, making conclusions based on cumulative figure of many trainings is misleading. As for example in PDC/PNDG training (i) 72% of women received leadership training, (ii) 56% of men received gender training, (iii) 49% of women received the entrepreneurship training. **The sentence is too exaggerated and needs rewording**	Women leadership training, a small part of all women in the project (2or 3 per PDC/PNDG), but a large part of all the trainees (72%).
20	4.6 Community Empowerment impact	*"QIF: quick disbursement for slow impact on economic development"*	This could be expressed less sarcastically and more fairly described as: **Quick disbursement had a positive effect on stabilisation and confidence building but a slower effect on economic development in remote locations where the cash economy is limited and where interactions with markets has also been limited.**	**Agreed. Will be reworded.** Whether there are differences between accessible and remote areas we do not know, and we suggest that the project itself analyses the data for differences between remote and accessible areas.
21	4.6 Community Empowerment impact	*"Most CEP communities are experiencing positive social development; cohesiveness is higher than before in most paras."*	Bearing in mind this finding, it is difficult to understand the negativity of this section of the report.	Few remarks: - We hope that removal of formulations experienced as sarcastic or exaggerated has also removed the sense of negativity - If not, then we find negativity a too exaggerated term. The mission has gone out of its way to find data and to analyse

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				data and found a mixed bag of results: indications of positive empowerment results and of disappointing economic results.
				- Neither project nor we are able to indicate how positive these results are (1cm or 1 km?) and how this compares to other development actors in absence of baseline and monitoring. We regret once more if disappointment with the project's inability to assess and proof assumed results showed too much in our writings.
22	4.6 Community Empowerment Impact	Unnumbered table on page 27	These positive findings contradict many of the evaluation assessments that suggest a lack of impact. **Findings such as this need to be reflected in the general conclusions at the end of the report.**	**Disagreed. The text has been elaborated.** The mission has clearly distinguished between economic and other impacts. Moreover, the mission has not indicated a "lack of impact"; it has only referred to lack of economic impact as per expectations (documents/ indicators) and to lack of proof for many other impacts. Conclusions will be reworded to highlight this more strongly. See further the reply to comment 21 above.
23	4.6 Community Empowerment Impact	*General TEXT*	The evaluator mentioned very clearly that *"Most CEP communities are experiencing positive social development; cohesiveness is higher than before in most paras."* This is the most important and remarkable progress of the Project. – **but this is not reflected in the general findings of the report** Evaluators seem to suggest that QIF would	a) See reply to comment 21 and 22 b) The evaluators disagree with this statement about the "achievement." The need for water supply was acknowledged by communities long ago but the project strategy was to start by generating income and meet these needs once regular incomes can make water projects sustainable. c) Linkage: Yes the new connectedness is

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			be sufficient for a community to solve all their problems. The achievement of the QIFs is that communities have a better understanding on their needs (as for instance need for safe water supply). Part of these needs can be achieved by QIF and profits generated through QIF activities. But much more important is to facilitate the linkage of the communities with other service providers (government, NGOs). Water supply is considered by many communities as a high priority, but instead of using their own funds to realize this, they are aiming to get support from the government to get this done.

Evaluators mention that the gap between poor and rich households has been decreased or has stayed stable at least. This does not correspond with the opening paragraph, where it is stated that no changes have taken place. | important. The mission fully understands that QIF/QIA is a tool to achieve different objectives

d) Gap: This statement refers to personal assessment made by CFs who filled the questionnaires. No or positive changes in most PDCs, negative changes in maybe 10% PDCs. This assessment is positive although the project did not take systematic step to achieve it such as baseline, participatory monitoring, or question in annual surveys. The mission in such short visits was of course not able to evaluate this well, but has heard evidence of all three cases (no/positive/ negative) from resource persons. |
| 24 | 4.8.2

Community Empowerment recommendations | *"Enforce participatory monitoring for results (so far training did not make this happen)"* | 'Enforce' is not a word used in the same sentence as 'participatory'.

Suggest – "Facilitate participatory monitoring". | **Agreed.**

Will be reworded |
| 25 | 4.8.2

Community Empowerment recommendations | *"Ensure women access to all project resources and benefits, including incomes and influence on decision making, with simple community monitoring system of gender equality."* | We agree - this has always been our aim. | - |

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26	5.2.2 Economic Development Funds, human resources and operations	*"Contrary to other components, this component or the project as a whole does not have any senior national or international sector experts (except a short-term cultural industries consultant)."*	Incorrect – this component had a senior technical advisor who started in April 2008 and subsequently left in 2009 - a replacement is currently being sought. ICIMOD was also considered to be an "expert" organisation for economic development. (All sectors have international experts – health, education, capacity building and economic development) **This sentence should be deleted**	**Agreed**. Will be reworded. The mission indeed knew that there had been an expert and that ICIMOD had been involved as expert organisation. It had also been informed that UNDP had difficulty hiring a replacement.
27	5.8 Economic development in Phase IV	*"The project intends to run ED through the CE component, also because it was unable to hire an own economic development expert to run the component.*	The reason to run Ed through CE is based on the need to better maximise the use of QIFs. Merging of Ed and CE has lead to a closer integration of community mobilizing, technical support and marketing support The project is well able to hire economic development experts and has done so and will continue to do so. The sentence should read **"The project is running the ED component through CE so as to improve the economic impact of the QIFs**."	**Will be reworded.** It is not important enough, but we were certainly informed at one time that the inability (delays) to hire an economic expert had influenced the decision to merge. We certainly agree that the merger has, besides risks, also very positive sides, much in line with our recommendations that ED should be based firstly on CE QIAs.
28	5.8 Economic development in Phase IV	*However, as the CE-team lacks expertise and is very much focused on implementing QIFs for a very high number of PDCs, it is likely that ED will again not receive the required attention and expertise."*	The project has appointed experts in agriculture, livestock, fisheries and marketing and will be appointing national and international experts in economic development (the management does not accept that experts need to be international)	**Will be reworded.** The district agri/fish/liv/ED experts were not yet in place during the evaluation and were understood to work for the DANIDA and AFSP project. The mission was not to evaluate the new

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			This could be reworded to say – "**the project design for farmer field schools will give greater technical input to the use of the QIFs and is an indication of the high value management place on long term economic development prospect of the Qifs."**	projects' designs, but as expertise problems were said to be solved through these new projects, it was unavoidable to get an idea whether these projects might solve the mentioned problems. The mission felt that the CE management (Chief Impl., Cluster Manager) was already overworked with CE QIFs and that for the direction of ED an extra more senior manager-level staff was required. The remark might also have been influenced by the feeling that the concerned projects' designs do not provide the requiring continuous specific senior expertise required by the farmer field schools approach, which is a very specific approach. Inputs for a number of days per year from ASPS-II experts on share basis will not be enough. There is a risk that extension will remain a series of conventional extension meetings, but be called FFS. Moreover ASPS-II/FFS is extension focused, and will not cover all expertise requirements for livestock, fisheries, and value chain development.
29	5.9.2 Economic development recommendations 3. Food security	*"Ensure that DANIDA and EC Food security projects are based on thorough sub-sector analyses and work with senior experts at project and district level."* *"Ensure that the influx of new QIFs from DANIDA and EC Food security projects (and ADB) does not undermine empowerment and economic development achievements."*	The EC food security and the DANIDA grants are not QIFs - they are clearly economic development grants with a different design and different concept. **Recommend this sentence be deleted** as it confuses the purpose of the Danida grant – which is technical upgrading through farmer field schools and investment grants for agriculture activities	**Not agreed**. The mission thinks the QIFs and new projects' grants will in practice not differ much, except for more consistent and competent accompanying extension activities. The need to assess the feasibility of any intervention remains important. CHTDF has a big enough task to increase quality of its already started CE QIAs and empowerment, to voice concern about an extra workload and extra activities in the same villages

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			– and this cannot be argued to undermine economic development achievements.	with the same staff. This is of course not impossible, but the mission is entitled to suggest this delicate task should be done with care.
30	6.5 Education effectiveness	*"In undertaking the development of Multi Language Education, the project has used scripts developed by third parties for what had previously been exclusively oral cultures."*	Scripts were not invented but developed with the full participation of the indigenous groups involved.	The sentence does not suggest scripts were invented or invented without participation. We could have written this para with more detail, but we lacked an overview of all languages and who developed the script, who developed the teaching materials, and with what/whose financial support.
31	6.5 Education effectiveness	*"One would however expect that e.g. developing Khumi MLE material would have priority over that of Chakma and Bawm (column d), and that Khumi and Mro, who have very low levels of education, would constitute much higher proportions of CHTDF student beneficiaries than of the CHT population(column g=e/f)."*	The project is not yet working in Khumi areas but is in the process of expanding into them and will develop MLE material at that time. **Suggest rewording – Quick affirmative action to incorporate other minority languages for MLE materials (Khumi and Mro) would be appropriate.**	**Disagreed.** The education component works in Unions and Upazilas, notably Thanchi Upazila, where most Khumi live. E.g. the education component works in Khumi inhabited Taracha Union, Rowangchari Uz, and in Bolipara Union, Thanchi Uz, where the mission visited Hoitan Khumi para. The CHTDF list of schools includes at least one Khumi schools, i.e. Co Aung Khumi Para Community Primary School. In B'ban 2% of beneficiaries is Khumi.
32	6.8.2 Education recommendations	*"The project should strengthen its data collection; it should establish for each present and future school catchment the population, the school age children's population, presently available schools, present ethnicity- and gender disaggregated enrolment rates. These data should guide the targeting and intervention design and be the basis for simple though comprehensive monitoring system on trends in enrolment, drop-out or absenteeism."*	This criticism is valid and the design for phase III has already taken this into account.	-

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33	7.6 health Impact	*"The project has no baseline or monitoring system that allows it to make any statements on impact."*	The criticism is valid and contracts are currently under process to establish baseline data. **It would be fair to say 'the project has been slow to establish their baseline studies which are only now being contracted**….*"*	The same chapter already mentions that new baseline data collection is being commissioned
34	10.1 Confidence building – conclusions and recommendations	*"The lack of detailed plans, monitoring and expenditure reports make it impossible to find out why this component has spend more than its budget while its most costly subcomponents (land, forestry, refugees) did not even start."*	The project reports annually on expenditure in line with the EC Phase III budget and reports annually on activities and outputs achieved in line with the EC logframe. In the most recent report provided to the EC in September 2009, the actual expenditure reported for Confidence Building was 518,101 against an approved budget of 1,573,500. The EC budget has not been exceeded. The total confidence building budget includes funds from other sources, and has activities not included in the EC Phase III budget. **This sentence is inaccurate and needs to be reworded.**	**Agreed and corrected.** The available reports will be assessed again and text adjusted accordingly.
35	10.1 Confidence building – conclusions and recommendations	*"The project has no contingency plans and budgets in place for if new Peace Accord-related opportunities arise."*	This statement is untrue. There is constant engagement, facilitated by CHTDF, of the diplomatic community in the CHT affairs which ensures a quick and flexible response to events. This statement contradicts with the earlier statement in the section 8.8.2, which is: "*The conditions for effective assistance to*	Will be reworded to incorporate any new information. The second quote confirms that the mission is aware of the project's efforts within the donor community. The statement that the project is exploring support does not contradict the absence of contingency plans and budgets. Especially support to the land commission would

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			peace accord implementation have not been fulfilled yet, but the situation appears to be changing and the project is exploring support to existing developments with regard to land and refugees." **One of these two sentences will have to be deleted.** **Budgets are available (CHTDF is not only funded by EC. UNDP funds are used for this component as also are CIDA funds.)**	probably be a large, costly, long-duration undertaking, e.g. because of the probably required incentives for people to start new lives either in CHT or outside. Contingency plans and budgets for different scenarios will prepare the project for the future
36	10.1 Community empowerment Conclusions and recommendations	*"After three to five years CHTDF, most PDCs are not yet ready to continue on their own, but at the same time capabilities and independence do not seem to increase with continued engagement by CHTDF."*	This statement is not fully supported by the data in Figure 3 on page 20 in section 4.5. And also Figure 4. **Statements need to be consistent with body of report**	We changed "**most**" to "**many**" to be safe. We have also adjusted the main text and the conclusions to reflect that available data, findings and project statements have been confusing in this regard. We suggest that the project more clearly formulates its indicators for independence and being ready. a. Many PDCs cannot act independently yet b. The project says it cannot leave any PDC alone until they are strong enough to survive increased exposure to and integration with the rest of Bangladesh c. The PDCs have not been able/allowed to prove that they can independently manage their funds and bank accounts d. We have to compare relevant CFs' statements with our own observations on e.g. the PDCs where the CF still does the accounts
37	10.1	*"The project has taken steps to address sustainability issues, but as long as the*	This is technically wrong although the meaning of this sentence is probably	**Will be reworded.**

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	education Conclusions and Recommendations	*government and the PEDP do not have a CHT-specific or general tribal education plan, more effort is required to make community schools sustainable."*	correct. **Better to say "The government does have a tribal education plan, but little effort has been made by government to use it."**	We understand that the present plan is not a real plan but a set of principles. We will distinguish between the present and a full plan.
38	10.1 health Conclusions and Recommendations	*"The major visible impact is confidence building."*	This is probably not what the writer meant to say. **Might be better to say 'A major impact of the health component has been on building confidence…………**	**Will be reworded**
39	10.1 health Conclusions and Recommendations	*"Early effects on malaria might be mostly attributable to the free distribution of mosquito nets by BRAC/Global Fund."*	This statement might or might not be true and neither Global fund nor CHTDF can claim total credit. **Maybe better to say that "CHTDF, together with….. have had a major impact on the incidence of malaria.**	**Will be reworded.** "Mostly attributable": It is reasonable to assume that BRAC/GF would have also had a sizeable impact if CHTDF had not been there, while CHTDF might have had a much less sizeable impact if BRAC/GF had not been there. To learn lessons and give due credit to deserving projects, BRAC and CHTDF should compare figures for areas where CHTDF is yes/no working.
40	10.1 Overview of component evaluation	The unnumbered table in section 10.1	Table appears to be subjective as there is no indication of what criteria is being used. General comment on 'sustainability': this is marked low by the evaluations, however the emphasis on community-based service delivery is a very big sustainable factor. "Relevance for confidence building." Health is marked as moderate, but in the text it is referred to as a major contribution.	**Will be elaborated.** The whole report is in a way subjective, so also this table. The mission has done its best to be objective. Summarising results in a table is dangerous and is done to stimulate discussion rather than providing "final judgments". Text will be reworded to reflect this. The table is based on the relevant chapters. Community-based service delivery certainly increases the feasibility and sustainability, but

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			Evidence of inconsistency – table and text need to match	that is not enough to make it sustainable. Health confidence impact is rated as probably high, but because of the in-built sustainability problems the relevance to confidence building is rated as moderate. ED is the opposite, the design has potential, but the component has not delivered.
41	10.2 Conclusions on the project as a whole. 10.2.2 Sources of information	*"The project follows neither EC standards (logframe approach, project cycle management guidelines) nor UNDP standards (results-based management). Practically none of a long list of result indicators of the initial proposals is reported against."*	Project follows both EC and UNDP standards. However, there are a number of log frames to which the project is currently reporting and this is not an ideal situation. The project collects a vast amount of data but recognises that not all of this data is relevant to the EC. Equally the project recognises that the results reporting is weak. However, the project does and has reported against the EC approved logframe. **Sentence needs re-wording**	**Will be reworded to clarify.** The project has indeed reported against a logframe, although the mission is confused about which logframe this is. It was not amongst the seven project-level logframes that the mission is aware of. The indicators are moreover much less specific than those in any of the other logframes and concern more activity indicators (e.g. X people trained). The EC and UNDP standards concern the focus on results and reporting on results and a requirement for SMART result indicators. Reporting activities without results is regarded as not following the standards. The mission of course recognises the problems of the project, i.e. multiple donors and a Prodoc of many years ago, and will check whether sufficient recognition of this is given in the report.
42	10.2 Conclusions on the project as a whole. 10.2.2 Sources of	*"The monitoring in-charge was also reportedly not an M&E expert, but somebody that had come to UNDP for a very different function."*	To use the word "reportedly" is dangerous for an evaluator. If the evaluator wanted such information then he should have asked the project management. The person in charge of monitoring was recruited as per UNDP normal recruitment procedures. His CV shows a strong	**Sentence should not have been written and will be deleted.** The mission has not been able to evaluate the recruitment procedure and does not find it important enough to do so as yet.

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	information		monitoring background (his CV is on file and could easily have been checked.) and his interview showed the same. **This sentence needs to be deleted or substantiated**	
43	10.2 Conclusions on the project as a whole**.** 10.2.2 Sources of information	*"The fact that monitoring, learning lessons and self-improvement does not seem part of the culture and skill sets is also clear from the fact that only a fraction of the Evaluation 2006 recommendations (notably on monitoring and CE improvements) were implemented, while the reasons for this have not been documented."*	Learning lessons and self improvement when compared with following or not following the evaluation 2006 is not a logical conclusion. The project set up a Planning and Monitoring unit fully staffed with national and international staff. It failed to deliver and is currently be re-structured and re-staffed. Lessons learned from the pilot phases of health and education have been very carefully taken on board but are not reflected in these conclusions. **This sentence needs to be reworded to give a fair and balanced view**.	**Will be reworded to clarify and balance .** It should be noted that the mission did not equalise learning with "following the 2006 recommendations", but with "neither following nor documenting the reasons why". Besides, many of those recommendations were agreed upon by CHTDF in 2006 and are still valid and are still agreed by CHTDF-staff as per our 2009 consultations. We agree that CHTDF learns and applies lessons and that the health and education components are examples. The 2006 education recommendations were by the way "major focus on sustainability" (only partly addressed), education based on needs emerging from CE (only partly addressed; e.g. see remarks on Khumi and Mro MLE), and coordinate and synchronise with NGOs like GK and Koinonia (not evaluated whether this was addressed). We consider these all still valid.
44	10.2.3 Gender and environment	*"The fact that PNDGs are not properly supported and monitored and that CHTWON is still fragile, donor-led and not strategised, shows that more effort is required to ensure gender assessment and mainstreaming in each component."*	PNDGS were given extra support for capacity development, leadership skills and project management skills through various training programs. Most of the PNDGs are still young and at learning stage hence more time should be given before commenting on the success of	**Replies on PNDG comment is given under CE.** **CHTWON text will be reworded.**

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			PNDGs.	
			CHTWON is only 1 year old and it already has its own strategy and constitution and has achieved government registration which is a major achievement and a major strength.	
			We agree totally that more effort is needed, and will continue to be needed for the life of the project, but why express it so negatively?	
			Suggest rewording in a fairer and objective way and more practical recommendations given.	
45	10.2.3 Gender and environment	*"…and gender issues are still generally overlooked by CHTDF;"*	**This is untrue and hence needs to be either substantiated or deleted**	**Agreed. Will be reworded**
46	10.2.3 Gender and environment	*"NGO staff seems more responsive."*	CHTDF has put a lot of effort into gender sensitisation of our partners as well as ourselves**.** **To say that NGO's are more responsive needs to be substantiated or deleted.** **This sentence could just as easily have said "CHTDF has worked on gender sensitisation with partner NGO's and the NGO's show a high level of responsiveness."**	**Will be deleted**
47	10.2.5.2 Operations	*"The mission surmises that operations are indeed slow, but was unable to obtain and check relevant evidence and*	This is rather a broad statement to make without at least some effort to substantiate. We would welcome detail	**Will be reworded.** This was a difficult issue to deal with as a mission as it constituted a real problem, which

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		information, also because the time for a thorough assessment was lacking."	from the evaluation team, both to strengthen our own work, and also to ask the forthcoming internal audit to address. **It needs to have evidence or be deleted.**	was mentioned by several partners and also by team members, although only by one staff in public. Such complaints came to us mostly during the last weeks. Checking was not feasible anymore, and more something for a performance audit. Leaving it out at the other hand, would leave a crucial issue out. We will rephrase to recommend the project to inventory of problems and suggestions for improvement. The term "surmises" refers to the likeliness of some of the examples given by staff and partners, which fit in with experiences of evaluation team members with UN procedures.
48	10.2.5.2 Operations	*"It is ironic that UNDP requires such strict reporting from NGOs, while it is itself not well able to inform the donors what it has actually done and achieved and at which cost."*	UNDP global requirements in the accounting for funds disbursed through Direct Implementation are rigorous, and where partners are of uncertain capacity, this is a reasonable expectation. UNDP not able to inform donors? Where is the evidence for this and which donors are being referred to? Were donors consulted on the quality of reporting? **This needs substantiating – or maybe EC should be asked to comment**	**Will be reworded** We have deleted the remark about donors as both statement and wording diverted attention from the subject. The evidence included the inability of the project to provide the donor's evaluation mission with cumulative expenditures per component and donor, expenditures per activity, cumulative quantitative progress on intended activities, details on results. Comments by EC and CIDA on recent reporting did not seem to contradict this impression.
49	10.2.5.2 Operations	*Table 13 - Reimbursement Speed (feedback Bandarban and Rangamati NGO partners)* The NGOs felt they could not discuss improvements as it seemed	Is the evaluation team comparing like with like? Do they realise the complexity of contracting in a highly charged, political environment? This table does not reflect a true comparison between similar situations. I doubt if comments on "Daka managed	**Will be reworded.** The statement about Dhaka office must indeed be incorrect, as the concerned staff work part of the time in Rangamati. Maybe NGOs are not aware what happens where. Will be corrected and casual remarks deleted. It is not the contracting, but the reimbursement.

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		to concern the Dhaka office more than the offices in the CHT.	contracting" is true as the majority of contracting is processed in Rangamati office and we currently have observers from the Regional Council in stages of the contracting process. **Comments of strictness and slowness are appropriate but the table should be deleted and casual comments deleted unless substantiated with facts.**	For the NGOs, all working in a highly charged political situation, support from different donors/INGOs is comparable and we feel the table is useful to express NGOs' concerns.
50	10.2.5.3 Finance	*"CHTDF is also accused of being easy on money where it concerns its own operations."*	**This is a serious accusation and needs to be substantiated or deleted.** **Casual comments should not be used as if they are objective statements.**	**Will be reworded.** The remark has been made in a specific context (relations, image) that should not be left out. It concerns especially the refusal to increase NGO staff salaries at a time that CHTDF staff salaries were sharply hiked. CHTDF has informed the mission that it was a New York initiative, but that will not prevent certain NGO misgivings that might affect relations and image.
51	10.2.5.3 Finance	*"Attempts at financial data gathering led to much confusion and different data sets which again did not match the recent financial status report as submitted to EC to justify a no-cost extension (excluding health)."*	The EC No Cost Extension relates to the EC Phase III agreement. The summary financial tables provided by the project for donor wise expenditure relate to individual donors and not individual agreements. I.e. the total against the EC includes more than one EC agreement. Similarly the summary financial tables provided by the project for project wise expenditure relate to all project wise expenditure and not EC eligible project wise expenditure. It is therefore not possible to compare the financial data in these tables with the reports submitted to the EC, which report	**Will be rechecked and reworded.** The mission understands the complexity of the issue and the difference between total and EC-eligible expenditure. The comments show the difficulty the project has in providing relevant information to donors and evaluation missions. EC funds a multi-donor project, and what is funded by which donor and how this relates to the own contributions should be of concern for each donor.

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			against specific agreements, and only report against EC eligible activities. **Review or delete this comment**	
52	10.2.5.3 Finance	*"An audit, preferably one that includes office management, procurement and subcontract management as well as a carbon footprint audit, could provide more insight and ways to increase efficiency."*	Audit planned for early 2010. **This could have been better expressed by "UNDP will be auditing the project in early 2010 which will provide better insights......."**	**Will be reworded** to acknowledge the upcoming UNDP audit.
53	10.2.8 Sustainablity	*"The schools and health services would very probably vanish, and have hardly more chance if they could continue a few more years."*	**This is a very subjective statement and is not substantiated and should be deleted. It is also not consistent with the text on the health and education sectors in the evaluation report.**	**Will be reworded.** The newly used term "problems to continue" will for clinics and many schools until better GoB conditions and plans are in place, still mean "vanish". The project has not been able show how it would be otherwise. E.g. some 75% of schools might not get registration and many communities will not be able to fund continuation
54	10.2.9 Conclusions and Evaluation	*"Even if peace building is the overriding concern, the mission does not agree with CHTDF and UNDP management assertions that the details and weaknesses of individual components are less important than the overall peace building goal."*	UNDP/CHTDF maintain that the overriding concern is Peace Building. It cannot be presumed from that statement that individual components are not given extreme importance. The evaluation team should note the management structure of CHTDF whereby each component has its own management structure which comes together in the senior management team. Each component is judged separately and as part of the whole.	**Will be reworded.** This remark in no way suggests that individual components are not given extreme importance. It reflects the repeated CHTDF feedback during meetings that sector shortcomings were excusable because of the ultimate peace goal. If the project agrees that the technical soundness of QIAs as tools for confidence is just as important as the goal for which they are used, this remark can be withdrawn.
55	10.2.9 Conclusions and	*"Assuming that sector programmes are just tools for peace building, these tools still have to be relevant, efficient,*	Individual components contribute towards peace but it is also an input in its own right. **The statement is of course true but is it**	This is related to the remark above. We welcome the acknowledgement. The discussion about sector quality, technical expertise and technical

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	evaluation	*effective and sustainable. With bad tools peace will be at risk."*	**an evaluative statement of the project? If so it needs to be more clearly stated and substantiated. We can find nothing in the report on the sections related to health, education and capacity building that suggest "bad tools".**	assessments was to our memory always limited to CE QIAs and partly ED. (The remark has been shifted to the impact chapter)
56	11.1.1 CE Overall	*"1. Stop to expand to new PDCs and phase out capable PDCs. Liaise with other development actors to have them cover so far not covered paras."*	**This is not applicable in a conflict situation - the benefits of peace have got to be widely and equitably distributed.**	We regret that t**he report omitted in this section the words: "**till the project has sorted out its challenges". We have been clearer about this during debriefings. **For the rest disagreed The text will be elaborated.** **Conflict situation**: there are tensions, but it is a post-conflict situation, not a conflict situation. The fact that numerous other organisations can work in the same areas proves this. The fact that most activities by CHTDF and others do not concern emergency aid and peace building but regular development activities also proves this. **Urgency**: If the other deserving paras are impatiently waiting, they have been doing so for 5-6 years and one more year won't make a difference **Analysis/Justification**. The evaluation mission would have benefited from an analysis and map about where exactly CHTDF is working, who is covered by other programmes and who of the rest is most deserving, and who should be targeted because of strategic reasons (e.g. remote areas, Bengalis) **Only CHTDF can do this**? CHTDF was the first sizeable programme after CHTDB/ICDP, but it is not the first and only programme that can bring peace dividend to the people. Many others work

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				in the area and are appreciated by the people.
				CHTDF with its size and clout could easily play a role of facilitation and coordination among agencies and help other agencies to enter deserving areas.
				Risk IP-bias accusation? We understand that CHTDF can be accused of being too IP biased when Bengali villages are not covered, too.
				CHTDF can at the one hand easily explain the logic behind this, show how it reaches those other paras through e.g. health, and at the same time work in coalition with others, formalizing and openly showing its support for others working in those non-CE paras.
57	11.1.1 CE Overall	*"2. Discuss with ADB and DANIDA how to postpone/minimise their grants for unready PDCs. This will free up capacity in CEP to work on empowerment, quality, technical expertise, exit strategies, etc."*	Point is obvious, and no-one would give a grant to an unready PDC, unless that grant is able to help that PDC to develop. The Danida funds are for improving agricultural practices through technical inputs. **The sentence is technically wrong**	**Will be reworded**
58	11.1.1 CE Overall	*"6. Slow down fund-driven empowerment, refocus on overall empowerment, quality."*	**CHT is not practicing fund driven empowerment in the first place – the emphasis, as is shown in this evaluation report, has been on the institution building of PDC's not on the funds.**	**Sentence will be reworded.** The reworded sentence will reflect what we really meant: the project is advised to review the proportion of CE staff/resources spent on the QIF process vis-a-vis those spent on other empowerment aspects (e.g. gender, benefit distribution) and technical quality. At the same time the project is advised to review whether the pressure and approach of the QIF process has

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				affected empowerment of especially the weaker/less exposed PDCs
59	11.1.1 CE, Overall	*"8. Transition from management of contractors to mature partnerships with local NGOs and hold local NGOs to the same standards of compliance as UNDP holds itself towards EC."*	UNDP already takes its compliance to the EC just as seriously as we do to our NGOs.	**Will be reworded**. We will omit the unjustifiably inserted reference to UNDP-EC relations, and focus on CHTDF-NGO relations.
60	11.2.1 ED, Overall	*"11. Hire a consulting firm with South-east Asia, South Asia and value chain development expertise to make subsector analyses for each product presently promoted through CE and ED with full technical, economic, social, environmental analyses."*	Candidates with expertise in economic development amongst indigenous peoples is currently being sought.	IP-relevant expertise is important, but such technical expertise relevant to the type of area is even more important. The IP-expertise issue can be solved by putting technical experts under leadership with IP-expertise and IP-relevant conditions
61	11.3 Education	*"Establish and safeguard gains before further expansion."*	Process of expansion is already underway and a strategy is agreed and in place for the sustainability of the inputs. **This recommendation does not seem to reflect that of the main body of the evaluation**	**Will be elaborated** In absence of baselines and a review of what CHTDF actually achieves, expansion would run risks of reduced efficiency and effectiveness
62	11.7 Recommendations project as a whole	*"Design Issues: Decide whether CHTDF is a project or a facility (funding/policy)* *b) If project: shrink to manageable project"*	The project is manageable.	**Will be reworded.** We have the highest respect for the team and don't think the team can be improved much, except by adding some technical experts. We think that the problems noted derive from the project being too big and wide and demanding too wide a range of expertise to be feasible for a human team.
63	11.7 Recommendations project as a	*"45f.Coverage: Start collaborating with other development actors (ADB/CHTRDP, CHTDB, BRAC, others) to cover paras that expected*	This is an extraordinary comment. We're in the process of signing agreement with ADB for collaboration and have numerous agencies and other players in technical	**The word "start" will be replaced by "expand"** The emphasis is of course not on collaboration but on "*paras that expected CHTDF to come and*

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	whole	*CHTDF to come and where no one has worked there as yet. The notion that only through CHTDF development can be achieved should probably change to one that realises (see also the choice of pictures on front cover) that development happens already without CHTDF, and mostly through communities themselves."*	advisory committees. **This sentence could say that "continuing collaboration with other partners** ……	*where no one has worked as yet"*